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THE LABYRINTH OF ROYALTY AND MINERAL
INTERESTS- A SURVEY
By FRED A. DEERING, JR.
Fred A. Deering, Jr. received his
B.S. and LL.B. degrees from the
University of Colorado. While at
the University of Colorado College
of Law he served as Editor of the
Rocky Mountain Law Review and
was elected to The Order of the
Coif. He is a member of the Colo-
rado, Denver and American Bar
Associations, and a partner in the
Denver firm of Gorsuch, Kirgis,
Campbell, Walker and Grover.
With the decision in Simson v. Langholf,' Colorado joins those
oil producing states whose appellate courts have been required to
engage in the game of semantics and conjecture known as "the con-
struction of transfers and reservations of royalty and mineral fee
interests."'
Recognition in Colorado of an interest in minerals in place as an
estate in land separate and apart from the surface ownership com-
menced with Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Hanna,' and the doctrine has
become well entrenched through a series of decisions. 4 In Frank v.
Bauer5 and Pike v. Empfield,6 without attempting definition or dis-
cussion, the Colorado Court of Appeals impliedly recognized the
creation and existence of royalty interests in ore mined and pro-
duced. Pierce v. Marland Oil Co., dealth with overriding royalties on
Indian leases, the court pronouncing the "rents and royalties are
profits issuing out of the land."" It was not until the Simson case,
however, that an appellate court in Colorado was faced with the
necessity of construing a conveyance pertaining to an interest in
minerals, necessitating a judicial differentiation between royalty
and mineral in place.
The Simson case involved an action to quiet title in fee simple to
49 % of all the oil and gas underlying certain property in Jackson
133 Colo. 208, 293 P.2d 302 (1956). For discussions of this case see Note, 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev.
441 (1956); Discussion Note, 6 Oil and Gas Rep. 1011 (1956).
2 The Colorado Supreme Court thus joins its judicial brethren in the states of Alabama, Arkansas,
California, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, West Virginia and Wyoming.
873 Colo. 162, 214 Pac. 550 (1923).
4 Farrell v. Sayre, 129 Colo. 368, 270 P.2d 190 (1954), commented on in Note, 31 DICTA 278
(1954); Brown v. Kirk, 127 Colo. 453, 257 P.2d 145 (1953); Mitchell v. Espinosa, 125 Colo. 267, 243
P.2d 412 (1952); Calvat v. Juhan, 119 Colo. 561, 206 P.2d 600 (1949).
19 Colo. App. 445, 75 Pac. 930 (1903).
621 Colo. App. 161, 120 Pac. 1054 (1912).
,86 Colo. 59, 278 Pac. 804 (1929).
8 86 Colo. 63, 278 Pac. 807.
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County, Colorado, the interest in question having been created
under the terms of an "agreement" (although in reality a convey-
ance) which, after reciting a consideration in favor of the grantor
of 1% of all oil and/or gas produced, saved and marketed under a
United States oil and gas prospecting permit, "assigned and set
over" to the grantee, 49% of all oil and/or gas that may be pro-
duced, saved and marketed" from certain described lands. The
instrument was acknowledged before (and, it is interesting to note,
was also prepared by) the county clerk and recorder. The trial
court found the instrument to be ambiguous, permitting the intro-
duction of extrinsic evidence to show the intent and meaning of the
parties, and held the defendants were the owners of the property
involved in fee simple, subject to the right of the plaintiff, his heirs
and assigns, to 49% of any royalty payment the defendants might
receive by virtue of any oil and gas lease executed on the property.
The trial court further ruled that the plaintiff, the owner of the
conveyed interest, had no right, title or interest in the fee of the
property, and no control in the leasing thereof or in any bonus
or delay rental payments. The supreme court reversed the judg-
ment, holding that the plaintiff was the owner in fee simple of 49%
of the oil and gas in place, saying:
"where the conveyance or reservation, as the case may be,
consists of an interest in perpetuity to all the oil and gas
minerals that may be extracted, the conveyance or reserva-
tion is a grant or reservation of the minerals in fee simple
with the attributes and rights that go with such ownership,
including the right to enter upon the land for exploration
of oil, 'participating in delay rents, bonuses and leasing."9
The court recognized that "although confusion often exists in
the minds of laymen and inexperienced conveyancers in the words
to be used in creating a royalty interest or a mineral interest, the
two estates are in fact separate and distinct and have well defined
legal attributes."1 o Unfortunately, however, if several of the state-
ments in the decision are to be taken at face value, it would appear
that the court has chosen to follow an originally ill-considered,
generally rejected doctrine, which is recognized only in the State
of West Virginia (and even there is open to question) to the effect
9 133 Colo. at 215, 293 P.2d at 307.
w Ibid., 293 P.2d at 306, citing Palmer v. Crews, 203 Miss. 806, 35 So. 2d 430 (1948), and
Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d (1948).
SCORES OF DENVER LAWYERS ARE ENJOYING THE COOL AIR-
CONDITIONED COMFORT AT MILE HIGH CENTER.
THE FINE NEW LAW LIBRARY ALSO ADDS TO THEIR PLEASURE.
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Rental Office: TA. 5-5231
DICTA
July-August, 1957
that a perpetual nonparticipating royalty interest in oil, gas and
other minerals cannot be created. For example, consider the state-
ment that:
"the ordinary meaning of the word 'royalty' as applied to an
existing oil and gas lease is the compensation provided in
the lease for the privilege of drilling for and producing oil
and gas and consists of a share of the oil and gas produced
or the profits therefrom, but it does not include a perpetual
interest in the realty."'"
And again, the pronouncement that:
"there being no oil or gas lease in existence at the time of
the conveyance or reservation, the words of the grant or
reservation 'assigned and set over' are such as to convey a
partial interest in the minerals in perpetuity, and an estate
in fee simple is thus created.' 1 2
In arriving at these conclusions, the court cited numerous de-
cisions from other jurisdictions.3 Careful scrutiny of these cases,
however, indicates that most of them are not authority for the
proposition advanced by the Colorado court, and a few are directly
contra.
As a further bulwark to its conclusions, the court relied upon
the time-honored, but often misconstrued and misapplied dictum of
Coke that "if a man seized of land in fee by his deed granteth to
another the profits of those lands, to have and to hold to him and
his heirs, and maketh livery secundum formam chartae, the whole
land itself doth pass. For what is the land but the profits thereof?"'
4
With deference to Lord Coke, it is suggested that a statement of
feudal rights in real property is hardly a realistic basis for the con-
struction of grants of oil and gas. Furthermore, the court over-
looked the fact that the royalty right is only one of the profits
which may be derived by the landowner from the oil and gas
underlying his property. Bonus payments for leasing to oil and gas
operators and delay rentals arising under such leases for the privi-
lege of deferring drilling operations are likewise profits arising out
of the ownership of oil and gas, as is the right of the landowner to
develop and produce the minerals himself, thereby entitling him
to all of the proceeds received from any purchaser. Certainly, Coke
does not suggest that the conveyance of the right to cut timber, for
example, being one of the possible profits derived from land, con-
stitutes a grant of the entire fee simple estate.
It is of course recognized that in cases of first impression an
appellate court must of necessity be guided to a great extent by
counsel, and it must be pointed out in fairness that the brief of
attorneys for the successful appellant was brilliantly conceived
and written.2 In addition, there is no question but that the court
was faced with something of a dilemma in the construction of the
interest involved. A literal construction of the instrument in ques-
n 133 Colo. at 215, 293 P.2d at 306 (emphasis supplied).
12 Id. at 216, 293 P.2d at 307.
Is Id. at 216-17, 293 P.2d at 307.
14 1 Co. Litt. 45.




tion was neither feasible nor desirable. It cannot seriously be con-
tended that the interest created was a full 49% perpetual non-
participating royalty interest, thereby entitling the owner to 49
out of every 100 barrels of oil produced. Such a conclusion would,
for all practical purposes, completely prevent development of the
property for oil and gas purposes. Few, if any, operators would be
willing to incur the expense and risk involved in the drilling of an
oil or gas well knowing that the remuneration, if successful, would.
be limited to 51% of the production obtained. From a practical
standpoint, then, the court was required to select one of two pos-
sible alternatives: First, that the interest conveyed was a per-
petual non-participating royalty interest amounting to 49% of the
royalty on all oil and gas produced, saved and marketed, this being
the conclusion reached by the trial court; or, second, that the grantee
received an undivided 49 % fee simple interest in the oil and gas
in place, thereby entitling him to the right of entry for exploita-
tion of the minerals, and participation in delay rentals and bonuses
derived under any oil and gas lease, this being the result
erroneously arrived at by the supreme court. A possible third, and
in the opinion of the writer, a less desirable solution would be a
holding that the interest conveyed was an estate in fee simple
in the oil and gas underlying the property, but not entitling the
owner to enter and develop the minerals or participate in delay
rentals and bonuses. The obviously hybrid nature of such an
alternative is readily apparent.
Standing alone, the result reached in the Simson case would
not be irretrievably damaging to the development of the law of
oil and gas in Colorado. The holding could have been justified on
the theory that use of a large fraction such as 49% discloses on
the face of the instrument that the parties were dealing with the
oil and gas in place and not with the royalty interest in these
substances. The danger in the decision is the repeated suggestion
that a perpetual nonparticipating royalty interest cannot be
reserved or conveyed, and that the attempt to do results in the
creation of a fee simple interest in the oil and gas in place. The
implications of such a doctrine are far reaching and possibly
catastrophic. The attorney representing an oil and gas lessee
must, on the basis of this decision, require his client to obtain oil
and gas leases from every owner of what would otherwise appear
to be royalty interests appearing in the chain of title. Attorneys
representing purchasers and sellers of interests in oil and gas must
be aware that if they prepare an instrument purportedly transfer-








they may very well be carving up the ownership of the fee simple
title to the oil and gas in place. Oil and gas lessees who are
presently producing properties charged with what have always
been construed as royalty interests may find they are tenants in
common in the mineral estate with the so-called royalty owners
whose interests are unleased. Even more dangerous is the position
of the royalty owner holding, let us say, under a transfer of a 2 %
perpetual nonparticipating royalty. If the Simson decision, and
its dictum, are the law in Colorado, this royalty owner (assuming
the standard %s royalty lease) will be entitled not to 2% of the
gross production from the property in which he holds his interest,
but will receive only 2% of 1/8 of the total production.
There are a number of excellent and definitive treatises con-
cerning the judicial construction of transfers of minearl and royalty
interest.'" It is not the purpose of this article, therefore, to retrace
the paths already trod by much more learned authors, nor to
attempt a correlation of the vast number of cases dealing with the
problem. However, due to the rapidity with which decisions pertain-
ing to royalty and mineral interests are being rendered,' and be-
cause of the literally hundreds of decided cases concerned with the
question, a compilation of the decisions on a jurisdictional basis,
and' a survey of what appear to be the prevailing views of the
appellate courts of the various states should be of interest and value.
DEFINITIONS
A nonparticipating royalty interest has a well-understood mean-
ing in the oil industry, and has been frequently defined by numer-
ous courts and authors.' A particularly lucid definition advanced by
one authority is that nonparticiapting royalty is "an interest in the
gross prduction of oil, gas and other minerals carved out of the
the right to participate in the execution of, the bonus payable for, or
mineral fee estate as a free royalty, which does not carry with it
the delay rentals to accrue under, oil, gas and mineral leases
executed by the owner of the mineral fee estate."'" As a necessary
16 See, e.g., Cantwell, Term Royalty, Seventh Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Tax-
ation 339 (Southwestern Legal Foundation 1956); Colby, Law of Oil and Gas, 31 Calif. L. Rev. 357
(1943); Jones, Problems Presented by the Separation of the Exclusive Leasing Power from the
Ownership of Land, Minerals or Royalty, Second Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation
271 (Southwestern Legal Foundation 1951); Jones, Non-Participating Royalty, 26 Texas L. Rev.
(1948) [primarily concerned with the duties owed the non-participating royalty owner by the
holder of the executive or leasing rights and the effect of Schlittler v. Smith, 128 Tex. 628, 101
S.W.2d 542 (1937) and Brown v. Sm:th, 141 Tex. 425, 174 S.W.2d 43 (1943)]; Levy, Oil Royalties,
A Distinct Species of Property, 11 So. Calif. L. Rev. 319 (1938) (containing a critique of many of
the California decisions); Masterson, A Survey of Basic Oil and Gas Low, Fourth Annual Institute on
Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 219 (Southwestern Legal Foundation 1953); Maxwell, The Mineral-
Royalty Distinction and the Expense of Production, 33 Texas L. Rev. 463 (1955 )(author convincingly
asserts that the basic distinction between a mineral interest and a royalty interest is that the former
is expense-bearing and he latter expense-free); Maxwell, A Primer of Mineral and Royalty Convey-
ancing, 3 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 449 (1956); Morris, Some Legal Consequences Resulting from a Separation
of the Incidents of Ownership of a Mineral Interest, 7 Okla. L. Rev. 285 (1954); and see Annot. 4
A.L.R.2d 492 (1948); Moulton, Problems and Pitfalls Arising From Mineral and Royalty Conveyances,
Proceedings, Mineral Low Section, A.B.A. 285 (1956) (containing an informative discussion of the
Montana decisions in the field); Nabors, The Louisiana Servitude and Royalty Doctrines: A Report to
the Mineral Law Committee of the Louisiana State Low Institute, 25 Tul. L. Rev. 30, 303, 485 (1950-
51), 26 Tul. L. Rev. 23, 172, 303 (1951-52); Stanton, Recent Developments in the Construction of Min-
eral and Royalty Grants and Reservations, Seventh Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation
301 (Southwestern Legal Foundation 1956); Sullivan, Assignments by the Landowner and Lessee, 17
Mont. L. Rev. 64 (1955); Summers, Transfers of Oil and Gas Rents and Royalties, 10 Texas L. Rev. 1
(1931); Tippit, Creating Mineral and Royalty Interests, 29 DICTA 186 (1952) (concerned primarily
with practical problems of conveyances); Turpin, Mineral Deeds and Royalty Transfers, First Annual
Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 221 (Southwestern Legal Foundation 1949).
I- Since early 1952 over 75 cases dealing with the mineral v. royalty. question have been decided.
16E.g., Bellport v. Harrison, 123 Kan. 310, 255 Poc. 52 (1927); Palmer v. Crews, 203 Miss. 806,
35 So.2d 43 (1948); Schlittler v. Smith, 128 Tex. 628, 101 S.W.2d 543 (1937); Moulton, supra note 16.
19 Jones, Non-Participating Royalty, supra note 16.
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adjunct to this definition it might be added that the owner of the
nonparticipating royalty interest does not have the right or privi-
lege of entering upon and producing the minerals from the land in-
volved. Nonparticipating royalty interests may be perpetual, 20 or
limited to a prescribed term of years, in which case the creating
instrument ordinarily provides for perpetuation by production.
2 1
In contra-distinction to the royalty interest is the so-called
"mineral-fee interest" which consists of the ownership in fee simple
of the oil, gas and other minerals together with the rights, attributes
and privileges appurtenant to such ownership, including the right
to enter upon the lands and explore for, produce and develop the
minerals, or the right to grant leases to others for such purposes
and to participate in the bonus payments, delay rentals and royalties
derived from or payable by virtue of such leases. As previously
indicated, the mineral fee estate, which may exist in conjunction
2 In connection with perpetual non-participating royalty interests the problem of the Rule against
Perpetuities has been raised in a few jurisdictions, notably Kansas. See Lathrop v. Eyestone, 170
Kan. 419, 227 P.2d 136 (1951) (holding that a perpetual non-participating royalty interest created
while the lands were leased, but prior to production, was invalid as a violation of the Rule); cf.
Miller v. Sooy, 120 Kan. 81, 242 Pac. 140 (1926). The conclusion reached in the Lathrop case, however,
would seem to be severely limited by later Kansas decisions in Froelich v. United Royalty Ca., 178
Kan. 503, 290 P.2d 93 (1955); Howell v. Co-op. Refinery Ass'n, 176 Kan. 572, 271 P.2d 271 (1954);
Kenoyer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 173 Kan. 183, 245 P.2d 176 (1952). Arkansas has rejected the
doctrine of the Lathrop case, holding expressly contra in Hanson v. Ware, 224 Ark. 430, 274 S.W.2d
359 (1955). Although generally outside the scope of this article, the reader is referred to Kuntz,
The Rule Against Perpetuities and Mineral Interests, 8 Okla. L. Rev. 183 (1955) and Meyers, The
Effect of the Rule Against Perpetuities on Perpetual Non-Participating Royalty and Kindred Interests,
32 Texas L. Rev. 369 (1954) for alluminating treatments of the subject.
- See Cantwell, supra note 16, for a treatment of determinable royalty interests, pointing up the
problems involved when the interest is susceptible of continuation by production.
Deister, Ward & Witcher
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with or severed and apart from the surface ownership is well recog-
nized in Colorado. 22 This view of the mineral ownership, that the
landowner actually "owns" the oil and gas in place in fee simple,
has become known as the doctrine of "absolute ownership" or "title
in place," and the states (including Colorado) following this theory
are generally referred to as the "absolute ownership states. '23 Some
jurisdictions, however, including California, Louisiana and appar-
ently Oklahoma, are more or less committed to the so-called "non-
ownership" or "no title in place" theory, to the effect that the land-
owner does not have an absolute unqualified title to the oil and gas
in place, holding instead only the exclusive right to drill for and
produce these substances. 24 Whether a state follows the ownership
theory or the non-ownership or qualified ownership theory has thus
far had little bearing on the differentiation between royalty and
mineral interests.25 This follows from the fact that even the so-called
non-ownership states have recognized the difference between an
expense-bearing interest in the minerals as distinguished from the
expense-free royalty interest. Actually, the ownership versus non-
ownership controversy is often simply a matter of semantics, the
application of either doctrine leading to the same practical result
in many situations.
With this brief introduction to basic terminology we proceed to
a discussion of decisions in states other than Colorado.
28
TEXAS
Texas was perhaps the originator, and is certainly the leading
exponent of the absolute ownership theory, having projected this
doctrine to its logical extreme by holding that an oil and gas lease
conveys to the lessee a determinable fee interest in the oil and gas
in place.
2 7
The evolution of the law concerning transfers and reservations
of mineral and royalty interests did not have a particularly
auspicious genesis in Texas. Several early decisions held the royalty
interest reserved by a lessor in an oil and gas lease (particularly
where payable in money rather than in kind) to be personalty. 2
Fortunately, this view was partially thwarted in Hager v. Stakes, 29
and completely overruled in Sheffield v. Hogg.30 Confusion was also
created by Caruthers v. Leonard3 1 holding that the conveyance of
2 See cases cited at notes 1, 3 and 4, supra.
2 Kulp, Oil and Gas Rights § 10.5 (1954) and cases cited at note 7 therein. The author points
out that "sometimes the decisions in the same jurisdictions are conflicting, while a state is vacillat-
ing as to which theory to follow" and in support of this cites a number of decisions. Id. n. 8.
N Ibid., and cases cited at note 8 therein.
"But see Little v. Mountain View Dairies, 35 Col. 2d 232, 217 P.2d 416 (1950).
w In the discussion that follows, the author has attempted to at least cite most of the cases
from the purticulur jurisdiction in question bearing directly on the subject matter of this article.
Because af the almost overwhelming number of decisions, however, it is impossible to include them
"Texas Co. v. Dougherty, 107 Tex. 226, 176 S.W. 717 (1915); Kulp, op. cit. supra, note 23; Walk-
er, The Nature of the Property Inferest Created By an Oil and Gas Lease, 7 Texas L. Rev. 1, 7 (1928).
5Curlee v. Anderson and Patterson, 235 S.W. 622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Farmers & Merchants
State Bank v. Tullis, 211 S.W. 847 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919); Jones v. O'Brien, 251 S.W. 208 (Tex. Com.
App. 1923), off'd, O'Brien v. Jones, 274 S.W. 242 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
29116 Tex. 453, 294 S.W. 835 (1927), see Comment, 13 Texas L. Rev. 501 (1935), and Note, 6
Texas L. Rev. 236 (1928).
W 124 Tex. 290, 77 S.W.2d 1021 (1934).
' 254 S.W. 779 (Tex. Cam. App. 1923), possibly, although not expressly, adopting dictum in




a fractional mineral interest did not entitle the grantee to share in
delay rentals payable under an existing lease. In a case decided at
approximately the same time, however, it was held that a mineral
conveyance coupled with an express transfer of the same fractional
interest "in all the rights and royalties accruing by reason" of an
existing lease, entitled the grantee to his share of the rentals."
The erroneous pronouncement of Caruthers v. Leonard was prob-
ably disposed of in Hager v. Stakes,3 3 and was uneqivocally over-
ruled in Harris v. Currie.3 4 Guess v. Harmonson 15 correctly held
that a conveyance of an undivided 1/2 interest in and to the royalties
to be derived from the production of oil, gas and other minerals did
not permit the grantee to participate in bonus and delay rental
payments, recognizing the fundamental distinction between
royalty and mineral interests.
EARLY DECISIONS
Hogg v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.3 and Porter v. Shaw, 7 both
pioneer cases, illustrate the common misconception still extant that
the landowner's ownership in the oil and gas is limited to a 1/s inter-
est, and also point up the loose manner in which the terms "royalty"
and "mineral" are used interchangeably by laymen, lawyers and
the judiciary. In the Hogg case, the court assumed, without deciding,
that the conveyance of an undivided 1/32 interest in and to all of
Collins v. Stilger, 253 S.W. 572 (
T
ex. Civ. App. 1923).
116 Tex. 453, 294 S.W. 835 (1927).
' 142 Tex. 93, 176 S.W.2d 302 (1943), discussed in Comment, 13 Texas L. Rev. 501 (1935).
'4 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
s 267 S.W. 482 (Tex. Com. App. 1924).
12 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
for or
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the oil, gas and other minerals "in, on and under said land" trans-
ferred (in addition to a 1/32 interest in the minerals in place) a 1/32
part of the gross production. 38 In the Porter case, the court recon-
ciled the grant of a 1/16 interest in the minerals with a statement
contained in the deed that the grantor and grantee were to share
equally in benefits under future leases. In Way v. Venus, 0 it was
held that a reservation of minerals "which may be found in the
future on any of the lands" reserved a present vested interest, the
words "which may be found in the future" being simply expressive
of the uncertainty of the existence of minerals, rather than imposing
a condition upon the reservation. In an unsatisfactory opinion, blest
with a well reasoned dissent, the court in Jones v. Bedford0 con-
strued a grant of "one-eighth of one-eighth royalty interest" as
conveying an undivided 1/64 interest in the oil, gas and other min-
erals in place, entitling the grantee to only 1/64 of the standard 1ys
royalty. The court simply eliminated the word "royalty" from the
granting clause because of additional provisions in the deed reciting
that the grantees should be entitled to 1/s of 1/s of the money rentals
under any oil and gas lease and should own the same fractional
interest in the oil, gas and other minerals.
Schlittler v. Smith" is a landmark case in Texas for several
reasons. It was one of the first cases in Texas recognizing the cre-
ation of a pure royalty interest, holding expressly that the reserva-
tion of a 1/2 interest "in and to the royalty rights" in all oil, gas and
other minerals did not constitute a reservation of the mineral fee
estate entitling the holder to participation in bonus or delay rentals.
Just as important, however, the case created a new legal concept in
the court's enunciation that "utmost fair dealing" must be used by
the holder of the exclusive leasing privilege in his relationship with
the royalty owners. Similar implications appear in succeeding de-
cisions4 2 culminating in Brown v. Smith.
43
Regardless of the well-defined distinctions between the royalty
and mineral fee interest, the presence or absence of the word
"royalty" in a conveyance imports no particular magic. 44 Several
decisions have construed the grant or reservation of a fractional
interest in the oil and gas as creating a royalty interest although
the word "royalty" was not employed in the conveyance. 4 In like
7 A conclusion possibly justified by the action of the parties in executing simultaneous docu-
ments referring to a 1/ royalty interest.
m 35 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
*o 56 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) (an example, incidentally, of the misuse of printed forms).
4 128 Tex. 628, 101 S.W.2d 543 (1937), reversing, Smith v. Schlittler, 66 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Cir.
App. 1933).
4"Winterman v. McDonald, 129 Tex. 275, 286, 102 S.W.2d 167, 173 (1937) (duty of "ordinary
care and diligence"); Moore v. City of Beaumont, 195 S.W.2d 968, 980 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) (implied
obligation).
43 141 Tex. 425, 174 S.W.2d 43 (1943) (restricting the holder of the exclusive leasing power in his
right to combine in a single lease acreage charged with a royalty interest with lands not so encum-
bered).
44 See, e.g., Jones v. Bedford, 56 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
45 Klein v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 126 Tex. 450, 86 S.W.2d 1077 (1935) (reservation of 1/
"mineral rights," with provision that grantors not entitled to lease or participate in bonus or rental
held to be 1/8 royalty-Query whether the interest should not be t/8 of the royalty); Pinchback v. Gulf
Oil Corp. 242 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) (holding that a reservation of 1/e of all minerals "that
may hereafter be produced and saved" constituted a perpetual non-participating royalty interest, but
erroneously opining that the grantee received "7/8 of the oil beneath the surface" subject to the royal-
ty charge); Miller v. Speed, 248 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952), a case distinguished for its
erudite discussion of the mineral-royalty distinction, and construing "1/24 of all oil, gas and other
minerals produced, saved and made available for market," as a royalty interest. The court probably
over-emphasizes the importance of the words "produced, saved and made available for market" for
even these words, when coupled with the executive right to lease and participate in bonus and
rentals, might compel construction as a mineral fee. See Discussion Note, 1 Oil and Gas Rep. 960
and cases cited in note 46, infra.
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manner, the grant of a fractional "royalty" interest has been held to
create a mineral fee estate where the deed specifies that the grantee
shall be entitled to ingress and egress to produce and develop the
property and to participate in delay rents and bonuses, or where the
instrument discloses a clear intention to convey minerals in place
rather than royalties.
46
THE "DOUBLE GRANT" DOCTRINE
The concept of double grants or "two-grants-in-one" has been
the source of considerable confusion, and in some instances moder-
ate chaos, in the construction of mineral and royalty instruments in
Texas. First propounded in Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,41
its application has almost unerringly failed to effectuate the prob-
able intention of the parties. The concept arises in connection with
the use of mineral deed forms containing granting, "subject-to,"
participation and reversionary clauses, all of which provide blanks
for the insertion of fractions.48 Compound the numerous blank
spaces in the deed form with the average layman's misconception of
the landowner's interest in the minerals, add the frenzied dealing in
the heat of a new oil discovery, and the result is at best puzling.
Considering the prevalence of and addiction to the printed form
mineral deed, the situation is not likely to improve. On the almost
invariably valid assumption that both parties intend the grantee
to participate in rentals and royalties under all leases, whether
existing or future, in the same proportion, and contemplate the
same undivided ownership in the minerals both before and after
the termination of an existing lease, the deed form mentioned
should be completed by the insertion of the same fractional interest
in all of the blanks. Unfortunately, however, the cases disclose an
almost irresistible impulse to insert one fraction in the granting and
reversionary clauses and a fraction eight times as large in the"subject-to" and "participation" clauses. Tipps v. Bodine49 and sev-
eral other decisions,5o exemplify the dilemma posed by the misuse
of fractions in these forms.
The "double grant" theory in essence holds that an instrument
may convey one interest in the mineral fee estate both before and
after termination of the existing lease, and a completely different
46 Loeffler v. King, 149 Tex. 626, 236 S.W.2d 772 (1951), reversing, 228 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1950); McLain v. First Nat'l Bank, 264 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Crumpton v. Scott, 250
S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) (granting clause: 
1
/3 undivided interest in "our royalty rights"; inten-
tion clause: "intended to convey . . . a 1/3 undivided interest in and to all mineral rights"); Acklin v.
Fuqua, 193 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
4i273 S.W. 828 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
4s The granting clause conveying an undivided interest in the minerals, the "subiect-to" clause
reciting an existing lease and providing for the sharing of rents and royalties thereunder, the "par-
ticipation clause" governing division of rents and royalties under future leases, and the "reversion-
ary" clause prescribing the ownership in the mineral estate upon termination of the existing lease.
49 101 S.W.2d 1075 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). Amazingly enough the court observed that no language"would more clearly and accurately express the intention of the parties" in construing a deed con-
veying a 1/16 mineral fee interest and providing for participation in 1/2 the royalty and rental under
an existing lease, but reciting that the grantee should own 1/16 of the minerals on termination of the
existing lease. The deed was held to convey a 1/2 mineral interest.
Go Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 563 (1945), modifying, 183 S.W.2d 235 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1944); Dils Co. v. Garrett, 294 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (writ of error granted
and case presently pending in the Supreme Court of Texas); Williams v. J. & C. Royalty Co., 254
S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Acklin v. Fuqua, 193 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) (mention-
ing, but apparently not applying, the "double-grant" theory); Schubert v. Miller, 119 S.W.2d (Tex. Civ.
App. 1938).
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interest in the rentals and royalties to accrue under such lease. As
a result of the application of this doctrine, it is not unusual for a
court to hold that a grantee shall receive 1/8 of the rental and royalty
under an existing lease and 1/64 of these payments under future
leases. The fact that the reduced participation under future leases
is nearly always Vs of the interest under the existing lease lends
credence to the supposition that although it might be legally pos-
sible to make a double grant in the same instrument, the possibility
of the parties so intending is exteremely remote. Instruments of
this type appear to be patently amibiguous (notwithstanding the
courts' repeated assertions that they are not), requiring the admis-
sion of extrinsic evidence in explanation of intention. 51
MISCELLANEOUS TEXAS DECISIONS
Although too numerous, or not of sufficient general importance,
to examine in detail and too divergent to categorize, there are sev-
eral other Texas cases deserving of mention. Allen v. Creighton5
2
holds that an inconsistency between the granting and a later clause
in a royalty deed will be construed in favor of the grantee. Howell
v. Liles53 mentions the apparent inconsistency, if not repugnancy,
between the phrase "royalty mineral rights" and the words "total
mineral rights," both contained in the same deed.5 4 Peacock v. Alex-
ander 5 and Commerce Trust Co. v. Lyon"t are both decisions limit-
ing a retained royalty interest to an existing lease. Caraway v.
Owens" illustrates that it is not necessary to reserve or convey
royalty in terms of " /," holding the reservation of "a fee royalty of
1/32 of the oil and gas" as entitling the grantor to 1/32 of the gross
production. Another recent decision points up the necessity for
careful draftsmanship, holding that the owner of a reserved Y2 of Y8
of the oil, gas and other mineral royalty is entitled to receive, under
a standard Y8 lease, only 1/128 of the gross production.5
RELATED PROBLEMS
While not precisely relevant to the present inquiry concerning
the distinction between mineral and royalty interests, the convey-
s, See Craft v. Hahn, 246 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952), where the plaintiff wisely alleged
mutual mistake thus permitting introduction of parol testimony regarding the expressed understanding
of the parties. Such an alternative allegation should always be considered in the "inconsistent frac-
tion" cases.
' 131 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
3S 246 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
s'The case is principally of interest, however, because it involves the doctrine of Duhig v.
Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1943), which was followed (without cita-
tion) in Brown v. Kirk, 127 Colo. 453, 257 P.2d 145 (1953), under which a reservatoin of minerals in
a warranty deed was held inclusive of all previously reserved or conveyed mineral interests. First
announced in Klein v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 126 Tex. 450, 86 S.W.2d 1077 (1935), the principle
has been followed, explained and modified in Benge v. Schaurbauer, 152 Tex. 447, 259 S.W.2d 166
1953), modifying, 254 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Sharp v. Fowler, 151 Tex. 490, 252 S.W.2d
153 (1952); Winters v. Slaver, 151 Tex. 485, 251 S.W.2d 726 1952); Pich v. Lankford, 295 S.W.2d 749
(Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (writ of error granted and presently pending in the Supreme Court of Texas);
Harris v. Windsor, 279 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); McLain v. First Nat'l Bank, 263 S.W.2d
324 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Howell v. Liles, 246 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Coffee v. Manley,
166 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
5 250 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
56 284 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
254 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955). But see Remuda Oil Co. v. Wilson, 264 S.W.2d 192 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1954).
5' Harris v. Ritter, 154 Tex. 474, 279 S.W.2d 845 (1955), modifying, 267 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1954).
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ancer, regardless of his jurisdiction, should be aware of the various
Texas decisions dealing with the problem of transfer of mineral
and royalty interests by a grantor owning less than the full inter-
est.5 9 One final problem, apparently thus far peculiar to Texas,
should also be mentioned. Dicta in two earlier cases indicating that
any royalty reserved in an oil and gas lease in excess of 1/8 is
"bonus"60 gave rise to the decision in Griffith v. Taylor"' in the
Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Amarillo. The court construed a
conveyance granting an undivided interest in the minerals in
place, but providing that it included of all of the /8 oil royalty
under any existing or future lease, as prohibiting the grantee from
participating in royalty reserved under a later lease (the grantor
having retained the exclusive leasing power) in excess of 1/8. The
Supreme Court of Texas reversed, holding that the 1/16 royalty
reserved in the lease over and above the standard 1/8 was "royalty"
in the normal and ordinary sense, and the grantee of an undivided
mineral interest was entitled to share therein.2 The case seems
to establish that any payment to a lessor, whether in money or in
kind, of a fractional interest in the production under an oil and gas
lease constitutes "royalty," at least where the interest is not termin-
able after the receipt of a specified sum.6 3 There is still a possibility
under the decision in State Nat'l Bank6 4 that a so-called "production
payment" which terminates upon receipt of a certain sum of money
out of oil would not constitute "royalty." An interesting case would
be presented if the amount to be satisfied out of the production pay-
ment were so great as to render the interest perpetual for all prac-
tical purposes. For example, to cite a ludicrous extreme, a produc-
tion payment of one billion dollars payable out of 1/16 of the oil and
gas produced, saved and marketed from a forty-acre tract.
(To be concluded in a later issue of DICTA)
W E.g., Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Harrison, 146 Tex. 216, 205 S.W.2d 355 (1947); King v. First
Nat'l Bank, 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260 (1946); Minchen v. Hirsch, 295 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Civ. App.
1956); McElnurroy v. McElmurray, 270 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Dowda v. Hayman, 221
S.W.2d 1016 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Hooks v. Neill, 21 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Note 25
Texas L. Rev. 100 (1946). And see Masterson, supra note 16, at 254.
0 State Nat'l Bank v. Morgan, 135 Tex. 509, 143 S.W.2d 757 (1940); Sheppard v. Stanolind Oil
& Gas Co., 125 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
m 284 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
- Griffith v. Taylor, 291 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1956). And see Morris v. First Nat'l Bank, 249 S.W.2d
269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
03 See McMahon v. Christmann, 285 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
04 State Nat'l Bank v. Morgan, 135 Tex. 509, 143 S.W.2d 757 (1940).
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Relegating the mechanics lien laws of Colorado to the field of
oil and gas law is an involved subject because of the complexities
in the existing statutes and decisions, and because of the history of
statutory enactment, amendment, repeal and reenactment, the
ultimate yield of which is confusing to the practitioner. It seems
impossible to state with certainty whether the present lien rights
applicable to oil and gas operations exist by virtue of one, two or
even three stautory enactments, and it is this problem which has
greatly extended the scope of this examination beyond our initial
contemplation.
Because of the length of the article it is necessary to submit its
published form in a series of three installments. In this first pub-
lished portion of the paper we attempt to trace the legislative his-
tory of the present Colorado lien laws in an effort to ascertain which
statutory laws now govern lien rights in the petroleum industry. In
* The authors acknowledge with gratitude the assistance of
Hubert Weinshienk in the preparation of this paper.
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the second of the installments we determine the parties who enjoy
the right to assert the lien, the content and recording requirements
for the lien statement, and the nature of the property and the char-
acter of ownership interests to which the lien may attach. In the
concluding section of the paper, questions of priority and enforce-
ment will be discussed. Suggestions for avoidance of lien liability
will also be tendered together with our notes as to the deficiency
judgment liability of various types of oil investors and operators.
Some suggested forms will also be submitted.
What Law Governs:
During the years 1861 to 1900 there were seventeen statutory
enactments, repeals, re-enactments, transcriptions and amendments
to the mechanics lien laws in Colorado. None of these are considered
significant to the discussion here except the Act of 1899,' which
constituted a general repeal and reenactment of the former lien
laws and which constitutes the source of our present general
mechanics lien law. It is this act2 which is referred to herein as the
"general lien law."
The Act of 19033 was the first specific statute providing for lien
rights arising out of drilling operations. Because of its significance to
certain supreme court decisions, it is desirable to set forth its terms
in detail. They are:
"Section 1. That any person or persons, company or corpo-
ration, who perform labor or furnish material or supplies
for constructing, altering or repairing, or for the digging,
drilling or boring, operating, completing or repairing of any
gas well, oil well or any other well, by virtue of a contract
with the owner or his authorized agent, shall have a lien to
secure the payment of the same upon such gas well, oil well,
or such other well, and upon the materials and machinery
and equipment and supplies so furnished, and in case the
contract is with the owner of the lot or land, then such lien
shall also be upon the interest of the owner of the lot or land
upon which the same may stand, and in case the contract is
with the lease holder of the lot or land then such lien shall
also be upon the interest of the lease holder on the lot or
land upon which the same may stand or in relation to which
such material or supplies are furnished.
"Sec. 2. That in perfecting and enforcing the right herein
given, the procedure indicated in the laws of this State, and
the remedies and rights given, in the statutes of and con-
cerning 'Liens of Mechanics,' as the same may now, or in the
hereafter shall exist, shall be held to apply in so far as the
same may be applicable."
Following the Act of 1903, Colorado law stood much as it does
today; there being both a general and a specific statute. To com-
pound and confirm the confusion the Legislature, as a part of the
1911 lien act,4 enacted the following provision in a bill providing a
I Colo. Laws 1899, c. 118.
2Cola. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 86-3-1 to 24 (1953).
aColo. Laws 1903, c. 141.
'Colo. Laws 1911, c. 164.
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lien for miners, mill men and those furnishing materials for mines
and mills:
"Section 8. The provisions of this article shall apply to oil
wells or springs, iron and lead mines, as well as all other
mines not herein specified, so far as the same may be appli-
cable."
The next succeeding section of that act stated that "all acts and
parts of acts in conflict" with the act are repealed.
The 1915 legislature specifically repealed the 1911 act in its
entirety. 5 The affirmative provisions of the 1915 act, which provide
the source for section 86-3-4 of Colorado Revised Statutes 1953
granted a lien to those persons who do work or who furnish mater-
ials, machinery, or other fixtures to mines, lodes, mining claims or
deposits yielding metals or minerals of any kind. Mercifully, nothing
was said in the section about "oil wells or springs."
This was the status of our statutory law by 1928, the year in
which the supreme court decided Poudre River Oil Corp. v. Carey6
and Terminal Co. v. Jones, 7 the only two Colorado authorities in-
volving lien rights arising from oil and gas operations.
From the standpoint of legislative history only the Terminal
case is significant. Its facts, briefly, are these: The landowner had
given an oil and gas lease (we presume a Producers 88) covering
his 160 acre farm, reserving a 8 royalty. The lease was assigned to
Municipal Oil Co. Inc., a defendant in the action, which company
then entered into a drilling contract for an oil and gas test well with
Terminal Company, also a defendant. The terms of their contract do
not appear in the decision nor in the trial record, but from various
recitals in the decision it would appear that the agreement was in
the nature of a "turnkey contract," which obligated Terminal to
deliver a finished and cased hole. Whether it was also to deliver the
stationary drilling equipment for use during production cannot be
determined from the decision.
Terminal then constructed a derrick and rig, and a frame house
at the location, setting the rig on concrete corners and equipping it
with "rig irons, calf wheel irons, sand reel, steel crown block rig,
and other parts."8 Following erection of this equipment Terminal
entered into a subcontract under which the subcontractor was to
furnish all necessary drilling tools, labor and supplies for the drill-
ing of the well in exchange for monetary compensation paid on a
footage-drilled basis. The plaintiffs in the action were employees of
the subcontractor; one as a carrier of equipment to the location, one
as a driller, and the third as a tool dresser. They all filed and fore-
closed liens for labor against the oil and gas leasehold estate, the fee
estate, the rig, and all equipment and tools. They asserted their liens
not only under the provisions of the general lien law of 1899, but
also under the terms of the 1903 act.
Defendants contended that the 1903 act was unconstitutional
and that it had been repealed by the act of 1911, which in turn had
been repealed by the act of 1915. The rulings of the supreme court
on these questions are helpful in determining the status of our
'Colo. Laws 1915, c. 116.
'83 Colo. 419, 226 Pac. 201 (1928).
'84 Colo. 279, 269 Pac. 894, 59 A.L.R. 549, 550, 557 (1928).
Id. at 281, 269 Pac. at 896.
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present lien statutes. After finding the 1903 act constitutional, it
was concluded that:
(1) The act of 1911 did not expressly or impliedly over-
rule the 1903 act because there was no conflict in
their provisions and also because the 1911 act did not
puroprt to legislate on the entire subject contained in
the 1903 act.
(2) Even if the 1911 act were construed to repeal the 1903
act, such act (that of 1903) was effectively revived
upon the repeal of the 1911 act pursuant to the laws
of 1915. (This conclusion was reached, even after the
court cited and discussed the rule against implied
revival.)
(3) The act of 1899 is applicable, pari materia, with the
statute of 1903 and they must be construed together.
It is difficult to conclude how broadly or in what sense the
court intended to apply the rule of pari materia. To the extent
that the rule is capable of restatement, basically it requires all con-
sistent statutes which can stand together and relate to the same sub-
ject, though enacted at different dates, to be treated prospectively
and to be construed together as though they constituted one actY
Was it meant in the Terminal case that the terms of the specific
statute controlled against and excluded such provisions of the gen-
eral act which related to the same areas of law, with the statutes
existing cumulatively only as to those areas in which one was void
qf content? Or was it meant that all provisions of both statutes
existed coextensively and without exclusion as to each other on
an alternate basis? The questions posed by the redundancy of legis-
lation in this area found little if any rest through the decision in
the Terminal case.
In 1929 the legislature enacted a second and more compre-
hensive statute granting liens to those who furnished labor, ma-
chinery, material, fuel, explosives, power or supplies for the sink-
ing, repairing, altering or operating of any gas well, oil well or
any other well.' 0 It is this law which constitutes the source of our
present specific statute in this area."
Possibly the 1929 statute impliedly repealed the 1903 act, and
certain commentators so surmised,'2 but there was no express re-
pealing provision in its contents. However, the question of such re-
peal is moot at this point because of the enabling act for the Colo-
rado Revised Statutes, 1953.11 By such act any statutes or parts of
statutes not contained in the Revised Statutes were repealed as of
the effective date of the 1953 enactment; and the provisions of the
1903 act are not contained in the Revised Statutes. Further, any
question which might exist as to an implied revival of the 1911 act
is handily blocked by a specific provision in the 1953 act.
Upon review of these legislative occurrences the lawyer who
9 Luchesi v. State Board of Equalization, 137 Cal. App. 478, 31 P.2d 800, 802 (1934); Burton v.
Denver, 99 Colo. 207, 61 P.2d 856 (1936); 50 Am. Jur., Statutes § 348 (1944); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 366
(1953).
1 Colo. Laws 1929, c. 123, p. 435.
11 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 86-5-1 to 11 (1953).
1 Lane, Mechanics' Liens in Colarado 44 (1948); and see annotator's note to Colo. Stat. Ann. Vol.
3B, c. 101, § 39 (1935).
13 Colo. Laws 1953, c. 63.
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attempts to appraise the law is inclined to feel somewhat like the
young lady at a cocktail party who after several drinks remarked
to her host, "You know, I feel more like I do now than at any time
since I've been here." He is faced with the facts that we perhaps
still have at least two statutes granting lien rights for labor and
materials expended upon oil and gas operations; that one is general
in its nature and one is specific; that the specific is even more spe-
cific than that specific act of 1903 (which enjoyed judicial interpre-
tation), and that there are no current appellate decisions.
The remark that "we still have at least two statutes" is inten-
tional. Quite possibly Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953, section 86-3-4,
granting a lien to miners might be viewed by some as a third statute
giving a lien to those who furnish labor or materials to an oil and gas
well. The fact that the provision in the 1911 act specifying applica-
tion of the miners lien to an oil well was deleted from the 1915 stat-
ute militates against such a conclusion. However, the wording of the
1915 statute, particularly that which grants a lien to those perform-
ing work or supplying materials to a "deposit yielding metals or
minerals of any kind," leaves room for a finding that it can be
applied to oil and gas situations, and other states have so held in the
face of more restrictive terminology. 14 Whether the mining section
is a third statutory grant of lien is not felt to be generally significant
14 Berentz v. Belmont Oil Co., 148 Cal. 577, 84 Pac. 49 (1906). Laborers working on the develop-
ment of an oil well were entitled to a lien against the lessee's interest under the provisions of Code
Civ. Proc. 1 1183 (Stats. 1908, p. 84): "any person who performs labor in any mining claim or
claims, or in or upon any real property worked as a mine . . . has a lien upon the same, and the
works owned and used by the owners for reducing the ores from such mining claim or claims, or
real property so worked as a mine, for the work or labor done or materials furnished
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because the miners' lien proviso by its own terms,15 by judicial inter-
pretation'6  and by renactment 17 is part of our general lien act.
Where, however, there are unitized oil and gas operations the lawyer
with a lien problem may wish to give this section careful attention,
and it is in this. connection that we shall discuss it separately in a
later installment. Otherwise, during the course of the article we
shall treat the miners' lien section merely as a part of the general
lien statute.
It is unfortunate that the specific lien statute relating to oil and
gas wells and operations was not also correlated to the general lien
law in the manner which was employed in the miners' lien law.
Since it is not so correlated, we are faced with the principal ques-
tion, which we noted in our discussion of the Terminal case, of
whether (a) the general lien act and the specific act are coextensive
and cumulative in all their provisions and, therefore, may be em-
ployed conjunctively or alternatively in those areas of the law
where they both contain provisos, and further may be em-
ployed conjunctively in those areas of the law where only one legis-
lates; or (b) the specific statute, being the later and more detailed
statute, is the exclusive statutory enactment as to those areas of lien
law in which it legislates, being cumulative only with the provisions
of the general statute which are required for a complete enjoyment
of such lien right given in the specific act.18
We were unable to find any definitive answers to this query.
We know of no authority in Colorado bearing squarely on the ques-
tion. The cases from those other jurisdictions which have both a
general and specific act relative to lien rights for labor and materials
furnished to oil and gas operations are of limited help because of
factual distinctions. In most of such states the statutes are similar to
0 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 86-3-4 (1953), incroporates the terms of § 86-3-1 by reference at three
different points. The original act also contained such references but to the applicable section of
Colorado Revised Statutes, 1908.
'- Chain O'Mines Inc. v. Lewiston, 100 Colo. 186, 66 P.2d 802 (1937)
17 Colo. Comp. Laws § 6445 (1921).
18 To illustrate the divergent results which occur when the two concepts ore applied, assume that
a roustabout is unpaid for his work in a given week, at the end of which he quit, and assume
further that the drilling of the well is not completed for another seven months. If the statutes are
considered coextensive, the claimant would have a maximum time for filing his lien statement
within 30 days after completion of the work. If the special statute is considered exclusive, the
claimant's maximum time for filing would be six months after the time he completed his work.
A more difficult question is presented where the specific statute does not contain a clear pro-
vision to cover the situation. For example, the question arises as to whether a copy of the lien
statement must be served upon the owner. If the statutes ore coextensive, clearly a copy must be so
served. If the specific statute is exclusive, it is probably not necessary to serve such a copy, although




our 1903 act in that they give the right to a statutory lien and there-
after dictate that the same shall be enforced pursuant to the pro-
visions of the general mechanics lien law of the state.19 In other
words, such statutes exist in a manner almost identical to that which
our miners' lien law now enjoys. Further, the Poudre River case
shows a reticence by our supreme court to be persuaded by decisions
which apply to the lien laws of other states, where there is any dif-
ference in wording.20
In this near void of authority it is possible to argue either side
of the stated question with some force. In contending that the acts
are coextensive in all their provisions it can be asserted that the
mandate in the specific statute2 1 that such law is "cumulative" with
other lien laws is to be construed in its very broadest sense. As noted
in subsequent portions of this paper, however, such a purely literal
interpretation of this provision creates difficult problems in the
application of the two statutes relative to substantive rights.
There is room within the generally worded opinion of the
Terminal case to conclude that our supreme court meant, in holding
the 1903 and 1899 statutes to exist in pari materia, that all of the
provsions of both acts are to be applied alternatively and conjunc-
tively. Conceivably, too, the court's decision in Chain O'Mines v.
Lewison1 implies a similar result. There the defendants attempted
to abridge the effect of the miners' lien section of the Compiled
Laws, 1921 (being the 1915 act). They argued that the mining sec-
tion could not give a lien for labor upon operations outside the scope
of the general lien section, since the mining section specifically
referred to the general lien act. In answer the supreme court stated
that the lien section of the general act which became law in 1899
and also the lien provision of the mining statute, adopted in 1915,
must be viewed in the light that the legislative intention was to
broaden and not to restrict the scope of the general mechanics' lien
law. It is perhaps arguable, by analogy, that a like interpretation of
our specific oil and gas statute and the general lien law would yield
a finding that these two statutes exist coextensively. The difficulty
of such a position, however, lies in the fact that the 1915 act by its
- Montana: Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 45-1003 (1947) reads: "The lien herein created (i.e., the
specific act) shall be enforced in the same manner, and the notice of same shall be given in the
same manner, and the materialmen's statement, or the lien of any laborer herein mentioned, shall
be filed in the same manner as now provided by the laws of Montana for materialmen's and
mechanics' liens, except that the time within which such liens must be filed shall be six months
instead of ninety days; and the method of procedure provided by the laws of the state of Montana
for enforcing materialmen's and mechanics' liens shall govern the enforcement thereof." Blose v.
House Oil and Gas Co., 96 Mont. 450, 31 P.2d 738 (1934) construed the statute as incorporating
even the provision of the general low prescribing duties of county clerks in indexing the lien.
Oklahoma, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 42, § 144 (1951), the specific act, was enacted with the state's
first comprehensive lien legislation; and § 146, with phrasing very similar to the Montana statute
quoted above, serves to incorporation the procedural provisions of the general lien act. While under
the general act the labor must be performed on the building and the material must be used in the
construction of it, that is not the case under the oil well lien statute. Consequently, a supplier of
tools or other third party whose materials do not end up embodied in the structure is protected only
in a well drilling enterprise. See Consolidated Cut Stone Co. v. Seidenback, 181 Okla. 578, 75 P.2d
442 (1938) and cases cited in the opinion.
Texas: Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5473 (Vernon 1956), Oil and Gas Lien Statute, dates from 1917;
and prior to its enactment, there was probably no statutory lien available to laborers and material-
men in the oil and gas industry. Oil Field Salvage Co. v. Simon, 140 Tex. 456 ,168 S.W. 2d 848
(1943). Art. 5476 provides that notice and other proceedings to secure and enforce to the lien shall
be advanced in the "same time and in the same manner" as provided for in the general lien chapter.
20 Poudre River Oil Corp. v. Carey, 83 Colo. 419, 426, 266 Pac. 201, 203 (1928).
2 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-5-10 (1953).
2 100 Colo. 186, 187, 66 P.2d 802, 803 (1937).
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own terms quite clearly was intended as an amendment expanding
the scope of the general lien act.
To our minds the more acceptable construction, which is of
equal or greater compatibility with the Terminal decision, is based
upon our concept of a common sense application of the two statutes.
It has often been said that the law is really nothing more than good
common sense, as modified by statutes' and court decsions. Since the
modifications here are not clear, we can only recommend this con-
struction to you as the proper one under the circumstances, not as
the most probable one.
To common sense, then. It should not be overlooked that the
mechanic's lien is "a creature of statute"' 3 and despite the general
tendency to construe mechanics' lien statutes liberally as to rights of
enforcement 4 the authority for the lien must still be found in the
statute. A careful reading of the general mechanics' lien sections
does not provide a clear basis for the claim of lien in situations in-
volving oil and gas operations. It is our opinion that this gap was
filled by the 1903 act, which was intended to be the sole authority
for claiming a lien against oil and gas interests. Where a statute
adopted in 1899 gives a lien against property for work done and
materials furnished, and is couched in terms clearly identified with
the building construction trade, it is only logical to assume that an
act appearing in 1903 relating only to liens against oil and gas inter-
ests should provide the only means by which such a lien is to be
obtained. It has been so held in at least one jurisdiction with com-
parable statutes.
25
We find implicit support for this position in the Poudre River
case.26 The court's decision impliedly rules out any construction of
the general statute and specific statute as co-extensive. Had the
court considered this construction applicable, it could have avoided
the narrow question upon which the case was decided and found a
lien for the plaintiff based upon the general lien law.
2 Lane, Mechanics' Liens in Colorado 3 (1948).
244 Summers, Oil and Gas 115 (1938).
2
5
Ball v. Davis, 118 Tex. 534, 18 S.W.2d 1063 (1929).
" In our opinion, the Poudre River case reached a questionable result. The Court disposed of the
lien question hurriedly by distinguishing the oil and gas lien 'statute from other similar statutes as
being less broad in the scope of its language, and by pulling out of context the phrase "so fur-
nished." The Court concluded that the use of the phrase "so furnished" showed the legislature's in-
tent to provide a lien for the supplier against the property which he supplied-really a lien in the
nature of a purchase money mortgage. However admirable such an intent might be, we believe that
it is contrary to the ordinary concept of the mechanic's lien, and that the legislature had failed to
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We see nothing inconsistent between this interpretation of the
Poudre River case and the holding in the Terminal case that the
general act and the specific act of 1903 were to be applied in pari
materia. We believe that the Terminal holding means specifically
that those provisions of the general lien law which are necessary
and convenient to the enjoyment of the full benefits of the lien con-
ferred by the specific statute are applicable to the special lien as
well as to the general lien.
2 7
In view of this historical development of the special lien law,
it seems logical to conclude that a lien claimant against an oil and
gas interest obtains his basic right solely from the special statute.
Obviously, at the time of enactment, it was not thought that these
statutes gave two duplicate remedies; but, rather it was thought that
the remedy was given for two different situations. It is clear that
the legislature was fully aware of the existing general lien law at
the time the special provisions were enacted, since the various
enactments of the specific statute contained provisions to show that
the act was cumulative to the rights conferred by the general lien
law. Regardless of the manner of approach and of the statutes iden-
'n It seems to us to be more than coincidental that the 1929 act appeared in the first legislature
following the Poudre River and Terminal cases, although the 1929 enactment does not clearly dispose
of the problems disclosed or created by those decisions. This act closely follows the language and
format of the Wyoming statute (Wyo. Camp. Stat. Ann., c. 55, §55-401 to 413) (Supp. 1955),. original-
ly enacted in 1919, insofar as the same applies to oil and gas interests, except for certain additional
sentences included in our act which are outside the natural pattern of the statute and from which
many of the problems attendant upon our present statute stem. Since the legislative history of the
1929 enactment cannot be reconstructed, either from the sponsor of the Colorado bill, or from the
legislative reference office of the Attorney General's office, we can only surmise that the 1929 act
was occasioned by the Poudre River and Terminal cases, and that it was patterned after the Wyo-
ming statute.
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tified with it, therefore, if the situation is that of a claimant against
an oil and gas interest, it follows that the claim must be and is made
under the specific statute.
Upon this theory, the obvious conflicts between the two statutes
can be resolved. The specific statute, if applicable at all, is applicable
in all its provisions to the exclusion of any conflicting provision in
the general lien law.
This construction, at least in part, finds specific judicial
sanction, though not binding in Colorado. The Texas court was
faced with the very question with which we are concerned here in
construing similar Texas statutory provisions. 8 The court supplied
this excellent reasoning in relating the two statutes:
The fact is that at the time of the enactment of the special
act here involved (chapter 3, title 90, article 5473 et seq.)
the oil industry had assumed large proportions in Texas. It
was then apparent that it might become, as it has since
become, one of the major industries of the state; and it was
doubtless the opinion of the Legislature that the interests
of those in the business, whether as laborers, mechanics,
materialmen, or operators and owners, made it necessary
that their rights no longer be made to depend on general
statutes of, to say the least, doubtful construction and in-
definite application and meaning; and so, in its wisdom,
because of the growing importance of the subject, and be-
cause of the number of people engaged in the industry, and
the values involved, enacted the special law to regulate,
govern, and control the special subjects named therein; but
as to general subjects which might be in the oil industry,
as in any other, such as the construction of buildings, liens
for accountants, clerks, repair men, etc., leave the general
laws, articles 5452, 5483, and 5503, as they were, applicable
The Court of Civil Appeals in Texas in the Ball case, note 29 infra, had decided the matter
according to the contention of the lien claimants that they were entitled to a lien under any one
of several statutory sections. The Supreme Court reversed the holding upon a logical analysis of the
Texos statutes, such as we have proposed for the Colorado statutes. The Court said:
.. The Court of Civil Appeals was of the opinion that Davis not only had a lien under
chapter 3, title 90. (articles 5473-.5479), relating to mechanic's liens on oil and mineral prop-
erty but likewise had a lien for the work here done under chapter 2 (articles 5452-5472) of
that title, being the general statute relating to laborer's and mechanic's liens, also under
chapter 5 (articles 5483-5488) relating particularly to farm, factory, and store operatives,
and under articles 5503 to 5505, chapter 7, articles especially providing a lien for repair
of any article, etc.
'Chapter 3 of title 90, which embraces articles 5473 to 5475 of the Revised Statutes,
was originally enacted in 1917, and deals specially and particularly with the liens of
materialmen, artisans, laborers, and mechanics engaged in the oil industry. The Court
of Civil Appeals was of the opinion that, because article 5479 declares that these articles
relating specially to oil and mineral property should be cumulative as to rights and reme-
dies given materialmen, artisans, laborers, and mechanics by other laws, that materialmen.
artisans, laborers, and mechanics in the oil industry could look to other chapters of title
90 for their liens. With this holding we cannot agree. By article 5473 materialmen, artisans,
laborers, and mechanics, for certain services, are authorized to fix liens against certain
properties for specified services.
"The purposes of the declaration of cumulative effect was not, to make other statutory
provisions applicable to those covered by the act itself, but to show that the things for
which liens were given by the act were not intended to nullify other lien statutes in favor
of mechanics, laborers, clerks, and others performing services in the oil industry, and materi-
almen who might furnish material in the oil or mining industry not covered by a special
act."
The value of this case in Colorado is somewhat lessened by the fact that the court here was aided
by the emergency clause of the enactment which stated:
"There being no law protecting laborers and materialmen for labor performed for
owners of lands, mines or quarries or owners of leaseholds for oil, gas, pipe lines or rights
of way for mining or quarrying purposes, creates an emergency and imperative public
necessity exists that the constitutional rule requiring bills to be read on three several days
be and the same is hereby suspended and that this act take effect and be in force from
and after its passage, and it is so enacted."
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then to subjects not covered by article 5473, and still
applicable thereto.
The very purpose of special statutes is to make the law
plain and easily ascertainable, and to hold that the special
statutes as to the class of labor particularly named in article
5473 are not exclusive, but that various other statutes of a
general nature apply, adds confusion to the subject, and the
law becomes a trap, calculated to involve all but the most
astute in its toils. No such construction will be given it as
to those named and the classes of labor set forth and the
lien given in article 5473.29
This construction is also supported by the normal rules of
statutory construction that (1) the more specific statute controls,
and (2) the later statute controls. The application of these rules with
the application of statutes in pari materia was approved by the
Colorado court in the case of Burton v. Denver.30
It should be noted by way of caution that this construction is
not the panacea. Although it resolves, as a practical matter, the
conflicts in the statutes, it leaves unanswered the questions as to
what provisions are in conflict, and it points up the weaknesses and
conflicts within the specific statute itself. These, and the many
possible variations of the two views which we have expressed here,
will be discussed in the subsequent installments of this article in
which detailed questions of entitlement to the lien, notice and
priority are considered.
(To be concluded in a later issue of DICTA)
mBol v. Davis, 118 Texas 534, 18 S.W.2d 1065, 1066 (1929) (emphasis supplied).
mBurton v. Denver, 99 Colo. 207, 61 P.2d 856 (1936).
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INTRODUCTION
The oil and gas industry has been characterized by the creation
of a variety of contractual arrangements and proprietary interests
which in many respects are sui generis and preclude definitive
analytical classification as contractual rights or proprietary inter-
ests. Inasmuch as tax consequences frequently depend upon such
classification, it is not surprising that the in oil payment is the
subject of considerable tax litigation. An oil payment is an interest
or contract under which the holder thereof is entitled to receive a
specified amount out of a specified portion of the oil production or
proceeds from the sale of production. A typical oil payment may,
for example, provide that the holder thereof shall receive $100,000
out of the proceeds from the sale of one-eighth of the production.
Ordinarily there is no obligation to pay the specified amount except
out of the designated percentage of production and the specified
amount is not a lien against the property generally; the tax conse-
quences of oil payments discussed herein are dependent upon these
characteristics.1
An oil payment may be created by reservation or it may be
created as a result of a direct grant or assignment. If created by
grant or assignment, as distinguished from creation by reserva-
tion, it is frequently referred to as a "carved-out oil payment." An
oil payment may be reserved in connection with a mineral, royalty
IPerkins v. Thomas, 301 U.S. 655 (1937). Comparable production payments are created with
respect to minerals other than oil and the principles discussed herein are generally applicable ir-
respective of the mineral involved. Commissioner v. Weed, 241 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1957) (sulphur).
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or leasehold conveyance and it may be carved out of mineral in-
terests, royalty interests, leasehold interests or a larger oil pay-
ment. Oil payments, as indicated in the discussion below, are cre-
ated in numerous situations and for various reasons, not the least
of which are tax reasons.
RESERVED OIL PAYMENTS
A, the owner of an oil and gas lease, assigns the lease to B for a
substantial consideration reserving a $100,000 oil payment payable
out of one-eighth of the proceeds from the sale of production. This
is the typical situation resulting in the reservation of an oil pay-
ment. A, in the context of this transaction, could have reserved an
overriding royalty as distinguished from an oil payment, but with
entirely different tax consequences. The reservation of an oil pay-
ment for tax purposes results in a sale subject to capital gains treat-
ment,2 whereas the reservation of an overriding royalty tax-wise
would result in a leasing transaction and the cash consideration re-
ceived by A would be ordinary income subject to depletion. 3 Inas-
much as it is ordinarily desirable from the taxpayer's standpoint to
regard the consideration received as capital gain rather than or-
dinary income, tax motivations are usually sufficient inducement to
the informed taxpayer to reserve an oil payment rather than an
overriding royalty in this situation. The disadvantage to A in this
situation is that if he reserves an oil payment the total proceeds
received by him from the sale of production over the lifetime of the
property ordinarily will be less than the amount received from a
comparable overriding royalty. This disadvantage can be obviated
in part by making the oil payment sufficiently large, but if the
amount of the oil payment is unreasonable in the light of the estima-
ted reserves of the property, the Internal Revenue Service undoubt-
edly will contend that the taxpayer has in effect reserved an over-
riding royalty. Inasmuch as this determination must be made at the
time of the transaction it is difficult, if not impossible, to take into
consideration such variables as fluctuations in the price of oil and
revisions in reserve estimates.
With respect to producing properties, termination of the oil
payment prior to depletion of the reserves can be assured by pro-
viding that regardless of the amount of the oil payment it shall ter-
minate at any time the value of the estimated remaining reserves is
less than, for example, 150% of the unpaid balance of the oil pay-
ment. However, with respect to "wildcat" non-producing properties,
it is impossible to adopt mechanics which will assure the termina-
tion of the oil payment prior to the termination of the economic life
of the leasehold. Although the author has found no cases or rulings
on this point, it is likely that the Internal Revenue Service will take
the position that the reservation of an oil payment on the assign-
ment of non-producing acreage involves a leasing transaction and
not a sale.
The reserved oil payment is an economic interest in oil and gas
in place and the owner thereof can take statutory or cost depletion
on all income received from the oil payment. 4 Inasmuch as the
2 Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
. Ibid.
'Perkins v. Thomas, 301 U.S. 655 (1937).
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holder of the oil payment has no operating rights, he is not entitled
to take any deduction for intangible drilling costs.6 The sale of the
entire reserved oil payment at some subsequent date permits the
seller to subject the proceeds from the sale to capital gains treat-
ment.6 The holding period for capital gains purposes commences
from the date on which the taxpayer acquired the oil and gas in-
terests out of which the oil payment was reserved.
7
CARVED-OUT OIL PAYMENTS
Carved-out payments may be used as vehicles to finance the
drilling of a well either by the sale of such payments for cash with
the proceeds pledged for the development of a well or in exchange
for services and/or equipment employed in the drilling of a well. In
the event the proceeds from the sale are pledged to the development
of a well or if given in exchange for services or equipment employed
in the drilling of a well, the transaction is not taxable and the tax-
payer merely reduces his development costs by the amount of cash,
services, or equipment received." The taxpayer's principal problem
in connection with oil and gas payments created for development
purposes is establishing that he was obligated to use such proceeds
in the development of a particular well and that the proceeds were,
in fact, used for this purpose. Taxpayers on frequent occasions have
been unable to sustain the burden of proof on these issues because
of loosely or improperly drawn agreements or because of failure to
maintain adequate records.9
The taxpayer may carve out an oil payment in order to realize
cash to be used for purposes other than the development of a well
or may assign a carved-out oil payment as a gift to a family member
or to a charity and it is in these situations that the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and the taxpayers are now doing battle. Three
conflicting views as to the nature and tax consequences of such
transactions have been advanced:
(1) The Internal Revenue Service position is that a carved-out
oil payment is an attempt to anticipate income and that the consid-
eration received by the assignor is to be regarded as ordinary income
subject to depletion. 0 With respect to the gift situation, under this
view the donor must continue to report the income payable to the
holder of the oil payment as income subject to the depletion allow-
ance and at the time of the donor's death the oil payment is regarded
as part of the donor's estate. In the case of a gift to a charity the
donor cannot deduct the oil payment as a charitable contribution in
the year of its creation, but at the time of the receipt of income from
the oil payment can deduct the amount of such income as a charita-
ble contribution for that particular year.1
(2) The position of most taxpayers is that the creation of a
carved-out oil payment is either a sale or gift, as the case may be, of
a capital asset. 2 In the sale situation any consideration received is
subject to capital gains treatment. In the gift situation income re-
Proposed U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.612.4.
C G.C.M. 24849, 1946-1 Cure. Bull. 66.
Alice G. K. Kleberg, 2 T.C. 1024 (1943) (acq.).8
G.C.M. 24849, 1946-1 Cum. Bull. 66.
See e.g., Rogan v. Blue Ridge Oil Co., 83 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1936).
o I.T. 4003, 1950-1 Cum. Bull. 10.
Ibid.
uSee, e.g., Scofield v. O'Connor, 241 F.2d 65 (5th Cir .1957).
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ceived is subject to capital gains treatment. In the gift situation
income received from the oil payment 3 is taxable to the donee and
the oil payment is not part of the donor's estate. 4 In the case of a
gift to a charity the taxpayer deducts the value of the oil payment
as a charitable contribution in the year in which it is created.15
(3) The loan rationale obviously can be applicable only to the
sale situation. Under this theory the transaction is regarded as if the
consideration advanced to the assignor is a loan to him from the
party acquiring the oil payment. The consideration received by the
assignor is not taxable at the time the oil payment is created, but the
income received by the holder of the oil payment is regarded as
ordinary, depletable income to the assignor taxable as received by
the holder. 16 The holder of the oil payment regards the income from
the oil payment as received as the repayment of a loan and not tax-
able to him except to the extent that such income is greater than
the amount originally paid for the oil payment. The Internal Rev-
enue Service initially distinguished between the carving out of
short-lived and long-lived oil payments; regarding the carving out
of a long-lived oil payment as a sale or completed gift, as the case
may be, and the carving out of a short-lived oil payment as an
Is Lester A. Nordan, 22 T.C. 1132 (1954).
14 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2031.
Is Lester A. Nordon, 22 T.C. 1132 (1954).
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assignment of future income.17 In 1950 the Internal Revenue Service
abandoned the distinction between short-lived and long-lived oil
payments both with respect to sales and gifts and now takes the
position that all carved-out oil payments involve assignments of
income rather than assignments of income-producing property and
as such result in the anticipation of income with the consequence
noted above.1 8 This position has been consistently rejected by the
Tax Court, but not without dissent.'"
The carved-out oil payment has had a checkered career in the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. In 1953 the Fifth Circuit held that
the creation of carved-out oil payments having from nine to thirteen
year payouts involved the sale of capital assets and that the con-
sideration received was subject to capital gainst treatment.2 1 In 1956
in the Hawn case21 the Fifth Circuit without equivocation estab-
lished "substantiality" as the criterion for determining whether the
creation of an oil payment involved a sale or anticipation of income.
Relying primarily on gift in trust cases of the type that gave rise to
the Clifford rules12 the court held that if the oil payment was insub-
stantial in terms of duration or in terms of its relation to the
assignor's total interest,23 its creation and assignment is an assign-
ment of future income. The court went on to hold that an oil
payment with an anticipated two-year payout and with an actual
nineteen month payout was not of substantial duration. The fair
inference of Hawn is that the carving out of an oil payment which
will not continue for a substantial period of time is not a sale of a
capital asset but is rather an anticipation of future income.
-2 4
Early in 1957 the Fifth Circuit, despite its own protestations to
the contrary, in fact, but not in words, repudiated the Hawn decision
in a series of five cases21 holding that as to both oil payments
carved out of a royalty and oil payments carved out of a working
interest the creation of such oil payments with estimated times of
payout varying from three to twelve years and actual payout periods
of from twenty-eight months to nine years resulted in sales rather
than anticipation of income. The only reference to substantiality is
a passing reference to the amount of the oil payment -6 the court
declaring that the Hawn case was not a holding to the effect that
there was no sale because "in amount it [the oil payment] was in-
subtantial" but "that it was not a sale at all, it was a credit arrange-
ment. which, though in form an assignment of the oil interest ...
was in fact and in law nothing but an anticipatory assignment of in-
" G.C.M. 24849, 1946-1 Cum. Bull. 66.
. I.T. 4003, 1950-1 Cum. Bull. 10.
'5See, e.g., John David Hawn, 23 T.C. 516 (1954), rev'd sub, non Commissioner v. Hawn, 231
F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1956).
2 Caldwell v. Campbell, 218 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1955).
"Commissioner v. Hawn, 231 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1956).
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 674.
m "In all of these cases, therefore, it is apparent that the courts have held income is still taxable
to various kinds of transferors, notwithstanding the fact that a transfer, complete and in good faith,
has been made to another. There is no different rule of law that requires the court to give any
degree of finality to a transfer which apparently fits under Section 117, than to one made under the
terms of the gift sections of the law." 231 F.2d at 345.
U4 "We are to consider the substantiality of the transfer and that the duration of the estate
covered by the transfer is an element of such substantiality." 231 F.2d at 348.
Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 241 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1957); Scofield v. O'Connor, 241 F.2d
65 (5th Cir. 1957); Commissioner v. Weed, 241 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1957); Fleming v. Commissioner,
241 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1957); Commissioner v. Wrather, 241 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1957). The Supreme
Court has granted certiorari in all five cases. 25 U.S.L. Week 3357 (U.S. June 3, 1957).~' Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 241 F.2d 71, 7-(5th Cir. 1957).
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come made as security for, and in payment of, Hawn's debt to the
contractor -2 7 .... " The court disregarded the entire thrust of the
Hawn opinion and its detailed consideration of cases for the penulti-
mate paragraph of the Hawn opinion where, without citation of
authority and at best as an alternative basis, the Hawn court had
likened the transaction to a loan arrangement. 2 It should be noted
that the assignor in the Hawn case had no personal obligation to pay
the amount of the oil payment and the owner of the oil payment had
no lien against the property as such. If Hawn had a "debt" to the
contractor it was a debt without any personal obligation and there
appears to be no basis for distinguishing this "debt' from that
created generally in carving out oil payments. It is true that the
purchaser of the oil payment borrowed, at least in part, the moneys
used indirectly by him in acquiring the oil payment, and the govern-
ment contended that in effect he was acting as the assignor's agent
in making the loan. However, the court in the Hawn case specifically
stated with respect to this contention that, "we need not cast it in
this mold . . .. "
It is interesting to note that only Judge Borah participated in
the decisions in both the Hawn case and the 1957 series of Fifth Cir-
cuit oil payment cases. Chief Judge Hutcheson, who did not partici-
pate in the Hawn case wrote all of the opinions in the five recent
cases, and Judge Tuttle who did not participate in the five recent
decisions wrote the opinion in the Hawn case. The conclusion seems
almost unavoidable that with respect to carved-out oil payments
there is in fact a conflict within the Fifth Circuit.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has denied capital gains
treatment for a carved-out oil payment which paid out within five
years, three and one-half months. The Seventh Circuit in the Slagter
case3" held that the carving out of the oil payment resulted in the
anticipation of income. However, rather than holding the considera-
tion received upon assignment of the oil payment taxable as ordina-
ry income at the time of receipt, the court characterized the moneys
advanced for the oil payment as a loan and held the income from
the oil payment taxable to the assignor as ordinary depletable in-
come as received by the assignee.
The Fifth Circuit has refused to distinguish between oil pay-
ments carved out of royalty interests and oil payments carved out
of working interests. The Commissioner argued unsuccessfully with
respect to oil payments carved out of the working interest that such
interests were mere assignments of future income and not assign-
ments of interests in real property and further that such oil pay-
ments actually represented assignments of oil which is property
"held primarily for sale in the ordinary course of business." The
court, relying primarily on local property concepts, characterized
oil payments regardless of their source as interests in real prop-
erty." The Fifth Circuit also rejected the Commissioner's contention
' Id. at 67.
' See note 2) supra at 347.
Ibid.
Commissioner v. Slagter, 238 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1956).
' Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 241 F.2d 71, 76 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. granted. 25 U.S.L.
Week 3357 (U.S. June 3, 1957) (No. 921).
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that the assignor's holding period with respect to a carved-out oilpayment does not commence until the oil payment is created. 32
The Tax Court has held that a gift of a carved-out oil payment
resulted in a completed gift rather than anticipation of income.3
Although this question has not been litigated in the circuit courts,
it is clear from the court's reliance on gift cases in the Hawn de-
cision that it would have regarded the gift of a short-lived oil pay-
ment as involving an assignment of income.3 4
The staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation
and the Treasury Department has recommended legislation which
would in effect codify the position of the Internal Revenue Service




Oil payments are frequently used to finance the acquisition of
producing properties. The tax advantages are better understood bycomparing the mechanics employed with orthodox loan financing.
A is the seller of a productive property, B is the purchaser and C
finances the transaction. In the orthodox loan transaction B pays
part of the purchase price with his own funds, and borrows thebalance from C giving C an interest bearing note secured by a lien
on the property. In the ABC transaction A sells the entire working
interest for a specified amount in cash representing the amount B
would ordinarily pay with his own capital, and A reserves an oilpayment in the amount plus interest that ordinarily would have
been financed. The oil payment is then sold to C for the amount thatotherwise would have been financed, usually as a result of a pre-
arranged plan. The tax consequences of the orthodox loan trans-
actions are as follows: (1) A realizes capital gains treatment on the
purchase price. (2) C realizes taxable income on repayment of loan
and interest only to extent of the interest. (3) B must report as in-
come all the proceeds from production including that portion used
in the repayment of the loan. B, in computing his taxable income,
deducts statutory or cost depletion, whichever is the greater. The
tax consequences of the ABC transaction are as follows: (1) A real-
izes capital gains treatment both with respect to the consideration
received for the working interest and the consideration received for
the oil payment. It is extremely important that the oil payment be
reserved rather than carved-out by B after the conveyance in order
to avoid the anticipated income theory discussed above. 6 (2) C re-
covers the amount paid for the oil payment through cost depletion
and is taxed only on the amount actually received over the amount
advanced, such excessive amount being comparable to interest pay-
ments. (3) B, the purchaser, realizes the principal tax advantage
from this transaction in that the amount payable to C under the
oil payment is excluded from B's income whereas in the orthodox
loan transaction such amounts would be included in B's income
32 Id. at 74.
Lester A. Nordan, 22 T.C. 1132 (1954). Accord R. E. Nail, 27 B.T.A. 33 (1932).
e See note 21 supra at 345.
s Report, Joint Committee on Internal Revenue, Taxation, and Treasury Department, 85th Cong.,
1st Sess. (Nov. 7, 1956).
s8 should acquire a sufficient working interest so that operating costs will not exceed revenueduring the payment period; otherwise excess costs will probably have to be capitalized as acquisitioncosts and recovered through depletion rather than deducted as a loss.
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even though applied on the loan. Although the amount of the loan
in the orthodox loan transaction would be recovered through cost
depletion, it would have to be amortized over the entire productive
life of the property, whereas use of the oil payment method in
effect permits amortization of the "loan" over the payout period of
the oil payment. In addition, after the oil payment has terminated
B can take statutory depletion which will offset in part at least the
cost depletion he could have taken if an orthodox loan had been
used, and as a result, ordinarily the total taxable income to B over
the entire productive life of the property is less in the ABC situation.
The characterization of an oil payment as a "loan" in the Slagter
and Hawn cases suggests the possibility that a court may apply the
loan analysis to the ABC transaction and destroy the advantages
generally assumed. If, as the Fifth Circuit has indicated in distin-
guishing. Hawn, there can be a "debt" without an obligation to pay
and an attempt is to be made to analytically determine whether the
transaction is in substance a "loan," the loan analysis would logically
apply to the usual ABC transaction. The implication of the Fifth
Circuit's subsequent construction of Hawn that the transaction may
involve a loan because C borrows the money3 is also disturbing in
this context, for if C is not a bank, in many instances he has
borrowed the money from a bank. While Slagter and Hawn involved
carved-out oil payments and the ABC transaction usually involves
a reserved oil payment, this does not appear an appropriate distinc-
tion if the question for determination is whether the transaction is
in substance a "loan."
EXCHANGES FOR PROPERTY OF LIKE KIND
Exchanges of property held for productive use in trade or
business or for investment for property of like kind are non-tax-
able.38 The Fifth Circuit has held that the exchange of a fee interest
in the minerals for an oil payment is a tax-free exchange of real
property interests of a like kind, 9 and has recently held that the
exchange of an oil payment for developed urban property is an ex-
change of property of a like kind."0 In reaching this conclusion the
court held that both the oil payment and the developed urban prop-
erty are interests in real property and the fact that the oil payment
is for a limited duration whereas the urban property is an interest in
a fee does not preclude the exchange from being an exchange of
properties of a like kind.4
CONCLUSION
In view of the conflict between the Fifth and Seventh Circuits
and within the Fifth Circuit as to the nature of carved-out oil pay-
ments and tax consequences arising from their creation, tax plan-
ning will be facilitated by an early resolution of this conflict by the
Supreme Court. In the event the conflict is resolved prospectively
by legislation, the adaptation of the "Clifford Rules" particularly
with respect to making "duration" a controlling consideration,
appears to be more equitable than legislation designed to require
the applicationof the Commissioner's anticipation of income theory.
See note 29 supra and related text.
s8 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1031.
SFleming v. Campbell, 205 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1953).
40 Fleming v. Campbell, 241 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1957).
41 Ibid. Accord Commissioner v. Crichton, 122 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1941).
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A FORM OF MORTGAGE AND ASSIGNMENT OF OIL
AND GAS PRODUCTION
By DONALD W. HOAGLAND
Donald W. Hoagland received his B.A. degree from Yale University in
1943, and his LL.B. from Columbia Law School in 1948. He is a member
of the Colorado, Denver, New York and American Bar Associations, and
a partner in the Denver firm of Lewis, Grant and Davis.
Subjecting an interest in land to the lien of a security instru-
ment is common practice and is a routine operation for most prac-
titioners. When the subject-matter involved is an interest whose
value lies in oil or gas production, some special problems arise that
call for special treatment. The purpose of this article is to tender
a suggested form of mortgage designed to meet these special prob-
lems.
The form is intended for use in Colorado, and would probably
be considered acceptable by our brethren in most of the surround-
ing states. This reference to jurisdictions activates a warning that
must be issued about the form: Whether the law governing the
validity and priority of the lien is the law of the state whose rocks
produce the mineral may depend on whether or not that state char-
acterizes the interest being mortgaged as in interest in land. For this
purpose Colorado is, unfortunately, in mid-air about this with
reference to the lessee's interest and most related interests, so that
the form attempts to pass muster as a chattel mortgage as well as
a real estate mortgage. However, if the interest being mortgaged is
characterized as personal property for this purpose, then a conflict
of laws problem may exist and the draftsman should hedge his po-
sition as well as possible.
The form is also intended to accommodate mortgaged properties
in many counties and states. This is one reason why it is a mort-
gage and not a deed of trust to the public trustee. It provides for
future advances, to establish a continuing basis for financing
the development of a producing field. It contemplates that the
purchaser of production will pay the mortgagor's share directly
to the mortgagee. If used to encumber the interest of the lessee
under any reasonably conventional oil and gas lease, on Colorado
lands, it would be the better part of valor to record it as a mort-
gage of real estate and have it indexed in both the real estate and
chattel mortgage indices. Consideration should also be given to the
applicability of statutes dealing with assignments of accounts re-
ceivable and mortgaging of personal property held for sale.
This is the suggested form:
DICTA
July-August, 1957 DICTA 227
Mortgage and Assignment of Production
(THIS INSTRUMENT SECURES FUTURE ADVANCES)
THIS MORTGAGE AND ASSIGNMENT OF PRODUCTION (hereafter
referred to as the "Mortgage") is made as of the --------------- day of ------------------------- ,
19 ------ - betw een -------------------------------------------------- of  ..............................---- ---
hereafter called "Mortgagor" (whether one or more), and ...............................
hereafter called "Mortgagee."
It evidences that:
(1) Mortgagor is justly indebted to Mortgagee in the sum of $ ........... ,
and as evidence of such indebtedness has made, executed and delivered to
Mortgagee a certain promissory note of even date herewith payable to the
order of Mortgagee, due on or before ----------------- bearing interest at
-------- % per annum, and payable as follows: (Here insert payment provisions).
(2) Mortgagor has also promised, for value received, to pay any fur-
ther advances which Mortgagee or the holder of said note may, at its option,
make to Mortgagor, the amount of such further advances to become a part
of the principal indebtedness secured hereby, the total of Which principal
indebtedness shall not exceed $ ------------ such further advances to
be advanced on or before --------------------------- , 19 ------ , to bear interest at a
rate not to exceed ------- % per annum and to be due and payable on or before
-------------------------------------------- - 19 ......
NOW THEREFORE, (a) to secure the payment when due and payable
of the principal and interest of the promissory note described above, and any
and all renewals or extensions thereof or any part thereof; and (b) to secure
the payment when due and payable of all further advances which Mortgagee
may, at its option, make to Mortgagor as described above, together with in-
terest thereon; and (c) to secure to Mortgagee the payment of all other loans
or advances to Mortgagor and of all other indebtedness, liabilities or obliga-
tions of Mortgagor to Mortgagee, actual, direct or contingent, and now ex-
isting or hereafter arising, however created and wherever or however
acquired by Mortgagee (all of which is hereafter referred to as the "Indebt-
edness") all of which shall be secured equally and ratably with the payment
of the amount evidenced by the promissory note described above.
MORTGAGOR DOES GRANT, SELL, CONVEY, ASSIGN, PLEDGE,
AND MORTGAGE to Mortgagee, its successors and assigns forever, all of the
following property: (Here insert property descriptions, or make reference to
an exhibit or .schedule, to be attached, which will describe the Mort-
gaged property).
Together with:
(a) all further rights, interests and estates of whatsoever kind or char-
acter now held or hereafter acquired by Mortgagor in and to the lands or
leases described above and in and to all oil, gas and other minerals therein
and thereunder or which may be produced therefrom; and
(b) all of Mortgagor's right, title, interest and claim in and to all oil,
gas, oil wells, gas wells, equipment, buildings, structures, derricks, compres-
sors, engines, boilers, pumps, lines, tanks, meters, pipe lines, tubing, casing,
rods, pipe fixtures, oil in storage, machinery, supplies, appliances
and other personal property of every kind and character whatsoever, now
or hereafter located upon, connected with, appurtenant to or used or ob-
tained in connection with the lands or leases described above, and any and
all improvements, betterments, replacements and substitutions therefor and
additions thereto; and
(c) all of Mortgagor's right, title, interest and claim now held, or here-
after acquired, in and to all income, rents, royalties, profits and proceeds of
every kind and character arising from the lands or leases described above,
including Mortgagor's proportionate share or shares of all moneys and pro-
ceeds realized from the sale, use or marketing of all oil, gas, casing-head gas
and other minerals produced, saved, marketed or sold therefrom on and after
the 1st day of ---------------------------------------------- - 19 , at 7:00 o'clock a.m.;
All of which is hereafter referred to as the "Mortgaged Property" and
all of which shall be subject to the lien of this Mortgage for the benefit and
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security of Mortgagee, its successors and assigns, for the purposes and upon
the terms and conditions herein set forth;
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD all of said Mortgaged Property unto Mort-
gagee, its successors and assigns forever; PROVIDED, ALWAYS, that these
presents are upon the express condition that if Mortgagor shall pay or cause
to be paid promptly when due and payable the Indebtedness and all other
sums at any time secured hereby and shall fully keep and perform the cov-
enants, conditions and agreements herein contained, then, but only in such
event, these presents shall be satisfied and this Mortgage shall be released
by the Mortgagee; otherwise, the same shall remain in full force and effect.
The indemnities of Mortgagor to Mortgagee under this Mortgage shall sur-
vive any such satisfaction or release.
ARTICLE I
Mortgagor's Covenants and Warranties
Mortgagor convenants and warrants that:
1. Mortgagor has good and merchantable title to the Mortgaged
Property, free and clear of any and all prior liens or encumbrances, and has
full right and authority to make this instrument; all leases and lease-
hold interests included in the Mortgaged Property are valid and subsisting
and that all payments, rentals, royalties and obligations thereunder have
been duly paid and performed; and that Mortgagor will forever
defend all and singular the Mortgaged Property unto Mortgagee, its success-
ors and assigns forever, against every person whomsoever lawfully claiming
or to claim the same or any part thereof.
2. Mortgagor is entitled to receive all proceeds from the present and
future production of the oil, gas and other mineral interests described above,
and that such interests, including all such proceeds, are free and clear of all
liens, encumbrances, overriding royalty interests or production payments of
whatsoever kind or character, excepting only as may otherwise be expressly
stated herein.
3. Mortgagor will not at any time during the existence of this Mort-
gage, without first obtaining the written consent of Mortgagee thereto, sell,
assign, transfer, dispose of, encumber or collect any of the Mortgaged Prop-
erty, or attempt to sell, assign, transfer, dispose of, encumber or collect any
of the income or. proceeds at any time constituting a part of the Mortgaged
Property or remove or permit the removal of any of the Mortgaged Property
from the premises upon which the same may be situated.
4. Beginning with production on and after the 1st day of.
19 ------- , at 7:00 o'clock a.m., Mortgagee shall receive directly from any pur-
chaser of production of oil, gas or other minerals attributable to the Mort-
gaged Property, sold or to be sold, ......... % of the moneys due or to become
due for and on account of such production and Mortgagor will, whenever
and as often as requested by Mortgagee, promptly execute, acknowledge and
deliver such division and transfer orders and all other instruments, docu-
ments or assurances required by pipeline companies or others as may be
necessary or desirable in causing direct payments of such moneys to be
made to Mortgagee or in fully preserving and vesting in Mortgagee all of the
rights conferred or intended to be conferred upon Mortgagee by this Mort-
gage.
A COPY OF THIS MORTGAGE LODGED WITH ANY PURCHASER
OF PRODUCTION ACCRUING TO THE MORTGAGED PROPERTY SHALL
BE SUCH PURCHASER'S FULL AND COMPLETE AUTHORITY TO MAKE
DIRECT PAYMENTS TO MORTGAGEE IN THE FULL AMOUNT OR
AMOUNTS DUE MORTGAGOR UNTIL WRITTEN NOTICE FROM MORT-
GAGEE TO SUCH PURCHASER ADVISING SUCH PURCHASER TO MAKE
PAYMENTS OTHERWISE OR ADVISING SUCH PURCHASER THAT THE
INDEBTEDNESS SECURED HEREBY HAS BEEN FULLY DISCHARGED.
5. To the extent of Mortgagor's power to do so, and without respect to
who may be the operator of the leases, Mortgagor will cause compliance with
all of the covenants, express or implied, of all oil and gas leases, assign-
ments, farmout agreements, operating agreements and similar agreements
covering the Mortgaged Property and will not declare, or cause or assert the
termination or breach of any such lease, assignment or agreement without
the written consent of Mortgagor; will keep and maintain the Mortgaged
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Property in a good state of repair and condition and will not remove or tear
down any part thereof without the prior written consent of the Mortgagee;
and will pay all taxes with respect to the Mortgaged Property, including ad
valorem and excise taxes, and whether levied upon the Mortgaged Property
or upon the oil, gas or other minerals produced or upon their production or
severance, before they become delinquent.
6. Mortgagor will neither suffer nor permit the creation of any lien or
encumbrance of any kind or character against any part of the Mortgaged
Property; will permit Mortgagee's representatives, at all times to have access
to, go upon, examine, inspect and remain upon the Mortgaged Property and
to go upon the derrick floor of any well at any time drilled or being drilled
thereon and will furnish to Mortgagee and Mortgagee's representatives all
pertinent information with respect to the development and operation of the
Mortgaged Property; and will promptly notify Mortgagee, in writing, of the
commencement of any action or legal proceeding affecting any part of the
Mortgaged Property.
7. To the extent of Mortgagor's power to do so, Mortgagor will (a) cause
the Mortgaged Property to be developed and operated prudently and eco-
nomically in accordance with the best approved practice in the field in which
itls located, (b) pay Mortgagor's share, if any, of all expenses of development
and operation, (c) comply with all applicable laws affecting the operation
and development of the Mortgaged Property, including workmen's compen-
sation laws, (d) keep the Mortgaged Property insured against fire and all
other hazards in such amounts and with such companies as may be required
by Mortgagee and with loss payable to Mortgagee, so that, in the event of
foreclosure of this Mortgage, all such insurance shall pass to the purchaser
at the foreclosure sale; provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall
be construed as a waiver of the lien of this Mortgage as a first and prior lien
against the Mortgaged Property, now or hereafter, nor shall anything hegrein
contained be construed to empower Mortagor to bind Mortgageeg in any
contract or obligation or renter the Mortgagee in any way liable or responsible
for any bill or obligation incurred by Mortgagor.
8. Upon request of Mortgagee, Mortgagor will promptly take such action
as may to Mortgagee seem necessary or advisable for the purpose of remov-
ing, remedying or curing any defect in or cloud upon the title to the Mort-
gaged Property or any part thereof, including any defect in this Mortgage or
any note which it secures, whether now existing or hereafter developing, and
will fully indemnify Mortgagee against and save Mortgagee harmless from
any and all loss, cost, damage or expense, including attorneys' fees, which
Mortgagee may incur by reason of any such defect or cloud, or by reason
of any action taken by Mortgagee in the exercise of any right or power con-
ferred upon Mortgagee by this Mortgage. This covenant of indemnity shall
in all respects continue and remain in full force and effect even though all
indebtedness and other sums secured hereby may be fully paid and this Mort-
gage released.
9. Mortgagor will pay all costs, expenses, recording fees and taxes inci-
dent to the preparation, execution, filing and recording of this Mortgage and
all reasonable costs and expenses of engineering or geological reports.
10. Mortgagor will keep, perform and observe each and all of the cov-
enants, warranties, terms and conditions of the Loan Agreement, if any, be-
tween Mortgagor and Mortgagee. The terms of any such Loan Agreement are
incorporated herein by reference.
11. Mortgagor will pay all taxes which may be levied on the Mortgaged
Property by any state in which any part of the Mortgaged Property may
be situated, together with any other taxes or assessments which may be
levied by any such state against Mortgagee on account of this Mortgage or
the Indebtedness.
12. Mortgagor will make, execute, acknowledge and deliver to Mort-
gagee, promptly upon demand, all such further mortgages, assignments,
pledges, transfers and assurances as may be required by Mortgagee for the
better securing of the lien of the Indebtedness upon the Mortgaged Property,
whether hereby conveyed or intended to be conveyed or hereafter acquired
in connection with the development or operation of the Mortgaged Property,
and Mortgagor will do or cause to be done all such other acts and things
as may be necessary or proper to carry out the intent hereof.
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ARTICLE 11
Default and Remedies for Default
1. The following are defaults: (a) failure of Mortgagor to pay the In-
debtedness secured hereby or any part thereof promptly when due and pay-
able, whether by lapse of time or by declaration or otherwise; or (b) failure,
or refusal, of Mortgagor to keep and perform each and all of the covenants,
agreements and conditions contained herein, or in the note or notes or any
Loan Agreement executed in connection herewith, to be performed and ob-
served by Mortgagor; or (c) the making, by Mortgagor, of an assignment for
the benefit of creditors; adjudication of Mortgagor as insolvent or bankrupt.;
filing of a petition or answer for an adjudication as a bankrupt, or seeking
any other relief under any bankruptcy, indebtedness relief or insolvency
law now or hereafter existing, by Mortgagor; or (d) any levy against any
of the Mortgaged Property by execution, attachment or otherwise; or (e)
actual or threatened litigation which may, in the opinoin of Mortgagee, result
in impairment or loss of the security herein provided; or (f) appointment of
a Receiver of Mortgagor or of the Mortgaged Property or any substantial
part thereof.
2. if any default occurs, then at the option of Mortgagee and without
notice, Mortgagee may declare the Indebtedness due and payable and Mort-
gagee shall have and may exercise each and all of the following remedies,
each and all of which shall be cumulative of each other and of all other rights
and remedies which Mortgagee has or may have as security for the Indebt-
edness under applicable laws now or hereafter existing:
(a) Mortgagee may take possession of the Mortgaged Property or any
part thereof and maintain, control and operate the same, without any liability
to Mortgagor, and apply all the net proceeds therefrom, after payment of
royalties, current charges and operating expenses, to the payment of the
Indebtedness until all obligations secured hereby are fully paid; and Mort-
gagor agrees upon demand, to the extent of Mortgagor's power to do so,
to give Mortgagee immediate peaceable possession.
(b) Mortgagee may obtain, from any court having jurisdiction, the ap-
pointment of a Receiver of all or any part of the Mortgaged Property to
handle, maintain and operate the same and apply the net proceeds to the
payment of the Indebtedness or to sell and dispose of the same under orders
of court.
(c) Mortgagee may proceed pursuant to law to sell all or any part of
the Mortgaged Property at public or private sale, with or without notice,
power of sale being hereby expressly granted to Mortgagee. Mortgagor agrees
that in the event of such sale the Mortgaged Property, or any part thereof,
may be sold with or without appraisement as Mortgagee may elect; that the
Mortgaged Property may be sold together or in separate parcels; that the
holder of this Mortgage may be the purchaser of the Mortgaged Property or
any part thereof; and that the proceeds of such sale or sales, after payment
of the costs advanced or incurred by Mortgagee and all expenses incurred
in connection with the operation of the Mortgaged Property, shall be applied
first to the expenses of sale, including reasonable attorney's fees; second,
to payment of the amount due on the Indebtedness; third, the balance, if any,
to Mortgagor. As to all personal property and equipment used, obtained or
found on or in connection with (or constituting part of) the Mortgaged
Property, Mortgagee may take possession thereof and may sell all or any part
thereof at public or private sale under the laws of the state in which such
property is located applicable to the foreclosure of chattel mortgages or any
other applicable laws.
(d) Mortgagee may declare the entire Indebtedness due and foreclose
the lien hereof in the manner provided under the laws of the state in which
the property is located, or any other applicable laws and Mortgagor hereby
agrees to pay all costs of foreclosure. proceedings, including reasonable at-
torneys' fees, which shall become a part of the Indebtedness.
(e) With or without acceleration of the maturity of the Indebtedness,
Mortgagee may receive the proceeds from the sale of oil, gas or other mineral
production from the Mortgaged Property directly from the purchaser and
apply the entire proceeds to the Indebtedness until it is fully paid.
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ARTICLE III
Miscellaneous
1. Failure of Mortgagee to insist upon strict compliance with any pro-
vision of this instrument, or any note, Loan Agreement or other instrument
evidencing or securing the Indebtedness shall not operate as a waiver of any
right of Mortgagee.
2. Mortgagee, or the holder of any note evidencing the Indebtedness
may, by agreement with the maker or makers of the note, and without notice
to any other person, from time to time extend the time of payment of the
note or of any installments thereof, or may accept a new note or new notes
in the same or different form in renewal of or in substitution for such a note
and any advances and future advances as herein provided may be made and
repaid and again made without impairing or affecting the lien hereby granted
or any rights of Mortgagee hereunder, and this Mortgage in any such event
shall continue in full force and effect as security for the payment of said
Indebtedness according to the terms and provisions of the note or notes or
other evidences of the Indebtedness.
3. Mortgagee may from time to time release any part of the Mortgaged
Property from the lien hereof and may likewise release or surrender any
other security then held by Mortgagee as security for the payment of the In-
debtedness, and any such release or surrender may be given without notice
to or consent by any person having an interest in or lien upon any of the
remainder of the Mortgaged Property, and without affecting the lien of this
Mortgage upon the remainder of the Mortgaged Property for the full amount
of the Indebtedness.
4. With respect to all personal property constituting a part of the
Mortgaged Property, this Mortgage shall also be effective as a Chattel Mort-
gage.
5. This Mortgage is binding upon Mortgagor, and Mortgagor's heirs,
executors, administrators, legal representatives, successors and assigns, and
shall inure to the benefit of Mortgagee, its successors and assigns, and the
provisions hereof shall be covenants running with the land.
6. This Mortgage may be executed in any number of counterparts, each
of which shall be deemed an original and all of which taken together shall
constitute one and the same instrument, and shall be deemed and may be
enforced from time to time as a Real Estate Mortgage, Chattel Mortgage or
Assignment, or as one or more thereof.
This Mortgage has been executed by Mortgagor as of the date indicated
at the beginning.
.................... .... ....................... .................... ......... ..- ----- --- ------- S e a l
.. . . .. . . ........... ........... ........ ........ .... ..... ....... ....... ... .. S e a l
... ... ... ................................................................................... S e aleaa
............................................................. --------------------------------- S e a l
(Here add appropriate acknowledgment forms).
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OIL AND GAS TITLE EXAMINATIONS
A Review of the Materials and Records that Must be Examined In
Order to Render Oil and Gas Lease Title Opinions*
By JOHN R. BERMINGHAM, CLYDE R. HAMPTON AND FLOYD E. RADLOFF
John R. Bermingham received his B.E. degree from Yale University in
1944, and his LL.B. from Columbia Law School in 1949. Clyde R. Hamp-
ton received his A.B. degree from Columbia University in 1949, and his
LL.B. from the University of Colorado in 1952. Floyd E. Radloff received
his B.S. degree in 1947, and his LL.B. in 1953, both from the University
of Colorado. All three authors are attorneys in the Legal Department
of Continental Oil Company and members of the Colorado and Denver
Bar Associations.
Examination of titles to lands that are or may become valuable
for oil and gas is very different from an examination of ordinary
real estate titles. Since a large discovery can momentarily skyrocket
the value of a tract of oil property from a few thousand dollars to
many millions of dollars, the title examiner must always assume
that millions of dollars are already at stake. Therefore, the custom-
ary "title standards" are virtually useless and every possible flaw
must be meticulously described. Furthermore, the entire concept
of an oil and gas lease is completely different from the customary
landlord-tenant relationship and if Indian or federal lands are in-
volved a host of intricate problems involving federal regulations
and decisions of the Department of the Interior are bound to arise.,
Fundamental to any title examination is a review of public and
private records. The purposes of this article are to provide the
reader with a very elementary and basic review of (1) the records
which must be examined in oil and gas title work as to the types of
land most frequently encountered, (2) the precise nature of these
records, and (3) the nature and limitations of abstracts and other
summaries upon which attorneys generally rely.
It should be noted that the records and title materials referred
to in this article are those that an attorney must insist upon review-
ing before giving an opinion that title is acceptable for drilling. For
other purposes, such as purchasing a nonproducing lease, paying
rentals, and general curative work, the particular problem at hand
may not justify as detailed an examination as must be made before
commencement of actual drilling operations.
THE RECORDS WHICH MUST BE EXAMINED
Private Files. The private files which an attorney must examine
are those belonging to his client and any other files which the client
may have examined and of which the client has knowledge. The
attorney must insist on examining any and all rental receipts or
* A book devoted to land and legal problems in oil and gas leasing by the Denver staff of the
Continental Oil Company Legal Department will be published this fall by F. H. Gower, Denver,
Colorado. This article is adapted from a chapter in that book.
, For a comprehensive treatise as to Indian lands, see McLane, Oil and Gas Leasing on Indian
Lands (1955); and for similarly excellent treatises on Federal lands, see Hoffman, Oil and Gas Leas-
ing on the Public Domain (1951), and Hoffman, Oil and Gas Leasing on Federal Lands (1957). These
books are invaluable aids when examining titles to Indian or federal leases,
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other evidence as to how lease rentals have been paid. He must
examine the original lease and all amendments, ratifications, and
also any and all assignments, options, overriding royalty agreements,
operating agreements and other instruments to which his client is a
party. He must review any mineral deeds which have been submit-
ted to his client by any successor in interest of the original lessor.
If the client has acquired the lease by assignment rather than as the
original lessee, he should be requested to obtain all of these mater-
ials that his predecessor may have in his files. If the lands are
patented the attorney should insist on a copy of the patent certified
to by the Bureau of Land Management in Washington and should
not rely on any copy obtained from an abstracter.2 Finally, the
attorney should insist on evidence as to the state of the surface of
the lands. Such evidence should consist of both an affidavit setting
forth the party or parties in possession and a report describing all
significant features of the surface, e.g., buildings, mines, wells and
houses.
Public Records Which Must be Reviewed as to Fee Lands
Every state has a statute which provides for the maintenance of
a system of public records where instruments affecting real prop-
erty may be recorded. These public records exist to preserve evi-
dence of deeds and other instruments in order that they may be
used as proof of matters which they contain and to charge any
interested person with "record" or "constructive" notice equivalent
to actual notice. The records are kept in the county seat of each
county and the person in charge of the records is the county clerk
and recorder.
The Colorado statute provides that no instrument conveying,
encumbering or affecting the title to real property "shall be valid
as against any class of persons with any kind of rights, excepi be-
tween the parties thereto, and such as have notice thereof, until
the same shall be deposited with the recorder."3 Therefore, with
respect to fee lands, the only public files which need be examined
are those of the office of the county clerk and recorder.
Public Records Which Must be Reviewed as to Federal Lands
The federal records which must be reviewed consist of at least
(1) the Bureau of Land Management records in Washington and
(2) the records in the District Office of the Bureau of Land Manage-
2 The patents which appear in county records are generally based on unofficial copies which
sometimes contain inaccuracies, particularly as to whether or not minerals have been reserved.
.Cola. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 118-6-9 (1953).
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ment having jurisdiction over the lands under consideration.'
Review of the records in these two offices is sufficient with respect
to leases issued under 43 C.F.R. § 192 (1955, & Supp. 1957),
i.e, leases covering ordinary public domain lands. With respect to
leasse issued under 43 C.F.R. § 200 (1955, & Supp. 1957), i.e., ac-
quired land leases and as to leases issued under other chapters of
the regulations, it is necessary to review additional records. When
examining the title to acquired lands, it is necessary to consider
the records of the particular governmental agency having juris-
diction over the surface of the lands in question, e.g., the Forest
Service, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Fish and Wildlife Service,
Atomic Energy Commission, the military or some other govern-
mental agency. These other governmental agencies frequently
have a central office in Washington and a field office having juris-
diction over the lands under consideration but the field office may
or may not be located in the same city as the field office of the
Bureau of Land Management.
Even though the federal records are the most important source
of information concerning federal lands, the records in the local
county clerk and recorder's office cannot be ignored. These must be
examined with respect to lands covered by federal leases for the
same reason that they must be examined as to fee lands-because
any instrument of record is notice to the whole world.
An assignment of a federal lease or an operating agreement
may be of record in the county records but not in the federal
records. Such an instrument is valid between the parties even
though not recognized by the government and it creates a defect in
the title of the person who is the apparent owner of the lease ac-
cording to the federal records.5 Such occurrences are rare but they
are always a possibility.
Mining claims are a type of interest which can cause a com-
plete failure of title under a federal oil and gas lease.' County
records are normally the only place where notices of mining claims
are filed. Claims often are not recorded with respect to the tract
affected and it is frequently difficult for anyone to determine pre-
4 The various District Land Offices and their jurisdictions are as follows:
District Office Jurisdiction
Phoen ix, A rizona --- ---------------.------------ .-- ......... ..... ........... .. A rizona
Los Angeles. California and Sacramento, California ................ ... .California
Denver, Colorado .............................- .. Colorado
Boise, Idaho ............---- ...- ------- ------ - --.............................. . .. . Idaho
Montana
Billings, M ontana ----.-.. -.--- .-- .................................. .-J No:th Dakota
ISauth Dakota
Reno, Nevada --.-. --. -. --------..................................  Nevada
( New Mexico
Santa Fe, New Mexico ....................................................- - -.... . ... - Oklahoma
I Texas
Salt Lake City, Utah ............. ... ........ .... ... Utah
Spokane, Washington -........ .......... Washington
F Wyoming
Cheyenne, Wyoming ............................. -- Kansas
i Nebraska
Washington, 0. C. ............. . ............ ....... States which have no local office
, Recovery Oil Co. v. Van Acker, 79 Cal. App. 2d 639, 180 P.2d 436 (4th Dist. 1947); Aronow
v. Bishop, 107 Mont. 317, 86 P.2d 644 (1938); Hackman v. Sunhcw Petroleum Corp., 92 Mont. 135,
11 P.2d 778 (1932).
6 A permit or lease issued under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 is invalid insofar as it covers
lands previously covered by a valid mining claim located prior to the passage of the Multiple Min-
eral Developmfnt Act effective August 13, 1954. Henry W. Pollock, 48 L.D. 5 (1921); Secy's Op.,
50 L.D. 650 (1924). See also Wilbur v. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306 (1930).
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cisely whether a given claim does or does not affect the lands under
consideration. Sometimes the most practical method of disposing of
the mining claim problem is to have a competent geologist actually
examine the lands. If he concludes that there could be no valid dis-
covery on the lands, he should make an affidavit to this effect. Such
an affidavit may then be relied upon as disposing of the danger of
a title failure from this source. If the facts are otherwise, however,
it will be necessary to locate the owners of the mining claims affect-
ing the lands under consideration and neutralize their inchoate
rights to Qil and gas.
Rights of way are another type of interest which can cause a
complete title failure under a federal oil and gas lease.7 Generally,
these interests are shown in federal records. It is conceivable, how-
ever, that the county records may contain the only evidence of a
right of way and this is another reason why it is not safe to dis-
regard reviewing county records in connection with federal leases.
Nevertheless, as a practical matter, county records are often
disregarded. This is especially true in reviewing titles for purposes
other than the purpose of actual drilling and particularly if the
mining claim and right of way problems have been disposed of by
surface examination and if the client is either the original lessee or
else is completely confident that the predecesso*rs in the chain of the
lease title have not entered into any assignments or operating
agreements which do not appear in the federal records.
Public Records Which Must be Reviewed as to Indian Lands.
A complete title examination of Indian lands includes an
examination of the records of the Office -of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs in Washington (and sometimes also documents de-
posited in the National Archives, which is the only place that many
original instruments, such as treaties, can be found). Records in
Area Offices of the Bureau of Indian Affairs8 and records of the
Superintendent of the Indian Agency having jurisdiction over the
lands in question must also be examined.
As in the case of federal lands it is not safe to disregard the
county records. There is no reason to believe that an assignment of
an Indian lease appearing only in county records would not be a
defect in the title of someone else purporting to hold the same lease
by virtue of a subsequent assignment properly filed with the appro-
priate Indian office. Some lands have only recently been made parts
of Indian reservations and, as to these lands, previously created
rights of way or previously located mining claims remain as much a
problem as ever. Federal records must also be reviewed to ascertain
that no rights remain in the United States.
I The only authorization given for the issuance of an oil and gas lease covering a right of way
acquired under any low of the United States is to be found in the Right of Way Leasing Act of
1930. 46 Stat. 374, 30 U.S.C. 306 (1952).
8 The Area Offices hoving jurisdiction over the Rocky Mountain Region are:
Office Jurisdiction
Aberdeen, S. Dak. Nebraska, South Dakota, and North Dakota.
Albuquerque, N. Mex. Colorado and New Mexico, exclusive of the New Mexico portion of the Navajo
Reservation which is under the jurisdiction of the Window Rock Area Office.
Billings, Montana Montana and Wyoming.
Phoenix, Arizona State of Nevada, the portion of the Western Shoshone Agency lying in Idaho,
States of Arizona and Utah, exclusive of the Navajo and Hopi Reservations and
the Intermountain Indian School, Brigham, Utah, which are under the jurisdic-
tion of the Window Rock Area Office.
Window Rock, Arizona Navajo and Hopi Reservations lying in the States of Arizona, New Mexico,
and Utch plus Intermountain Indian School at Brigham City, Utah.
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Public Records Which Must be Reviewed as to State Lands.
In considering titles to state lands the most important records
to be reviewed are those in the state land office or other body
having jurisdiction over the lands in question. In Colorado the State
Land Office is composed of a Mineral Section and a State Land
Board Section and the records in each of these offices should be
examined. For the same reasons as have been set forth with regard
to federal lands and Indian lands the county and federal records may
not be disregarded when reviewing titles to state leases.
DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTUAL RECORDS
County Records. Every instrument which is accepted by the
clerk and recorder for recordation is photostated, microfilmed or
otherwise reproduced and the copy is placed in an appropriate
volume and given a book and page and document number. These
volumes of instruments are indexed either by tract or by grantors
and grantees. When reviewing records in those counties using only
the grantor-grantee type of index, it is often advantageous to obtain
the permission of the local abstracter to use his private tract index
since tract indices are much easier to use. Tract indices merely list
the type of each instrument affecting the tract in question and the
date and recording data as to each such instrument. After this infor-
mation is obtained it is necessary to go to the large volumes in the
county clerk and recorder's office where the copies of the instru-
ments themselves are kept. It should be borne in mind that certain
types of instruments may be kept in separate volumes, e.g., oil and
gas leases, mining claims and liens.
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The most important matters for which records must be
examined are:
(1) Conveyances and reservations affecting minerals in the
tract in question.
(2) Leases, assignments, operating agreements, etc.
(3) Liens of all sorts, mortgages, notices of lis pendens.
(4) Collateral proceedings, such as quiet title actions, probate
proceedings, foreclosure proceedings, tax sales and attachments.
As to collateral proceedings usually only the final judgment or
decree is placed of record. (In some cases the final action in a col-
lateral proceeding does not appear in the county records even
though it properly should have been placed there. If such proceed-
ings are suspected to have been held they should be disregarded only
after very careful consideration.) Where a final decree or other
final action does appear of record, there remains a question as to
the regularity of the proceeding leading up to the recorded instru-
ment. In such cases it may become necessary to obtain and examine
the complete file of such collateral proceeding in order to determine
whether or not the recorded instrument actually has the legal, effect
which it appears to have on its face. This kind of material may in
some cases be found in courts of the same county where the lands
lie, but in other instances the cases may have been heard in courts
in other parts of the same state or even in other states altogether.
The examiner must require title to be perfected of record in the
county where the lands are located.
Bureau of Land Management Records. No attempt will be made
in this article to describe the records of the Bureau of Land
Management which are maintained in Washington, D.C. It is cus-
tomary to obtain a "status report" as to such records from any one
of several attorneys located in Washington who are experienced in
the law relating to federal oil and gas leases. A substantial portion
of the practice of some of these attorneys consists of obtaining
Washington status reports for parties who find it inconvenient to
go to Washington to personally examine the records.
As was previously noted, District Offices of the Bureau of Land
Management are located at various key cities throughout the coun-
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tract books, serial registers and case files. These records are de-
scribed as follows:
(1) Plat Book - A plat book contains plats arranged according
to township and range numbers. Generally, an examination of
the particular plat or plats pertaining to the lands involved in the
title search is the first step in checking a district land office record.
These plats show whether any part or all such lands have been
patented whether there are outstanding oil and gas leases, with-
drawals, classification of lands and other matters. This information
is usually shown by means of notations on the plat itself, but some-
times these notations are so numerous that a separate page contain-
ing notations is inserted in the book next to the plat or affixed to
the plat page. Sometimes when part of the lands shown on a plat
have been designated as within a known geologic structure of a pro-
ducing oil or gas field an additional plat showing such area is in-
serted. Also, in areas where there has been considerable oil and gas
activity, there will be found inserted along with the plat for that
area a plat showing the leases that have been issued including both
leases that have been cancelled and also those still outstanding, with
appropriate indications as to the status of each lease and the lands
covered thereby.
(2) Tract Book - A tract book is a large bound volume in
which are listed all entries affecting each specific tract of land. If
an entry affects only part of the lands described at the top of the
page then the entry will include a description of the portion of
such lands affected. Typical entries shown on a tract book are
homestead entries, applications for patent, offers for oil and gas
leases, and applications for rights of way.
(3) Serial Register - A serial number is assigned to every
filing of any sort that is made with respect to federal lands. The
"serial register" is a brief chronological listing of the important
actions taken with respect to any given filing. For example, the
serial register relative to an oil and gas lease includes such informa-
tion as the date of issuance of the lease, assignments, applications
for extension, and sometimes additional information such as rental
payments or creation of overriding royalties.
(4) Case Files - A case file is a file containing all of the original
correspondence and instruments which have been filed relating
to any particular serial number. A person desiring to examine a case
file cannot go directly to the file as he can to the serial register,
tract book or plat book. He must furnish the attendants in the land
office with the serial number of the case file he wishes to examine
and then the file is made available to him provided that he can
show a satisfactory reason for being interested in the contents in
the file, such as that he represents a party interested in acquiring
an interest in the lease involved.
Indian Land Records. As in the case of Federal lands it is
customary to have a competent Washington attorney examine all
records in Washington pertaining to Indian lands under consider-




The most readily available source of information concerning
Indian lands is usually the Office of the Superintendent for the
agency having jurisdiction of the lands under consideration. The
Superintendent maintains complete files relating to the lands under
his jurisdiction, including maps, tract books and usually separate
lease files. However, the Area Director maintains complete records
concerning oil and gas leases covering Indian lands in his area and
these records must also be examined.
State Land Records. As previously noted, the State Land Of-
fice in Colorado has a Mineral Section and a State Land Board
Section and records in each of these sections should be examined.
In the Mineral Section of the Colorado State Land Office the follow-
ing records should be examined:
(1) Plat Book - The plat book is a large bound volume con-
taining "plat" pages and "tract" pages arranged acording to town-
ship and range numbers. The plat pages show if the State of Colo-
rado has patented any of its lands and whether the minerals were
reserved to the state or passed to the patentee of the state patent.
The corresponding "tract" page contains more detailed informa-
tion relating to the state lands shown on the plat page. Of primary
importance, the tract page will show whether any uranium or oil
and gas leases have been issued by the state on its lands.
(2) Cardex File - If the plat book discloses that a uranium
or oil and gas lease has been issued by the state on any of the lands
under search, the cardex file should next be examined. This is a file
consisting of a number of trays which contain cards on which
appear data relating to specific uranium or oil and gas leases. The
card relating to the lease in question will show the name of the
lessee, the date of the lease, the description of the lands covered
thereby, and assignments of such leases, if any.
(3) Lease Files - In order to examine the lease itself and any
assignments thereof and other information relating thereto, it is
necessary to obtain the lease file containing such lease from the
office clerk.
(4) Reception Register - Under the regulations promulgated
by the State Board of Land Commissioners in 1955 ("Regulations
Governing the Issuance of Colorado Oil and Gas Leases"), state
lands are offered for oil and gas leasing to "the highest responsible
bidder." Generally, only those lands upon which applications have
been received will be offered for lease bids, although the Board
of Land Commissioners reserves the right to include in any list any
tract on its own motion. The applications for leases are entered in
the Reception Register. The Reception Register, a bound volume,
should be examined to determine if the State Land Board has
received an application for lease on any of the lands under search.
If such an application has been made, this register will show the
name of the person or company making such request.
In the State Land Board Section of the State Land Office the
following records should be examined:
(1) Clear Lists - If all or part of the lands under search
are "in lieu" lands, then it will be necessary to obtain a certified
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copy or copies of the clear list or lists relating to such "in lieu"
lands. A clear list will show that the "in lieu" selection made by the
state was properly authorized and that the title to such lands has
been vested in the state. If title has been vested in the state, the
lands are said to have been "clear listed."
(2) Miscellaneous Files - The clerk should be requested to
furnish the landman with all files relating to the surface usage of
the lands under search. There may be grazing leases, agricultural
leases, rights of way and other matters which may affect the lease-
hold interest.
ABSTRACTS, CERTIFICATES OF TITLE
AND STATUS REPORTS
Abstracts. Attorneys writing title opinions seldom see the
public records referred to in the preceding sections of this article.
Instead, they rely on abstracts, certificates of title and status
reports. The following points should be borne in mind as to
abstracts:
(1) Abbreviated Abstracts - Although an abstract may iden-
tify and briefly describe all instruments appearing of record affect-
ing the lands in question, this generally is insufficient in oil and gas
work where the exact language used in conveyances and reserva-
tions is of utmost importance in determining mineral ownerships.
Therefore, when the instruments in an abstract appear in an ab-
breviated form, the examining attorney often should require that
photostatic copies of many of the instruments be obtained in order
that the complete wording may be examined. Some attorneys insist
on verbatim abstracts.
(2) Certification of Abstracts - An abstract will contain at
least one "certificate" whereby the abstracter certifies as to its
accuracy and describes the records upon which it has been based.
An abstract may contain several certificates, each of which covers
a different period of time and sometimes different tracts of land.
It is therefore important that every abstract reviewed be examined
to definitely ascertain that all the lands purportedly covered by
the abstract are in fact continuously covered for all periods of time
without any omissions.
(3) Abstracts are Valuable Personal Property - The cost
of an abstract may run into many hundreds of dollars and often
only the one original copy may exist. Consequently, abstracts
should be treated with proper care, and it is always advisable to
obtain a receipt when an abstract is loaned to some other party.
(4) Limitations on Abstracter's Liability - An abstracter is
under liability for error only to the person in whose favor the ab-
stract was certified or the party who originally ordered the abstract,
and no one else using an abstract can obtain damages from the
abstracter for any errors that may exist. Therefore, a party using
a borrowed abstract may desire to have it recertified in his favor.
Actually, an abstracter's liability for error should never be relied
on in any way by anyone interested in oil and gas rights since the




(5) Exceptions in Certificates - The abstracter's certificate
always contains certain exceptions to which the abstracter will not
certify. These exceptions may include: (a) right of way and ease-
ment not conveyed by deed, (b) All instruments not of record,
(c) Unpatented mining claims or mining claims not accurately tied
to governmental survey or other ascertainable point, (d) Rights of
persons in possession, (e) Matters involving area or boundaries, and
(f) Matters which an accurate survey of the property would dis-
close.
Certificates of Title. A certificate of title (sometimes called
report of title or memorandum of title) is a very abbreviated type
of abstract in which the abstracter expresses his opinion as to the
present ownership of the lands and indicates any unreleased oil
and gas leases, conveyances of minerals, and outstanding encum-
brances and liens of record. The certificate of title is much less
reliable than a complete abstract and should not be used as the
basis for a title opinion. A certificate of title is often helpful, how-
ever, in determining the owner of lands and for the purpose of
acquiring a lease or for revealing any major defects in the title.
They may be helpful in rendering delay rental opinions. Normally,
the liability of the abstracter in preparing the certificate of title
is limited to the amount paid to such abstracter for its preparation.
Status Reports. The term "status report" is loosely used to
describe a summary of federal, state or Indian office records. Some
status reports are virtually worthless due to a failure to show all
entries affecting the lands under consideration and showing the
source of the entries. In preparing a useable status report as to a
federal lease, the lands under consideration must be broken down
inX, sections, half-sections, quarter-sections--just as far as is
necessary to provide any reader with the same knowledge he would
have received from an actual examination of the records. All entries
affecting such tract should be shown as to each such specific tract
and the source of each entry should be identified as being the plat
book, tract book, or other source, as the case may be. This may in-
volve a considerable amount of repetition but it is extremely im-
portant as to federal lands, particularly as to entries in Bureau of
Land Management tract books, since the validity of federal leases
occasionally depends on precisely where notations have or have not
been made. 9 A copy of the serial register from the district land of-
fice should be included. It is not necessary to examine and sum-
marize the contents of each and every case file applicable to the
lands in question. However, case files for any entry not fully dis-
posed of according to both the plat and tract books should be
examined and the present status indicated. As to any particular
lease under consideration, each item in the case file should be
summarized.
9 43 C.F.R. 192.43 (Supp. 1957); B. E. Van Arsdale, 62 I.D. 473 (1955).
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SOME STATUS FACTORS AFFECTING AVAILABILITY
OF PUBLIC LANDS FOR GENERAL LOCATIONS
By FREDERICK FISHMAN
Frederick Fishman received his LL.B. degree, with highest honors in 1941,
and his LL.M. degree in 1942, both from Suffolk University School of
Law. He is a member of the bars of the Supreme Court of the United
States, of Colorado and of Massachusetts. From 1946 to 1954 he served
as Adjudicator in the Washington office of the United States Bureau of
Land Management, and from 1954 to June 1957 he served as Super-
visory Adjudicator in the Colorado Land Office of the Bureau. He has
just been transferred to Washington as an adjudicator in the Appeals
Office of the Bureau of Land Management.
It is axiomatic that a person desiring to make a mining location
should examine the tract and plat books of the appropriate land
office of the Bureau of Land Management to ascertain the avail-
ability of the land for such purpose and should also examine the
records of the county recorder to determine whether any other
person is claiming the land. Similarly, an attorney's title opinion of
a mining claim which has not taken into consideration the records
of the Bureau of Land Management and the status of the land as of
the time the claim was located is without a proper foundation, and
often may be misleading.
One of the problems-if not the major one-confronting a per-
son checking the land office records, is the significance of the pres-
ence of certain notations and their effect on the availability of the
land. In the main, there are three major groups of factors which
may preclude appropriation of the land under the federal mining
laws: (1) withdrawals, (2) surface disposals, and (3) value of the lands
for leasable minerals (either real or prospective by virtue of being
included in a mineral lease, permit or application therefor). This
paper will not attempt to set out all possible status situations pre-
cluding mineral location, but will attempt to cover what the writer
considers to be the highlights.
In seeking to determine the effect of a particular withdrawal
upon the availability of land to appropriation under the mining
laws of the United States, one should determine (a) under what
authority the withdrawal was made, and (b) the purpose of the
withdrawal, i. e., the contemplated use of the land withdrawn.
Moreover, a withdrawal may be clothed in other garments. For
example, under a regulation' adopted January 10, 1955 a small tract
classification is effective as of the time it is noted on the land office
tract and plat books to preclude any other appropriation of the
land, including those under the federal mining laws, except as pro-
vided in the order of classification or in any modification or revision
thereof. Similarly, by virtue of a regulation2 adopted September 3,
'43 C.F.R. 257.3 (Supp. 1957) (filed Jan. 14, 1955, 8:45 a.m.).
43 C.F.R. 254.6 (1954) (filed Sept. 10, 1954, 8:47 a.m.).
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1954, a classification of land for recreational or public purposes
under the act of June 14, 19263 as amended in 19544 will remove the
land during the pendency of the classification, from the operation
of the United States mining laws except as provided in the order of
classification or in any modification or revision thereof. Moreover,
in United States v. Foster,5 the Director, Bureau of Land Manage-
ment, ruled that where a small tract offer is filed with the appropri-
ate land office and the land is subsequently classified for small tract
purposes, the classification order relates back to the time of the
small tract offer and cuts out any intervening appropriation of the
land, including that under the mining laws.
The Foster decision raises certain questions which are not eas-
ily resolved. In Edwards v. Brockbank6 the Department of the
Interior recognized that under sections 5(a) and 7 of the Federal
Register Act' orders of restoration (and presumably of withdrawal)
were not "valid as against any person who has not had actual know-
ledge thereof until copies of the document have been filed with the
Federal Register and made available for public inspection."8 , The
Foster decision treats the filing of a small tract application when
followed by small tract classification of the land as an actual with-
drawal of the land.
Not uncommonly, an application for withdrawal has the force
and effect of a withdrawal during the pendency of the application.
Under the regulations 9 an application for a withdrawal, made under
Executive Order No. 10355,10 when noted on the serial register and
official plat and tract books in the appropriate land office, tempor-
arily segregates such lands from settlement, location, sale, selec-
tion, entry, lease, and other forms of disposal under the public land
laws, including the mining and the mineral leasing laws, to the
extent that the withdrawal or reservation applied for, if effected,
would prevent such form of disposal.
The aforementioned withdrawals and applications therefor
stem from authority delegated to the Secretary of the Interior from
the President, under Executive Order 10355. However, the Recla-
mation Act of 1902,11 vests directly in the Secretary of the Interior
the authority to make withdrawals for reclamation purposes. What
then, is the effect of posting on the land office records an applica-
tion for withdrawal for reclamation purposes? The Solicitor has
held that such an application does not have any segregative effect
'4 Stat. 741 (1926).
'68 Stat. 173 (1954), 43 U.S.C. § 869 (Supp. 1956).
'Contests 2474, 2475 (1956). The Director stated in part as follows: "The contestees have not
established that prior to the classification of the lands on October 2, 1953, the sand and gravel
deposits within each location had market value which was essential to validate each and to prevent
the withdrawal of the lands made by the classification order from attaching. Therefore, each of the
locations is invalid because not perfected by a valid discovery made prior to the classification
(Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 456; Wilmot D. Everett, decided October 17, 1955, A-27010
Supp., unreported; United States v. Clyde W. Riggle, decided July 11, 1955, A-27184, unreported).
Furthermore, in my opinion, each of the locations is invalid for the reason that under the doctrine of
relation which is generally applied to filings under the public land laws, the classification order
related back to the dates of filing of the small tract applications thus precluding the attaching of any
intervening rights to the same tracts by others through mining locations not perfected by valid
discoveries made prior to the dates of filing of the applications." Id. at 26.5
A-25960 (1951).
49 Stat. 501-02 (1935), 44 U.S.C. §§ 305 (a), 307 (1952).
O Id. § 7, 44 U.S.C. § 307 (1952).
943 C.F.R. 295.9 (1954).
10 3 C.F.R. 77 (Supp. 1952).
1 32 Stat. 388 (1902), 43 U.S.C. § 416 (1952).
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in that a reclamation withdrawal does not become effective 12 to
preclude the appropriation of the land as to persons not having
actual knowledge of the withdrawal until copies of the document
have been filed with the Federal Register and made available for
public inspection in accordance with law."3 First form reclamation
withdrawals under the Act of June 17, 190214 preclude mining lo-
cations. 15 However, the Secretary of the Interior may, under an-
other statute 16 and regulations 17 open such lands to location under
such terms as he may deem appropriate. Lands withdrawn under
the second form of reclamation are not thereby precluded from
mineral appropriation.
In the instructions of June 6, 1905,11 first form with-
drawals embrace lands which
"may possibly be needed in the construction and main-
tenance of irrigation works, and other commonly known
as 'withdrawals under the second form' which erpbraces
lands not supposed to be needed in the actual construction
and maintenance of irrigation works, but which may pos-
sibly be irrigated from such works."
As a practical matter, all reclamation withdrawals within the
past twenty years have been made under the first form.
Withdrawals for power site purposes made prior to the act of
June 25, 191019 were effective to preclude mining locations on the
land.20 The 1910 act stated in part that lands withdrawn under its
provisions "shall at all times be open to exploration, discovery,
occupation and purchase under the mining laws of the United
States, so far as the same apply to minerals other than coal, oil, gas
and phosphates." By the act of August 24, 1912, 21 "metalliferous
minerals" were substituted for the named minerals. During the
period from August 24, 1912, to the enactment of section 24 of the
Federal Power Act of 1920,2'2 power-site reserves established under
'2 See Solicitor's Op. M-36382, Effective Date of Orders Withdrawing Public Lands for Reclama-
lion Purposes, October 24, 1956.
"349 Stat. 502 (1935), 44 U.S.C. § 307 (1952).
"See note 11 supro.
'5 Harry A. Schultz, A-26794 (1953); United States v. Dawson, 58 I.D. 670 (1944).
"47 Stat. 136 (1932), 43 U.S.C. § 154 (1952).
"43 C.F.R. 185.36 (1954).
"33 LD. 607 (1905).
"36 Stat. 847 (1910), 43 U.S.C. § 141 (1952).
o See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1941).
21 37 Stat. 497 (1912), 43 U.S.C. § 142 (1952).
-41 Stat. 1075 (1920), 16 U.S.C. § 818 (1952).
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the 1910 act as amended by the 1912 act were not thereoby closed to
metalliferous mining locations. However, non-metalliferous lo-
cations made after the 1912 act and prior to June 10, 1920, may be
permitted to go to patent if the patent applicant consents," to take
the patent subject to section 24 of the Federal Power Act, in ac-
cordance with the proviso to that section.24
From June 10, 1920 until August 11, 1955, mining locations made
on power site lands, for which the withdrawals were made during
that period were null and void.21 It should be noted that in that
case it was held that if under applicable law26 the parties remain
in possession for a period equivalent to the state statute of limita-
tions, absent adverse claims, and have made a discovery after the
restoration of the land, such action would be sufficient to permit a
patent to issue, all else being regular.
The Mining Claims Restoration Act of 195527 removed in the
main, power site reserves as a bar to mining, except for lands
(1) which are included in any project operating, or being con-
structed under a license or permit issued under the Federal Power
Act or other act of Congress, or (2) which are under examination or
survey by a prospective licensee of the Federal Power Commission,
if such prospective licensee holds an uncancelled permit issued
under the Federal Power Act authorizing him to make preliminary
examination or survey and such permit in the case of a prospective
licensee has not been renewed more than once. Although a negli-
gible percentage of power site lands fall within either excepted
category, the cautious title examiner will undoubtedly check with
the Federal Power Commission to determine whether either of the
exceptions applies to the land in which he is interested. The legisla-
tive history of the act 28 makes manifest the Congressional intention
not to validate claims which were located at a time when the land
was withdrawn from entry, but rather to permit new locations, or
relocations, on such power site lands, absent other prohibiting
factors.
Section 429 of this 1955 statute contemplates in part that the
owner of any unpatented mining claim, located after the date of
the act, shall file for record in the appropriate land office (1) within
sixty days of the date of location, a copy of the notice of the lo-
cation of the claim, and (2) within sixty days after the expiration of
any assessment year a statement as to the assessment work done or
improvements made during the previous assessment year. What are
the consequences of non-compliance with these provisions? It would
appear that failure to timely file a copy of the location notice with
- In effect by such consent, the patentee agrees that the United States, its permittees, and
licensees may enter upon, occupy and use any part of the land for power purposes and that no
claim or right to compensation shall accrue to the owner of the land from the occupation or use of
any such lands for power purposes.
24 Walter W. Hall, 50 L.D. 656 (1924).
', Harry A. Schultz, 61 L.D. 259 (1953), citing Coeur D'Alene Crescent Mining Co., 53 I.D. 531,
537 (1937).
Rev. Stat. § 2332 (1875), 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1952).
V 69 Stat. 682, 30 U.S.C. § 621-25 (Supp. 1956).
H.R. Rep. No. 86, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
' 69 Stat. 683, 30 U.S.C. 623 (Supp. 1956.)
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the land office may render the claim invalid. The situation could
probably be cured by making a relocation and then filing timely.
The separation of the mineral estate from the surface by the
patenting of the surface should put the careful title examiner to
further study of the problem. It is true that section 9 of the Stock-
Raising Act of 191610 creates a separate mineral estate, but it spe-
cifically provides in part as follows:
"All entries made and patents issued under the provisions
of this division of this chapter shall be subject to and con-
tain a reservation to the United States of all the coal and
other minerals in the lands so entered and patented, to-
gether with the right to prospct for, mine, and remove the
same. The coal and other mineral deposits in such lands
shall be subject to disposal by the United States in accord-
ance with the provisions of the coal and mineral land laws
in force at the time of such disposal."
Similarly, under Section 8 of the Taylor Grazing Act,31 where
the United States gives a patent to the surface and retains the
minerals, the minerals are not thereby removed from the mineral
loction laws.2 Rather, the minerals in the lands received by the
United States, if any are received, do not become available to
mineral location until an order of restoration so makes them.
Generally speaking, where minerals only are restored, they become
available on the thirty-fifth day after the date of the restoration
order. Where land and minerals are both involved, the minerals do
not become subject to location until the 126th day after the date
of the order.
Under various special acts of Congress, the surface of lands has
been granted to governmental bodies for public purposes and to
divers charitable organizations with all minerals being reserved to
the United States. The specific statutes33 do not in terms make the
minerals subject to location. In considering the question of whether
such minerals are subject to location, the Department of the Interior
held that where a patent contains a reservation of all minerals
under a law providing for such a reservation but containing no
authorization for the disposal of the minerals, mining claims cannot
be located since the United States mining laws apply only to
minerals in lands belonging to the United States.34
Mining locations cannot be made on lands included in small
tract leases, since, although the Small Tract Act, of 193811 contem-
plates a reservation of all minerals to the United States, it also pro-
vides that such minerals will be subject to disposition under such
laws as the Secretary of the Interior may prescribe. No such reg-
.039 Stat. 864 (1916), as amended, 42 Stat. 208 (1921), 43 Stat. 1145 (1925), and 60 Stot. 1100
(1946), 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1952).
31 48 Stat. 1272 (1934), as amended, 62 Stat. 533 (1948), 43 U.S.C. 0 
3
15g (1952).
1 Sec. 8(d) of the Taylor Grazing Act. This provides in applicable portion as follows: "Where
mineral reservations are made by the grantor in lands conveyed by the United States, it shall be
so stipulated in the patent, and any person who prospects for or acquires the right to mine and
remove the reserved mineral deposits may enter and occupy so much of the surface as may be
required for all purposes incident to the prospecting for, mining and removal of the minerals there.
from, and may mine and remove such minerals, upon payment to the owner of the surface for
damages caused to the land and improvements thereon."
"E.g., A grant to the City and County of Denver, 38 Stat. 706 (1941).
M-36279 (1955).
52 Stat. 609 (1939), as amended, 68 Stat. 240 (1954), 43 U.S.C. § 682 (Supp. 1956).
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ulations have been prescribed and such minerals are not subject to
location."
Similarly, the existence of an airport lease precludes the
making of a valid mineral location on the lands covered thereby.
3 7
Moreover, the filing of an airport lease application under the act
of May 24, 1928,0 operates as a segregation of the lands described
therein from the time such lease application is filed in the proper
land office.
However, the existence of a grazing permit, license, or lease
does not preclude or restrict prospecting, locating, developing, min-
ing, or patenting the mineral resources under laws applicable
thereto."
Land within a subsisting homestead entry is subject to mineral
location if the locator makes peaceable entry thereon.40 In United
States v. Schaub4 1 it was held that a special use permit issued by
a Regional Forester on national foiest lands reserving land for use
of the Bureau of Public Roads as a source of road building material
under section 17 of the Federal Highway Act 42 and the act of March
30, 1948,11 was sufficient to be a valid withdrawal and appropriation
of the land and to render it closed to entry or location under the
mining laws. The court held in this case that as the United States
had already made an appropriation of the minerals involved, the
land was not open to another mineral location.
Generally speaking, lands purchased by the United States are
not public lands and therefore are not subject to mineral location.
In Rawson v. United States,44 it was held that patented lands, which
have been reacquired by the United States, are not by the mere
force of the reacquisition restored to the public domain but, in the
absence of legislation or authoritative directions to the contrary,
remain in the class of lands acquired for special uses, such as parks,
national monuments, and the like, and as such, could not rationally
be claimed to remain open to location under the mining laws. The
lands in issue in that case had presumably been purchased under
the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act.4- The court further held
that the placing of such patented lands under the jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Agriculture refuted any notion that the lands were
subject to the general mining laws.
The Department has uniformly held that, after the passage of
the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920,46 and until the effec-
tive periods embodied in the acts of August 12, 1953 4 and of Aug-
ust 13, 1954,48 there could be no room for the contemporaneous oper-
ation of the mining laws and the Mineral Leasing Act with respect
to the same lands and that if an attempt were made, after the
p See 43 C.F.R. 257.15 (1954) and Depcrtmental decision of August 15, 1947, A-24669, unre-
te Albert Lindemuth, A-26429 (1952).
38 45 Stat. 728 (1928), as amended, 55 Stat. 621 (1941), 49 U.S.C. § 211.14 (1952).
m See § 6 of the Taylor Grazing Act, 48 Stat. 1272 (1934), 43 U.S.C. § 
3
15g (1952).
40 See James W. Bell, 52 L.D. 197 (1927); Union Oil Co., A-26518 (1953).
t 103 F. Supp. 873 (D. Alaska 1952). See also Sam D. Rawson, A-26800 (1953).
"2.42 Stat. 216 (1921), as amended, 63 Stat. 1070 (1949), 23 U.S.C. 1 18 (1952).
"62 Stat. 100 (1948), 48 U.S.C. § 341 (1952).
44 225 F.2d 855 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 934 (1955).
4 "50 Stat. 522 (1937), 7 U.S.C. §§ 1001-05(d), 1007-29 (1952).
" 41 Stat. 437, as amended, 30 U.S.C. 11 181-287 (1952).
4" 67 Stat. 539, 30 U.S.C. 1§ 501-05 (Supp. 1956).
48 68 Stat. 708, 30 U.S.C. §§ 521-31 (Supp. 1956).
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enactment of the Mineral Leasing Act, to locate a mining claim on
land covered by an outstanding permit or lease issued under that
act, the Department would not recognize the attempted location.
The Department has also held that the filing of an allowable applica-
tion for a noncompetitive oil and gas lease has a segregative effect
on the land applied for and confers upon the applicant a priority of
right over any adverse interest thereafter sought to be initiated.
4
1
By act of August 12, 1953,50 Congress provided, among other
things, that any mining claim located under the mining laws of the
United States subsequent to July 31, 1939, and prior to January 1,
1953, on lands of the United States which were at the time of such
location included in a lease issued under the Mineral Leasing Act or
covered by an application for such a lease should be effective to the
same extent as if such mining claim had been located on lands which
were at the time of such location subject to location under the
mining laws of the United States. The act required, however, that
in order to obtain its benefits the owner of any such mining claim
must, not later than 120 days after August 12, 1953, post on such
claim and file for record in the office where the notice of location
of such claim was of record an amended notice of location of such
claim, stating that such notice was filed pursuant to the provisions
of the act and for the purpose of obtaining its benefits. The act
" See Jebson v. Spencer, 61 I.D. 161 (1953) (and cases there cited); Monolith Portland Cement
Company, 61 I.D. 43 (1952); United States v. U. S. Borax Co., 58 I.D. 426 (1943); Filtrol v. Britton
and Echart, 51 L.D. 649 (1926); Clear Gravel Enterprises, Inc., A-27287 (1956).
, See note 47 supro.
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provided further that any mining claims given force and effect
under the act shall be under certain conditions subject to the
reservation to the United States of all minerals subject to disposition
under the Mineral Leasing Act.
On August 13, 1954, Congress passed another act,5 under the
terms of which mining claims may, thereafter, be located on lands
of the United States which are at the time of location included in
leases issued under the Mineral Leasing Act or covered by applica-
tions for leases under that act. The act of August 13, 1954, further
repeated the substance of the act of August 12, 1953, and provided
that in order to be entitled to the benefits thereof the owners of the
mining claims located on such lands subsequent to July 31, 1939, and
prior to January 1, 1953, must have posted on the claims and filed
for record within the time allowed by the act of August 12, 1953,
amended notices of location, stating that such notices were filed
pursuant to the provisions of the 1953 act and for the purpose of
obtaining the benefits thereof.
As previously indicated, under the act of August 13, 1954,32
holders of mining claims on lands53 located after December 31, 1952,
and prior to February 10, 1954, must not later than 120 days after the
date of the act (December 11, 1954), post on the claim and file in
the recorder's office an amended notice of location stating that
such notice is filed pursuant to that act and for the purpose of
obtaining the benefits of that act.
Section 5 of the act of August 13, 1954, 54 removes the disability
after August 13, 1954, of lands being unavailable for mineral location
by virtue of their actual or prospective value for leasable minerals.
However, the owner of any claim validated under the acts of Aug-
ust 12, 1953, or August 13, 1954, in effect waives the right to all
leasable minerals when patent issues, if at the time of issuance of
patent the lands have presumptive or actual value for any leasable
mineral. 5'
The status of claims located on lands having actuAl or pre-
sumptive value for leaseable minerals at the time of location and
which were located between February 10, 1954, and August 13, 1954,
is not entirely clear. It would appear that such claims would be
considered as void ab initio and could not be validated. However,
they could be relocated after August 13, 1954 in accordance with
the terms of the act of that date.
Prior to the enactment of the acts of August 12, 195350 and
August 13, 1954,. 7 the mere fact that land was classified as being
valuable for a leaseable mineral did not necessarily preclude the
land from mining location. The Department held"8 that lands
actually classified as coal lands must actually possess value for
coal in order to prevent location.
51 See note 48 supro.
=- Ibid.
"This provision is applicable only to those lands which at the time of location were: (a) In-
cluded in a lease or permit issued under the mineral leasing laws; or (b) Covered by an applica-
tion or offer for a permit or lease under the mineral leasing laws; or (c) Known to be valuable for
minerals subject to disposition under the mineral leasing laws.
u 68 Stat. 710 (1954), 30 U.S.C. § 525 (Supp. 1956).
M Note 53 supra sets out the criteria for presumptive or actual value.
5 See note 47 supro.
5 See note 48 supra.
r1 John McFayden, 51 L.D. 436 (1926).
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In a recent opinion,-" the Solicitor of the Department, in dis-
cussing metalliferous mining locations within a petroleum reserve,
held as follows:
"A petroleum reserve created by a withdrawal made under
and pursuant to the provisions of the act of June 25,1910
(36 Stat. 847), as amended by the act of August 24, 1912
(37 Stat. 497; 43 U.S.C. secs. 141, 142), is a temporary with-
drawal which, in and of itself, does not prevent the location
of mining claims for metalliferous minerals.
"Metalliferous mining locations could be made within
petroleum reserves prior to the act of Februeary 25, 1920
(41 Stat. 437; 30 U.S.C. sec. 181), even if the land was then
known to contain oil or gas. After that enactment and prior
to the enactment of the acts of August 12, 1953 (Public Law
250; 67 Stat. 539), and August 13, 1954 (Public Law 585; 68
Stat. 708), lands valuable for oil and gas were not subject
to location under the United States mining laws. But only
lands known to contain those minerals were excluded from
location for metalliferous minerals.
"If the creation of a petroleum reserve is tantamount to the
classification of the reserved lands as mineral, valuable for
oil and gas, the rule applicable to lands classified as valu-
able for coal and, subsequent to the act of February 25, 1920,
supra, oil shale would apply to them. That rule is that the
locator of a mining claim on lands so classified may defeat
the classification by proving, in a proper proceeding, that
the land is, in fact, not valuable for the coal, oil shale, or
oil and gas, whichever was named in the order classifying
the land. Since the petroleum reserve .stamps the land as
prima facie valuable for oil or gas, the burden of proof rests
upon the mining claimant."
In effect, the opinion holds that the creation of a petroleum
reserve raises a presumption of the value of the land for oil and
gas, which presumption may be rebutted in a proper proceeding
by a locator showing that the land has in fact no value for oil or
gas, the burden of proof resting upon the locator. This writer knows
of no prescribed procedure whereby a locator could raise the issue
and have it decided, other than by the filing of a mineral patent
application. It is true, of course, that the issue might be raised by
the Government in a contest proceeding directed against the
validity of the claim, in which event the Government could rely on
the evidentiary weight of the presumption until sufficient evidence
had been adduced to rebut the presumption," in which event the
burden of going forward and the ultimate burden of proof would
rest with the Government.
-63 I.D. 346 (1956).
00 See Sherman Inv. Co. v. United States, 199 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1952); Christiansen v. Hilber.
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Until the 1890's it was common for oil and gas leases to run for
a specified duration, after which they would terminate if not con-
tinued by renewal. Ordinarily such leases were for long periods,
perhaps for fifteen, twenty or twenty-five years.1 Since the turn of
the century, however, leases of shorter duration have become cus-
tomary in the oil and gas industry.2 The craracteristic present day
lease runs for from sixty days8 to ten years and is perpetuated under
the habendum clause for an indefinite length of time thereafter if
either oil or gas is "found in paying quantities,"1 "produced,"5 or
"produced in paying quantities"' during the initial period. The
opening period specified by the lease is called the "fixed," "def-
inite," "initial" or "primary" term.
The courts are not at all uniform in their declarations of what
the lessee must do to continue his lease beyond the primary term.
It is common for authorities on gas law to tell us that in order to
extend the lease "there must be production."7 However simple this
may appear, a student of the subject will not find it helpful. The
'2 Summers, Oil and Gas § 288, p. 115 (Perm. ed. 1938); Veasey, The Law of Oil and Gas, IV.
The Habendum Clause, 19 Mich. L. Rev. 161, 162 (1921).
* Ibid.
' E.g., Murdock-West Co. v. Logan, 69 Ohio St. 514, 69 N.E. 984 (1904).
4 Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Adkins, 278 Fed. 854 (6th Cir. 1922); Alford v. Dennis, 102 Kan. 403,
170 Pac. 1005 (1918); Murdock-West Co. v. Logan, 69 Ohio St. 514, 69 N.E. 984 (1904); Roach v.
Junction Oil & Gas Co., 72 Okla. 213, 179 Pac. 934 (1919).
'Anthis v. Sullivan Oil & Gas Co., 83 Okla. 86, 203 Pac. 187 (1921); Strange v. Hicks, 78 Okla.
1, 188 Pac. 347 (1920).
6 Cadillac Oil & Gas Co. v. Harrison, 196 Ky. 290, 244 S.W. 669 (1922); Walden v. Potts, 194
Okla. 453, 152 P.2d 923 (1944).
'See 2 Summers, Oil & Gas § 298 at 133 (Perm. ed. 1938), "courts generally hold that produc-
tion within the definite term is necessary to extend the lease beyond it."
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habendum itself usually calls for "production" before extension, or
else the courts will often construe such words as "found" and "dis-
covered," when they are used in the habendum in place of the word
"produced," as being synonymous with "produced.",, Therefore, we
know from the beginning that "production" is required. The prob-
lem remains. The student still must determine what constitutes
"production" under the law of different states. He has yet to under-
stand which operations will, and which will not, extend the lease
after the specified term comes -to an end.
It is our purpose here to examine this problem in relation to
"shut in wells." A "shut in well" is one which is capable of giving
up oil or gas, but which is not being operated, often because there is
no pipe line or other market. Will the presence of such a well on
leased property at the end of the primary term qualify as "pro-
duction" under the habendum clause so as to carry on the lease?
If so, how long may this extension continue without the actual
marketing of oil or gas from the property? What are the rights and
duties of the parties while the lease is extended in this manner?
For a simpler analysis, we may distinguish four distinct circum-
stances under which shut in wells may play a part in the continu-
ation of a lease. They are (a) where oil or gas is marketed during
the definite term and the wells are subsequently shut in; (b) where
oil or gas is discovered but not marketed during the primary term;
(c) where unusual circumstances or lease terms extend the lease
and oil or gas is later discovered but not marketed; and (d) where
the primary term ends and, although there in nothing else to main-
tain the lease, discovery is made later. Let us consider these cat-
egories one at a time.
I. EXTENSION
A. Where Marketing Precedes the Shutting In
A Texas case has held that where active operations are fol-
lowed by a decline in well pressure such that the high-pressure
pipe line being used cannot carry the gas, a well may be shut in
until a new market is found if the parties have included shut in
royalties in their lease.9 In the absence of shut in royalties, another
Texas case' ° ruled that a temporary and unavoidable cessation of
marketing, as where a well's casing collapses and several months
pass before substitute wells are brought in, will not cause a forfeit-
ure of the lease. While the issue in such a case is not strictly one of
forfeiture, but rather is one of expiration under the habendum,
the decision nevertheless indicates that under such conditions the
lease will continue. The court, however, followed reasoning derived
from West Virginia authorities, and, as we shall see, Texas has not
generally adopted this view.
In Holchak v. Clark" Texas has maintained its view that only
marketing will qualify as "production" for the perpetuation of a
Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Adkins, 278 Fed. 854 (6th Cir. 1922); Murdock-West Co. v. Logan, 69
Ohio St. 514, 69 N.E. 984, 985 (1904): "the lessees must actually find oil in paying quantities, and
this is the same as obtaining and producing it in paying quantities." Walker, The Nature of Property
Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 8 Texas L. Rev. 483, 514 (1930). Contra, Texas
Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Bratton, 239 S.W. 688 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
u Shell Oil Co. v. Goodroe, 197 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
10 Scarborough v. New Domain Oil & Gas Co., 276 S.W. 331 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
" 284 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
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lease. The Holchak criticism of Texas cases deviating 2 from this
strictness implies that a temporary cessation of marketing will
terminate a lease in Texas if it occurs after the definite term. The
point is not entirely settled, however. The criticism in Holchak is
dictum, and the fact situation there is to be distinguished from that
in the case just cited.
Kahm v. Arkansas River Gas Co.'3 stated the Kansas position.
Here again a gradual depletion of well pressure after several
months of successful operations made it necessary to disconnect
the well from the only available pipe line, which carried gas only
under high presure. Although the Kansas Supreme Court intimated
that a temporary cessation of production would not terminate the
lease, it held that the lease must expire where further marketing
would require the prior development of new wells of sufficient
capability as to attract a new, low-pressure pipe line. From the
court's language, it would seem that the reasoning in this case is
analagous to that in an Oklahoma decision terminating a lease
where the only producing well was "plugged and abandoned." Even
though the circumstances were not identical, Kahm appears based
on the view that the permanence of the cessation is material. In so
holding, it is consistent with still another Kansas case, which term-
inated a lease where a well became depleted and the sole hope of
future profitability lay in further drilling and discovery.'
4
When wells ceased to surrender oil, but remained capable of
producing gas, although no market was available a 1931 Louisiana
decision terminated the lease involved."
On the other hand, a lease in Kentucky was held to have
remained in force for two years after the only active well had been
shut in.1 The closing of the well followed seven years of operation.
Lack of labor and materials during World War II had forced the
cessation. "Production," the Kentucky Supreme Court said, " ... is
not a continuing usage. Rather, it is a continuing possibility ... in a
situation of this kind.""
It is clear that in West Virginia a lease will not expire if the
wells are shut in after marketing has occurred unless it can be
shown that the lessee has not acted with due diligence. In Hutchin-
son v. McCue 1 it was said, "the lessee is entitled to an extension of
the term for 'as long as the premises are diligently and efficiently
operated, provided minerals shall have been discovered within the
fixed term.' "" Even though the court refused to extend the lease
in this case, it clearly did so by reason of its finding that the lessee
had not actively sought a new market.
" Scarborough v. New Domain Oil & Gas Co., 276 S.W. 331 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Texas Pac.
Cool & Oil Co. v. Bratton, 239 S.W. 688 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
" 122 Kan. 786, 253 Pac. 563 (1927).
1"Jewett v. Coffeyville Vitrified Brick & Tile Co., 122 Kan. 287, 251 Pac. 1110, 1111 (1927):
"When the term had expired and the wells had become unprofitable, the lease was at an end.
Defendant was not entitled to hold it thereafter upon a possibility that they might find a deep gas
at some later time when they chose to drill for it."
'5 Smith v. Sun Oil Co., 172 La. 655, 135 So. 15 (1931): "where a well has ceased to be a pay-
ing proposition for anyone concerned, it has clearly ceased to produce gas in paying quantities."
"Locke v. Palmore, 308 Ky. 637, 215 S.W.2d 544 (1948).
" 215 S.W.2d at 545.




B. Where There Is Discovery, But No Marketing
During the Primary Term
Two strong lines of authority differently interpret the haben-
dum clause. Under the following section of this note, we will see
that Oklahoma, West Virginia, Pennsylvania and Tennessee con-
strue the clause broadly. 20 Texas, Kansas and Louisiana have given
it a narrower construction.
The Broad Construction
Oklahoma. The two views may be found directly opposed in the
majority and dissenting opinions in Bristol v. Colorado Oil and Gas
Corp.,21 decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit. In this case, gas in paying plantities was discovered during
the primary term. For nine years thereafter, and seven and two-
thirds years after the end of the fixed term, the lessee was unable
to market the gas. A pipe line was at last obtained and the gas
marketed. The lessor brought action claiming the lease had expired.
Although shut in royalties had been paid each year according to
agreements made annually, they were not an issue in the case
because the lessor had refused to receive them for the last year. The
question was precisely whether the condition stipulated in the
habendum had been performed. The majority reasoned, consistently
with well established Oklahoma law, that no forfeiture results
where gas has been discovered in paying quantities during the
primary term and the lessee has acted with due diligence in
obtaining a market within a reasonable time. It was held that nine
years was a reasonable time. Although this may be seriously ques-
tioned, the decision clearly illustrates the legal principles espoused
by those courts which broadly construe the habendum.
Circuit Judge Huxman, in his dissent to Bristol,22 emphasized that
oil or gas must be brought to the surface and sold during the fixed
term. The only exception under which the lease may continue
without the active operation of at least one well, he said, is where
marketing has occurred during the definite term but has been tem-
porarily suspended to allow additional exploration. Only in this
event will "due diligence" and "reasonable time" become elements.
It would seem the majority were corrct in their statement of
Oklahoma law. In Parks v. Sinai Oil & Gas Ca.,23 the Oklahoma court
had cited the West Virginia case of Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan24 to
support a holding that a lease would continue beyond the primary
term if gas were discovered and cased off while drilling continued
to a lower sand. Parks stated that discovery in paying quantities
vests the lessee with a limited estate,2 which could not be lost by
the failure to market within the fixed term. It is interesting that
the court here cited the earlier case of Roach v. Junction Oil & Gas
0 This line of authority has received unfavorable treatment from some commentators. Summers,
supra note 1, § 300 at 144-48, has stated that these cases are probably based on equitable consid-
erations, but that it may be objected that conditions precedent to prolonging a lease must be
literally performed. Walker, supro note 8, at 518 makes substantially the same objection.
225 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1955).
225 F.2d at 898, 901.
2383 Okla. 295, 201 Pac. 517 (1921).
65 W. Va. 531, 64 S.E. 836 (1904).
-This view is criticized in Summers, supra note 1, at 144, where it is argued that courts have
long held that the lessee gets a vested interest upon the very execution of the lease, and that there-
fore the West Virginia "vested interest upon discovery" doctrine offers no greater basis for extending
a lease than is present in other states, including those which narrowly construe the habendum.
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Co.,e which possibly could have been distinguished on the ground
that in that case the habendum called only for the "finding" of gas
in paying quantities and provided for a $100.00 royalty, which was
tendered by the lessee.
What is significant about the Oklahoma cases is that they have
followed the language of the West Virginia decisions. Nearly every
case in this area of oil and gas law may be distinguished from other
closely related cases on the facts and consequently the authority in
most states is incomplete since all conceivable fact problems have
not been adjudicated in each jurisdiction. It is often difficult to find
authority directly in point. It follows, therefore, that an adequate
appraisal of each state's law requires an understanding of the
reasoning used the the few cases decided. When a court such as the
Oklahoma Supreme Court cites West Virginia authorities, 27 one may
feel reasonably sure that the habendum will more or less consist-
ently receive a broad construction. Those citing the weight of
authority in Texas, however, will adhere to the stricter interpreta-
tion.
West Virginia. In the West Virginia case of Barbour, Stedman
& Co. v. Tompkins,28 the court used the words "discovered in paying
quantities" interchangeably with "produced in paying quantities."
The good faith opinion of the lessee that he had discovered gas in
profitable amounts was considered sufficient to extend the lease,
even though no gas had been removed from the ground and mar-
keted. Perhaps the broadest statement of the West Virginia doctrine
is to be found in South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass.29 Here it was
asked "may we not, therefore, say the qualifying clause 'as oil or
gas is produced' really means 'as long as the premises are diligently
and efficiently operated, provided minerals shall have been dis-
covered within the fixed term?' ,,3 The West Virginia court stated
that a strict construction of the habendum would "inflict disastrous
losses upon diligent and honest lessees in many instances-a conse-
quence plainly not within the intent of either party."'1 Still other
opinions by the same court have made it clear that discovery during
the primary term will extend the lease unless the lessee clearly
abandons the property or forfeits by failure to develop it.2
Pennsylvania. In Pennsylvania, a dictum in Summerville v.
Apollo Gas Co. 33 states that discovery and production are synon-
ymous in that state. Although gas had never been sold from the
property, but a well had been completed during the primary term,
the court said "we do not find any denial that the well produced
1,000,000 feet of gas a day ... .-4 The payment of shut in royalties
w72 Okla. 213, 179 Pac. 934 (1919).
"West Virginia authorities were cited in: Parks v. Sinai Oil & Gas Co., 83 Okla. 295, 201 Pac.
517, 519 (1921); Roach v. Junction Oil & Gas Co., 72 Okla. 213, 179 Pac. 934, 936 (1919).
2581 W. Va. 116, 93 S.E. 1038 (1917).
S71 W. Va. 438, 76 S.E. 961 (1912).
30 76 S.E. at 967.
31 Ibid.
3Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S.E. 836, 840 (1909): "Our cases seem clearly
to hold that discovery of oil or gas is alone sufficient to vest the right-a right, it is true, which
may be lost by abandonment, manifested by neglect to produce, or pursue the work of production
and further development." Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co., 51 W. Va. 583, 42 S.E.
655 (1902).
"207 Pa. 334, 56 Ati. 876 (1904).
. 56 Atl. at 878 (emphasis added).
July-August, 1957
had kept the lease alive, and so this statement is dictum, but it may
be considered some indication of the Pennsylvania position.
Tennessee. Benedum-Trees Oil Co. v. Davis" is a federal court
decision interpreting Tennessee law. It terminated a lease where
nine years had passed since completion of a well and all efforts to
obtain a pipe line had failed, with no future prospect. The court's
rationale, however, was that a reasonable time had passed. From
this we may infer that the lease might not have expired if gas in
paying quantities had been successfully marketed within some time
less than nine years. We may note, also, that the court applied the
West Virginia rationale that discovery grants the lessee a vested,
though limited, estate in the property, whereas his rights are in-
choate before discovery.
Wyoming. The present writer has found scant authority for the
Wyoming position. In a 1924 decision, 6 the Wyoming court extend-
ed a lease covering property upon which gas had merely been dis-
covered, and not marketed, during the definite term. The lease con-
tained independent "marketing" and "producing" clauses, and from
this the court inferred that the parties had intended the habendum
clause, which required "production," to demand merely discovery,
but not the actual selling of gas. While discussing whether the lease
had been forfeited, as a separate problem from whether it had ex-
pired by its own terms, the court stated that discovery grants the
lessee a vested interest. This is most compatible with the West Vir-
ginia law.
Montana. Where gas is found within the primary term in what
would be commercial quantities if a market were present, and yet
no market is even prospectively available, an operator who has
shown diligence in his attempt to find a market is entitled to re-
tain his lease on that portion of the land on which the well is lo-
cated. The Montana court, in a 1936 case, ruled that under such cir-
cumstances the "gas well was 'producing' within the meaning of the
lease.37 According to the reasoning given, the well "producing" in
"legal contemplation" from the day the well was completed. The
Montana court criticized Elliott v. Crystal Springs, t a Kansas de-
cision terminating a lease in its entirety under virtually identical
circumstances, saying that it "is not in accord with the authorities
generally."'
The recent case of Fey v. A. A. Oil Corp.40 definitively places
Montana in line with the West Virginia authorities.
To say that they (the lessees) shall be declared in default
and to forfeit their lease if they do not market their product,
when there is at the time no profitable market, would be
contrary to equitable principles and to any express terms
of the lease. It would amount to saying, the defendants have
drilled a producing well which furnishes gas in market-
able quantities, but as there is no market the well is not
107 F.2d 981 (6th Cir. 1939).
"' Pryor Mountain Oil & Gas Co. v. Gross, 31 Wyo. 9, 222 Pac. 570 (1924).
vSeverson v. Barstow, 103 Mont. 526, 63 P.2d 1022, 1024 (1936).
8 106 Kan. 248, 187 Pac. 692 (1920).
w 6 3 P.2d at 1024.40 126 Mont. 552, 285 P.2d 578 (1955).
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producing. The contract is not reasonably susceptible to any
such interpretation.
4 1
In this case marketing arrangements were made after the fixed
term had ended.
As we shall see, those states which narrowly construe the haben-
dum clause would have held that the lease expired in each of these
cases.
Kentucky. Although interpreting the "unless" clause rather
than the habendum, Unity Oil Co. v. Hill42 indicates the Kentucky
alignment. The drilling of a well, without "shooting it," was held to
meet the requirement under this clause. A dictum, however, says
that "it (the well) was not . . . a producing well; that is, one from
which oil in profitable quantities could be taken.4 This tells us,
though admittedly without great force, that a well capable of giv-
ing up commercial quantities is considered a producing well in
Kentucky.
We may rely with greater assurance, however, upon Penna-
grade Oil & Gas Co. v. Martin.44 Here a well was completed dur-
ing the primary term but was shut in for two and one half years
until a pipe line was obtained. The Kentucky court held that the
lease had not expired, arguing that the lessee must be given a rea-
sonable time to market gas after its discovery.
Colorado. No authority is available for the Colorado position
on these matters.
(2) The Narrow Construction
Texas. The Texas line of authority, giving a narrow construc-
tion to the habendum, has been called the majority American
rule.
4 .
Certainly this is not clear from the case-law. Nevertheless, this con-
struction does have substantial backing. Perhaps it has received its
clearest expression in the following remarks from Stanolind Oil &
Gas Co. v. Barnhill:
Appellants did not contract for a term which would de-
pend upon the possibility of procuring a market for the
product at some date subsequent to its express date of ex-
piration. The lease did not provide that it should remain in
force and effect for five years, and as long thereafter as
there may be prospects of a market for the product ... ,
The facts in this case had shown discovery in paying quantities
during the primary term, followed by extensive efforts to find a
market. About one year after the fixed term ended, a market was
obtained. In such a case, the West Virginia court would have con-
tinued the lease.4 7 The Texas court did not.
Holchak v. Clark4 s another Texas decision, criticized the West
Virginia rule and two Texas cases following it.4 9 The court canceled
:" 285 P.2d at 587-88 (emphasis added).
2200 Ky. 577, 255 S.W. 151 (1923).
"255 S.W. at 152 (emphasis added).
"211 Ky. 137, 277 S.W. 302 (1925).
13 See note 7 supro; see alse, Walker, supra note 8 at 517 where the West Virginia rule is eval-
uoted as being "a minority group of cases which hae placed a Ibieral construction upon the
hobendum clause .... "
44 107 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Cir. App. 1937).
"- See South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438, 76 S.E. 961 (1912).
4" 284 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Cir. App. 1955).
4. See note 12 supra.
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a lease where a favorable drill stem test had shown oil in paying
amounts and an active well had been completed after the primary
term. "One cannot say that discovery of oil followed by diligent
operations is the equivalent to production of oil and gas in paying
quantities, without doing violence to the plain meaning of words in
common use . . . Production has a commercial connotation.
'50
Holchak is careful to add, however, that the parties could, by spe-
cial provision, provide for such a circumstance. Later in this note,
in the section dealing with shut in royalties, we will discuss how
this might be done.
Dicta in Morrison v. Swaim"' further support the Texas rule.
Oil had been discovered during the primary term. Just the same,
the Texas court said "the well in question did not occupy the status
of a producing oil well... ,,52 The lease would have expired had not
drilling extended it under a special form of the habendum clause,
which provided for extension for as long as good faith drilling
operations continued.
A very recent case, Sellers v. Breidenbach,3 has reaffirmed
these Texas interpretations. Sellers repeated the rule that in
Texas a shut gas well will not extend a lease in the absence of a
shut in royalty provision. It also distinguished the West Virginia
rule from that which is predominant in Texas.
Only oversimplification, however, would lead us to state that the
Texas position has been clearcut. There has been considerable dif-
ference of opinion in that state. Primarily because of the Sellers de-
cision, which is the most recent, Texas' position appears clearly de-
fined. The cases to the contrary, although too common to be insig-
nificant, are not the weight of authority there. One of the contrary
cases, Cox v. Miller," argued that the gas must be marketed with-
in a reasonable time and that there must have been "a reasonable
expectation and probability of a market for the gas at the time
the well was completed"5 in order for the lease to extend. Since
the facts indicated that no market was even prospectively avail-
able, the lease expired. The Cox reasoning would clearly have ex-
tended the lease if a market had been fairly well assured. A nar-
row construction of the habendum clause would not have led to
this implication, nor has it done so.56
In Mitchell v. Perkins5 7 a lessee was given a reasonable time to
market the product of a well even if the fixed term expired be-
fore the time had elapsed. "It is elementary," the court said, "that
where gas or oil is discovered within the primary term, the lessee is
entitled to a reasonable time within which to market the same."58
A 1955 Texas case from the Court of Civil Appeals also held that
where a lease does not provide for shut in royalties and gas is dis-
covered in paying quantities during the fixed term "the lessee
50 284 S.W.2d at 401.
5-220 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
Id. at 495.
r 300 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
"' 184 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
55 Id. at 327.
"
8
See Home Royalty Ass'n v. Stone, 199 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1952) (Kansas law held to terminate
lease even though the parties stipulated that gas had been marketed within a reasonable time after
the primary term).
5' 266 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, Perkins v. Mitchell, 153 Tex.
368, 268 S.W.2d 907 (1954).
58 Id. at 454.
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should have a reasonable time to market the gas, even though the
time required should extend beyond the primary term,"5 if a mar-
ket is readily available. The lease expired when due diligence
was not shown by the lessee. This case, Union Oil Co. v. Ogden,6o
is in line with Mitchell v. Perkins and Cox v. Miller. These three
cases would seem clearly to establish an exception to the severity
of the "Texas rule." They may well be established Texas law over
the long run. Decisions in other states accustomed to construing the
habendum narrowly are in opposition, however."
Holchak v. Clark, supra, has criticized the language in Texas
Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Bratton,'2 where an habendum calling for
both discovery and production was interpreted to require only dis-
covery in paying quantities, and not marketing, in order to extend
the lease. Since "discovered," "found," and "produced" are generally
held to mean the same thing the Bratton case may possibly offer
some authority, though slight, for cases arising under differently
worded habendum clauses. It should be noted, however, that the
court seeed to assign a separate meaning to the word "discovered,"
thereby vitiating somewhat Bratton's usefulness for analogy. In
any event, the case is in direct alignment with those decisions which
have broadly construed the habendum, and as such is contrary to
the main .course of Texas rulings.
Other states -which have narrowly construed the habendum
where gas has been discovered but not marketed during the primary
term are Kansas and Louisiana. In some states, such as New Mexico,
there is little basis for distinct classification, if in fact classification
of them is possible.
Kansas. In 1920, the Kansas Supreme Court 64 held a lease to
have expired where paying quantities were found during the def-
inite term but where there was no prospect of obtaining a pipe line
of the necessary pressure. Twelve years later, Ratcliff v. Gouinlock 5
terminated a lease for the mining of clay. Although clay of the
proper sort had been discovered within the primary term, it had
not been mined until one month afterward. Reasoning by analogy
from oil and gas lease problems, the court overrode the lessee's con-
tention that where a well or mine is substantially completed during
the fixed term, equity maintains the lease. Rather, it is stated that
in oil and gas law it is, "necessary that there should be actual pro-
duction of oil and gas, not merely exploratory activities in order to
extend the term of the lease."6 While the words "actual production"
are ambigious, it is clear that the lessee could have gained an exten-
sion only by taking clay from the mine during the initial period of
the lease.
5278 S.WJ2d at 249.
60 278 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
61 See note 56 supra; Ratcliff v. Gouinlock, 136 Kan. 149, 12 P.2d 798 (1932) (terminated mining
lease where active extraction of clay began a month and a half after the primary term ended).
82239 S.W. 688 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
82 In Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Adkins, 278 Fed. 854, 856 (6th Cir. 1922), the court held that
"found" means "discovered and produced in paying quantities within the term named in the lease."
It was said in Murdock-West Co. v. Logan, 69 Ohio St. 514, 69 N.E. 984, 985 (1904), that even
though the habendum speaks only of finding oil, "the lessees must actually find oil in paying
quantities, and this is the same as obtaining and producing it in paying quantities." See Walker,
supro note 8 at 514-15.
e' Elliott v. Crystal Springs Oil Co., 106 Kan. 248, 187 Pac. 692 (1920).
82136 Kan. 149, 12 P.2d 798 (1932).
08 12 P.2d at 800.
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Two 1952 cases clearly express the Kansas law. Extensive dicta
in Tate v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.67 review the opposing construc-
tions of the habendum. The court concedes that, "there is a respect-
able contrary minority view in West Virginia, Texas, Oklahoma,
Kentucky, Wyoming, and perhaps in a few other states." 68 But it
goes on to say that in its opinion "the great weight ou authority...
appears to be in harmony with the view that actual production dur-
ing the primary term is essential to the extension of the lease beyond
the fixed term." 9 Although the present writer has found it impos-
sible to substantiate this view of the weight of authority, the court's
emphasis, once again, on "actual production" (by which it ap-
parently meant "marketing") 'is clear.
The Tate decision is cited in the other 1952 case, Home Royalty
Ass'n. v. Stone.7 0 The issue, upon both fact and law, is here crystal
172 Kan. 351, 240 P.2d 465 (1952).
w 240 P.2d .t 469.
% Ibid.
O 199 F.2c 650 (10th Cir. 1952).
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clear. Four days before the end of the primary term, a gas well was
completed with a daily potential of 10,514,000 cubic feet. The gas was
successfully marketed three months later, and the parties stipulated
that this was a reasonable length of time. The issue raised was
whether a lessee has a reasonable time to market gas after com-
pletion of a well with high potential even though the time might
extend past the expiration of the fixed term. The court held that in
Kansas no such opportunity is given. "There must be actual pro-
duction," it said, "as distinguished from exploration and dis-
covery .... -1
Louisiana. A lease was held to have expired by its own terms
in a 1933 case where the Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned that
"gas must be produced within the required time; that is, with-
drawn and reduced to possession for use in commerce.
' -3
New Mexico. The case of Town of Tome Land Grant v. Ringle
Development Co.73 offers an obscure guide to New Mexican law on
this subject. It does, however, give us some dicta. The New Mexico
court distinguished between leases which provide shut in royalty
and those which do not. Where there is no set consideration for the
lease, but merely a promise to develop with a hope of future royal-
ties "a lessee cannot be permitted to fail in development and hold
the lease for speculative purposes ... 14 This view Would seem com-
patible with both the West Virginia and Texas rules. Under the par-
ticular facts of the case, the lease was terminated by reason of the
lessee's lack of diligence during the primary term.
Summary. The preceding review of the case-law in several
states warrants the following generalizations, although strictly
speaking each state must be considered individually. In certain
states discovery of gas during the primary term will usually suffice
to extend the lease under the habendum clause if the gas is dis-
covered in paying quantities, the lessee shows due dligence in find-
ing a market, a reasonable time has not elapsed, and there is at
least a prospective market. Several other states will generally not
extend the lease under such conditions, but instead will require the
actual taking and marketing of gas from the well during the definite
term. Colorado has no authority and the New Mexico authority is
obscure.
C. Where Unusual Terms or Circumstances Extend the Lease,
and Oil or Gas is Later Discovered But Not Marketed
Even though oil or gas has not been sold in commercial quan-
tities during the fixed term, unusual clauses or circumstances3 may
extend the lease. This may occur, regardless of the state's tendency
to follow either the West Virginia or Texas rule. For example, where
habendums have provided that a lease is to remain in effect so long
as oil or gas is produced or good faith drilling operations are con-
tinued, courts interpreting Kansas 76 and Texas77 law have extended
71 199 F.2d at 652.
Pace Lake Gas Co. v. United Carbon Co., 177 La. 529, 148 So. 699, 701 (1933).
"56 N.M. 101, 240 P.2d 850 (1952).
4 240 P.2d at 852.
'sSee Strange v. Hicks, 78 Okla. 1, 188 Pac. 347 (1920), where the conduct of the parties was
held to be such as to show that they did not consider the lease terminated by failure to market the
gas within the primary term.
Christianson v. Champlin Refining Co., 169 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1948).
Morrison v. Swaim, 220 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
DICTA
July-August, 1957
the lease even though there has been a mere discovery of oil, if
drilling operations have continued beyond the fixed term. A Wyo-
ming decision78 extended a lease on the ground that separate
"marketing" and "producing" clauses indicated that the parties in-
tended to restrict the word "producing" in the habendum clause to
mean discovery in paying quantities. In Montana, a lease which pro-
vided that no royalty was to be paid on shut in wells which were
closed due to lack of a profitable market was extended on the
ground that this language had shown that the parties "contem-
plated the possibility of a well capable of producing . . . and the
possibility that there would be a market for it." 9 In another Kansas
case,80 a separate drilling clause, which allowed extension if drilling
were diligently carried through to paying production, was held to
have sufficiently modified the habendum as to allow extension.
The parties may agree to an extension of the primary term
beyond the date they have originally set. By so doing, the entire
lease may be kept in force even though gas has merely been dis-
covered, and not marketed, during the original lease term, accord-
ing to a Texas decision."' A lessee lost his lease to a subsequent good
faith lessee in such a case in Ohio,8 2 however, where he failed to
record the renewal agreement. The Ohio court ruled that the
renewal was in fact a new lease, and as such would have to be
recorded as provided by Ohio statute.
Estoppel will sometimes be present to keep the lease in force.
A lessor in Kentucky 83 was precluded from claiming the expiration
of a lease after he had knowingly acquiesced in the lessee's good
faith drilling of wells following the end of the definite term. The
estoppel doctrine has also been asserted in this connection in Louis-
iana.1
4
Stipulated rentals. There have been a number of cases in
which a lease has continued where only a shut in well has been
present and the lessor has been paid a stipulated rental or fixed
royalty in accordance with lease provisions to that effect. If such a
rental is the only royalty provided for in the agreement, the lessor
has in fact very little interest in whether a well is shut in or is
active.8 5 The rule is different, however, where the lessor is entitled
to royalties in excess of the fixed rental.8 In this event, the rules
discussed at length in the previous sections of this note apply.
7s Pryor Mountain Oil & Gas Co. v. Cross, 31 Wyo. 9, 222 Pac. 570 (1924).
" Steven v. Potlatch Oil & Refining Co., 80 Mont. 239, 260 Pac. 119, 122 (1927).
'0 Tate v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 172 Kan. 351, 240 P.2d 465 (1952).
81 Masterson v. Amarillo Oil Co., 253 S.W. 908 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
8a Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Co. v. City of Tiffin, 59 Ohio St. 420, 54 N.E. 77 (1899).8 
Cadillac Oil & Gas Co. v. Harrison, 196 Ky. 290, 244 S.W. 669 (1922).
"Caldwell v. Alton Oil Co., 161 La. 139, 108 So. 314 (1926). Although the lease was canceled
an other grounds, the lessor was held to be estopped from claiming forfeiture due to the lessee's
failure to drill during the twelve month initial period where the lessor had acquiesced in drilling
after this time had elapsed.
88Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Adkins, 278 F. 854 (6th Cir. 1922); Summerville v. Apollo Gas Co.,
207 Pa. 334, 56 Ati. 876, 878 (1904): "It may be that for some time the lessee was not able to
find a purchaser for the gas, but that was not the affair of the lessors. They were not interested in
the proceeds of the sale of the gas. Their rights under the agreement extended only to the receipt of
a stipulated annual rental for each well, and the free use of gas for domestic purposes. Beyond
this, the question of whether or not the quantity of gas was profitable was for the decision of the
lessee." McCutcheon v. Enon Oil & Gas Co., 102 W. Va. 345, 135 S.E. 238 (1926); see also dicta in
Town of Tome Land Grant v. Ringle Development Co., 56 N.M. 101, 240 P.2d 850 (1952) and Cox
v. Miller, 184 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
5' Lowry v. Philadelphia Optical & Watch Co., 161 Pa. 47, 28 Att. 1004 (1894); accord, Benedum-
Trees Oil Co. v. Davis, 107 F.2d 981 (6th Cir. 1939); Smith v. Sun Oil Co. 172 La. 655, 135 So. 15
(1931); Caldwell v. Alton Oil Co., 161 La. 139, 108 So. 314 (1926).
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Shut in Royalty Clauses. While terminating a lease in accord-
ance with the Texas construction of the habendum clause, the
Texas court in Sellers v. Breidenbach87 mentioned that the parties
could have kept the lease alive had they made explicit provision for
shut in wells. How might they have done so? What sort of provision
would have this effect?
A relatively new type of clause now in common use 8 is the"shut in royalty clause." One form is:
If while this lease is in effect, oil or gas be discovered on
said land which cannot be profitably produced for lack of
a market at the well or wells, lessee may pay lessor (a stipu-
lated sum) as royalty for each such well .. . and while such
royalty is so paid, such well or wells shall be considered as
producing in commercial quantities for all purposes here-
under.8 9
At least one form does not provide, as this one does, that the
payment of the royalty will suffice to class the well as a producer
of paying quantities. Under this type of provision, it may be neces-
sary to show that the well has a paying potential.90
Several Texas decisions have extended leases under such
clauses. 9' The leases would have expired otherwise. In Freeman v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 92 however, the presence of the clause did
not achieve extension of the lease where the royalty was tendered
four months after the primary term had ended. The royalty must be
paid during the primary term if the lease is to be extended. The
clause gives the lessee an option: he may pay the royalty and gain
extension, or not pay it and see the lease expire.9 3 It creates no
obligation.
D. Where the Primary Term Ends with Nothing to Sustain
the Lease and Oil or Gas is Discovered Thereafter
In Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan," a West Virginia case, a lease
continued in force when gas was found in paying quantities during
the fixed term and the lessee drilled deeper, finding a great quan-
tity of gas in the lower sand shortly after the fixed term ended. The
K 300 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
w8 Scurlock, Practical and Legal Problems in Delay Rental and Shut-in Royalty Payments, Fourth
Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Low and Taxation 17, 37 (Southwestern Legal Foundation 1953).
8 Union Oil Co. v. Ogden, 278 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
0o Scurlock, supra note 88 at 45.
"Union Oil Co. v. Ogden, 278 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Moriss v. First Nat'l Bank, 249
S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Shell Oil Co. v. Goodroe, 197 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ .App. 1946).
0 141 Tex. 274, 171 S.W.2d 339 (1943).
WUnion Oil Co. v. Ogden, 278 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
N 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S.E. 836 (1909).
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extension was explicitly attributed to the first of the two dis-
coveries. Just the same, the court remarked that equity would have
kept the lease alive even if the only discovery had been after the
lease period had elapsed. A lessee who makes a good faith effort
to complete a well during the primary term will, according to this
dictum, be protected in West Virginia. Whether the other states
broadly construing the habendum will follow this precedent is, of
course, conjectural. It is clear that Kansas, Texas and Louisiana
will not.
II. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE PARTIES UNDER
AN EXTENDED LEASE
It has been stated that extension of a lease has the same effect
upon covenants to develop as would a new lease with immediate
possession.95 The implied covenants to develop the property continue
as before." These covenants are, however, just as the primary term,
subject to the "reasonably prudent operator" test, which demands
only that the lessee develop the land where it would be prudent
to do so. He need not extend drilling where there is insufficient indi-
cation that such activity would be profitable," although in Cosden
Oil Co. v. Scarborough"' the court cautioned that development may
not be postponed indefinitely. McCutcheon v. Enon Oil & Gas Co.9
excused a lessee from drilling more than one well while no market
was available. But Severson v. Barstow00 emphasized that the
lessee must be reasonably diligent in his efforts to obtain a market.
III. CONCLUSION
A shut in gas well will extend a lease beyond the primary term
if a shut in royalty clause so stipulates, the lessor is estopped from
denying extension, unusual terms are present to modify the haben-
dum clause, or the habendum as such is given a broad interpreta-
tion. While the overwhelming majority of cases require "produc-
tion" to satisfy the ordinary habendum clause, 01 there is a split
among the states as to what constitutes "production." The weight
of authority in cases directly in point would seem to be that dis-
covery in paying quantities during the fixed term is sufficient. This
is the West Virginia rule, which is followed by a number of other
states, as related in detail above. On the other hand, some states
narrowly construe the habendum and will not extend a lease in
most cases unless either oil or gas has been taken from the ground
and sold in commercial quantities. There is no Colorado authority
on this subject. When a lease is extended, the usual implied cove-
nants to develop continue, but are subject, as during the fixed term,
to the "reasonably prudent operator" test, which may limit the
lessee's obligation if no market is available.
mTibbeus v. Clayton, 288 Fed. 393, 400 (E.D. Okla. 1923): "It is immaterial whether you call it
an extension or renewal."
e In Sander v. Mid-Continent Corp., 292 U.S. 272, 279 (1934), the Court said: "It is conceded
that a covenant on respondent's part to continue the work of exploration, development and produc-
tion is to be implied (sic) from the relation of the parties and the object of the lease; and that this
covenant was not abrogated by the exp:ration of the primary term of ten years." (emphasis added).
Robinson v. Miracle, 146 Okla. 31, 293 Pac. 211 (1930); Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va.
531, 64 S.E. 836 (1909). See also, Cosden Oil Co. v. Scarborough, 55 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1932) (dictum).
5' Cosden Oil Co. v. Scarborough, supra note 96; Pelham Petroleum Co. v. North, 78 Okla. 39,
188 Pac. 1069 (1920).
See note 96 supro.
ul 102 W. Va. 345, 135 S.E. 238 (1926).
50 103 Mont. 526, 63 P.2d 1022 (1936).
101 See note 7 supra.
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OIL AND GAS RIGHTS IN RAILROAD RIGHTS OF
WAY - THE UNION PACIFIC CASE
By PAULINE NELSON
Pauline Nelson is a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
This note received second prize in the writing competition sponsored by
the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation.
The status of oil and gas rights in railroad rights of way has
been a matter of controversy for fifty years, and a troublesome
question for federal oil and gas lessees since the enactment of the
Mineral Leasing Act in 1920. United States v. Union Pacific R.R.
Co.' has settled the question between the United States and the
Union Pacific. But the case has created more problems than it has
solved, and while the rights of the railroad have been determined,
there are other contenders whose interests are undecided.
In the Union Pacific case the Court held the railroad is not the
owner of the mineral estate in the right of way granted to it by the
Act of July 1, 1862.2 The decision was based upon what the Court
found to be a reservation of minerals to the United States. Section 2
of the 1862 act gave the railroad company "the right of way through
the public lands,' and Section 3 subsidized construction of the road
by a grant of alternate sections on either side of the right of way,
with the proviso that "all mineral lands shall be excepted from the
operation of this act." The mineral exception, the Court held, ap-
plied not only to Section 3 but to the entire act, and hence applied
to the right of way as well as to the subsidy lands.
Until this decision the mineral land exceptions in railroad land
grants were not construed as mineral reservations. The subsidy sec-
tions given to the railroads were those sections not known to contain
minerals at the time the patents issued. The mineral or non-mineral
character of the land was determined by the Interior Department
before issuance of the patent, and the administrative determina-
tion was final. The railroad's title could not be upset by a sub-
sequent discovery of minerals in the patented sections, and if such
minerals were found they belonged to the railroad.3 This was not a
reservation of minerals, but a classification of land, with a convey-
ance only of those sections classified as non-mineral.
The same mineral exception is now held to be a mineral reser-
vation also. The Court in applying the exception has made a distinc-
tion between the alternate sections and the right of way. The
exception is held to apply to both; but the classification method
used in applying it to the alternate sections is not workable in deal-
ing with the right of way, and the proviso must therefore be
interpreted, where the right of way is concerned, as a mineral
reservation. The right of way grant, therefore, conveyed the sur-
face only, with the minerals reserved to the United States.
The decision is in keeping with the rule that a grant of land
by the sovereign must be construed strictly against the grantee,
77 Sup. Ct. 685 (1957).
12 Stat. 489, amended 13 Stat. 356 (1864).
3 Burke v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 234 U.S. 669 (1914).
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and that nothing will pass by inference or implication unless
essential to the use of the thing granted.4 It is also generally stated
that in construing such a grant there must be considered not only
the language of the act itself but other Congressional acts and the
apparent governmental policy of the time.5 In this case the Court has
applied these rules perhaps with greater rigor than in any other
land grant case. While Congress in 1862 followed a policy of holding
back mineral lands, none of the public land acts of that time con-
tained any reservations. It may be said the Court has considered
not only the policy of the time but the wisdom that comes after-
wards, and has read into an 1862 act a Congressional policy of
separating the surface and mineral estates and reserving minerals
to the United States--a policy in fact not fully developed until the
early years of the 20th century.6
The result reached is more favorable to the United States than
any of the prior oil and gas cases arising under the railroad acts.
This is the third case in the federal courts in which the United
States has sought to enjoin a railroad from drilling for and removing
oil and gas from its right of way. In the first, the Great Northern
case 7it was held that under the General Right of Way Act of 18758
4 Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262 (1942); Caldwell v. United States, 250
U.S. 14 (1919); United States v. Oregon & C. R.R. Co., 164 U.S. 526 (1896); Barden v. Northern Pac.
R.R. Co.. 154 U.S. 288 (1894).
United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 91 U.S. 72 (1875).
SStatutes enacted in 1909 and 1910 (35 Stat. 844; 36 Stat. 583) permitted agricultural entrymen
on land subsequently found to'contain minerals to obtain patents with minerals reserved. The policy
of reserving minerals was first generally applied in the Surface Patent Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 509, and
the Stockraising Homestead Act, 39 Stat. 862 (1916), 43 U.S.C. 291-302 (1952).
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262 (1942).
8 18 Stat. 482, 43 U.S.C. 934-39 (1952).
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the railroad acquired nothing more than an easement-a right of
use and occupancy-and hence had no right in the underlying
minerals. In the second, the Illinois Central case9 the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that under its specefic right
of way grant ° the railroad received a "determinable fee" in the
right of way, and that the interest granted included the mineral
rights. The Union Pacific case reaches still a third result. What-
ever the nature of the railroad's interest, the Court says, there was
a specific reservation of minerals to the United States.
The difference in result in the three cases is traceable to their
different statutory bases, and reflects the changing public land
policy of the United States in the second half of the 19th century.
Prior to 1860 the government made a number of railroad grants, giv-
ing to the railroads a right of way across public lands and a bonus
consisting of alternate sections of land on either side of the right of
way.- There was no exception of mineral lands in these acts. The
Illinois Central grant was probably the largest in this period. By the
1850 act the railroad received a right of way 200 feet wide, and every
alternate section of public land, whether mineral or non-mineral,
for a width of six sections on each side of the right of way.
The period from 1860 to 1871 was a period of lavish grants in aid
of the transcontinental railroads. As an inducement for the construc-
tion of roads across thousands of miles of vacant territory, millions
of acres of public land were given to the Union Pacific, the Northern
Pacific, and other railroads. 1 2 The total has been estimated at more
than 158 million acres. " But while Congress was prodigal in dealing
with the railroads, there also developed an increasing jealousy of
the nation's mineral resources. All the railroad grants of this period,
like other public land acts, excepted mineral lands.
In the period after 1871 the Congressional attitude toward the
railroads changed. The prodigality ceased. There continued to be
grants of right of way across the public domain,' 4 but there were no
more gifts of public lands adjoining the railroad route. The General
Right of Way Act of 1875"1 put an end to grants by special act of
Congress, and delegated authority to the Interior Department. The
act embodied the policy of the special acts of the early 1870's that
railroads should be subsidized only to the extent of the necessary
rights of way, and provided that public lands should be disposed of
subject to such rights of way.
Until the time of the oil and gas cases all right of way grants,
under whatever act of Congress they were made, received a uniform
interpretation in the courts. It was held that the nature of the rail-
road's use of its right of way precluded a holding that the right of
way was an intangible right of passage only; that since the use was
continuous and involved permanent improvements, a grant of right
of way to a railroad required the fee for its enjoyment. But since
United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 187 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1951), affirming 89 F. Supp. 17
(ED. III. 1949).
0 Act of September 20, 1850, 9 Stat. 466.
U1 Atlantic and Gulf, and Mobile 'and Ohio grants, 9 Stat. 771-72 (1849); Illinois Central grant,
9 Stat. 466 (1850).
'Among others, the Union Pacific grant, 12 Stat. 489 (1862); Northern Pacific, 13 Stat. 365
(1864); Cali onia and Oregon R.R., 14 Stat. 239 (1866); Atlantic and Pacific R.R., 14 Stat. 292 (1866).
18See United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 77 Sup. Ct. at 692.
14 Portland, Dalles & S.L.R.R. grant, 17 Stat. 52 (1872); Central Pacific grant, 18 Stat. 306 (1875).
15 18 Stat. 482, 43 U.S.C. 934-39 (1952).
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the grant was made for the purpose of construction and operation
of a railroad, it did not convey an unqualified fee simple title, but a
"fee simple determinable, sometimes called a base, qualified or
limited fee,"'" subject only to the condition that in the event the
land ceased to be used for railroad purposes it would revert to the
United States.
In Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Townsend17 the Court held the land
forming the right of way was taken out of the category of public
lands and was not subject to further disposition by the government.
An adjoining landowner could acquire, no rights in it, either by
adverse possession or by virtue of a patent covering the entire legal
subdivision.
Most of the cases interpreting the right of way acts involved
the land-grant railroads and right of way acts of the pre-1871
period. But in a decision later overruled by the Great Northern case
the Court applied the same reasoning to the General Right of Way
Act. The right of way acquired under the provisions of that act was
held to be not a mere easement but a determinable fee.' t
Did a grant of this character also convey to the railroad the
mineral rights in the right of way land? The question arose as early
10 New Mexico v. United States Trust Co., 172 U.S. 171, 183 (1898).
1' 190 U.S. 267 (1903). See also Stuart v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 342 (1913) ;Clairmont v.
United States, 225 U.S. 551 (1912); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Roberts, 152 U.S. 114 (1894); St.
Joseph & D.C.R.R. Co. v. Baldwin, 103 U.S. 426 (1881); Barnes v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 16 F.2d
100 (9th Cir. 1926); City of Reno v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 268 Fed. 751 (9th Cir. 1920); Holland v.
Northern Poc. Ry. Co.,214 Fed. 920 (9th Cir. 1914); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Davenport, 102 Ken. 513,
170 Pac. 993 (1918).
"- Rio Grande Western Ry. Co. v. Stringhom, 239 U.S. 44 (1915).
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as 1905, and the Interior Department then adopted a position it has
adhered to consistently ever since. A right of way grant to a rail-
road, it held, was for railroad purposes only; the grantee and its
lessees had no rights in the underlying minerals and could not drill
for and remove oil and gas.'"
This position of the Department was contrary to most of the
decided cases interpreting determinable fee titles. Such a title,
courts have held, gives the owner rights equivalent to those of an
owner in fee simple, except that his fee may be defeated by the
occurrence of the contingency by which it is determined.0 The
estate is a fee because it may last forever; it is determinable because
it may end on the happening of the contingency. It is generally held
the owner has the entire present interest in the land, including the
right to remove timber, stone and minerals. Since the grantor re-
tains nothing more than a possibility of reversion, upon a contin-
gency that may never occur, the removal of minerals is not such
waste as he could enjoin.
2'
The question acquired greater importance after the enactment
of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920,22 when oil and gas leasing of
public lands brought another party-the federal lessee-into the
controversy. Oil and gas leases covered entire subdivisions, without
excepting the right of way, and the lessees claimed their interests
included the oil and gas under the right of way. The Department,
however, ruled otherwise, holding that neither the federal lessee
nor the owner of the right of way had any right to the minerals in
the right of way strip. Applying the ruling of the Townsend case,
the Department held a lessee, standing in the same position as the
patentee in the Townsend case, could acquire no interest in the right
of way strip, but since the right of way was given for one purpose
only the right of way owner also had no right to remove the
minerals.2'
Because of the impasse thus created-a situation in which no
one could legally drill for oil and gas on a public domain right of
way-the Department sponsored and Congress passed the leasing
act of 1930,24 which authorized the Secretary to grant oil and gas
leases on rights of way-such leases to be given only to the owner
of the right of way, or, upon competitive bidding, to the owner or
lessee of adjoining acreage. And in a number of subsequent decisions
the Department held the railroads could not drill for oil and gas on
a right of way without first acquiring a lease under the 1930 act.
25
The first test of the issue came in the Great Northern case,
which was decided against the railroad-not on the ground a deter-
,' Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 33 L.D. 470 (1905). See also Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 34 L.D. 504
(1906).
90 1 American Law of Property, § 2.6 (1952); 2 Tiffany, Real Property, § 220 (3d ed. 1939).
21 Gannon v. Peterson' 193 Ill. 372, 62 N.E. 210 (1901); Hillis v. Dils, 53 Ind. App. 576, 100 N.E.
1047 (1913); Landers v. Landers, 161 Ky. 800, 151 S.W. 386 (1912); First Universalist Society v.
Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 29 N.E. 524 (1892); Quinn v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co., 256 Mich. 143, 239 N.W.
376 (1931); Board v. Nevada School District, 363 Mo. 328, 251 S.W.2d 20 (1952); Davis v. Skipper,
124 Tex. 364, 83 S.W.2d 318 (1935). Contra: Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co. v. United States, 140
F.2d 436(9th Cir. 1944); Union Missionary Baptist Church v. Fyke, 179 Okla. 102, 64 P.2d 1203 (1937).
241 Stat. 437, 30 U.S.C. 181-263 (1952).
23 Windsor Reservoir & Canci Co. v. Miller, 51 I.D. 27, aff'd on rehearing, 51 I.D. 305 (1925).
The Windsor case involved a reservoir site acquired under the 1891 irrigation act [26 Stat. 1101, 43
U.S.C. 9A6-49 (1952)]. That act also had been interpreted as conveying a determinable fee title.
24 46 Stat. 373, 30 U.S.C. 301-06 (1952).
25!Ownership of Minerals Beneath Land Grant Act Right of Way, 58 I.D. 160 (1942); Use of Rail.
road Right of Way for Extracting Oil, 56 I.D. 206 (1937); Charles A. Son, 53 I.D. 270 (1931).
DICTA
July-August, 1957
minable fee title in the right of way did not include mineral rights,
but on the ground that the right of way grant did not convey the
fee at all. The 1875 act, the Court said, clearly grants only an ease-
ment and not the fee. The Court, however, distinguished the 1875
act from the pre-1871 grants, leaving unaffected the holding that the
prior grants conveyed a greater interest than a mere easement.
Then in the Illinois Central case the Court of Appeals squarely
upset the Department's contention and held the right of way grant,
a determinable fee, conveyed the entire interest in the right of way,
including mineral rights and the right to use the land for any pur-
pose so long as the operation of the railroad continued.
While the Union Pacific decision is based fundamentally on
what the Court finds to be an express reservation of minerals, it
also indicates-in accord with the Department's thesis and contrary
to the Illinois Central case-that a grant for railroad purposes must
be for railroad purposes only. "Whatever may be the nature of the
Union Pacific's interest in the right of way, '26 the Court said, drill-
ing for oil is not a railroad purpose within the meaning of the land
grant act.
The Court did not re-determine the nature of the Union Pacific's
interest. But if it had been determined the right of way is an ease-
ment only, it would have been unnecessary for the Court to find
specific language in the grant reserving the minerals. An easement
is nothing more than a right to use the land for a specific purpose,
and never carries with it the mineral interest. Since the Court did
find a specific reservation of minerals, it is apparent the railroad's
interest is more than a mere easement, and that the "limited fee"
cases are not disturbed. The Court distinguished those cases; it did
not overrule them. None of them, the Court stated, involved a
controversy between the United States and the railroad over min-
eral rights. "The most that the 'limited fee' cases decided was that
the railroads received all surface rights to the right of way and all
rights incident to a use for railroad purposes. '27
It would seem, then, the Union Pacific's interest is just what
the courts have determined it to be since the beginning of the rail-
road litigation, a determinable fee estate, but with the minerals
reserved to the United States. If this is the nature of the railroad's
title, the question then arises as to the effect of subsequent patents
77 Sup. Ct. at 686.
Id. at 689.
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of the land traversed by the right of way. Did a homesteader whose
patent covered the entire quarter section, without excepting the
right of way strip and without a reservation of minerals, thereby
acquire the mineral interest in the right of way?
The Union Pacific case decides nothing more than that the rail-
road has no interest in the minerals. It does not determine title as
between the United States and subsequent patentees. The case is
not like the Great Northern decision, in which judgment deter-
mining title in the United States was limited to those sections of
the right of way crossing land still owned by the United States, and
where a patentee taking land subject to the railroad easement ac-
quired the fee, including the mineral interest, in the right of way.28
The Union Pacific decision leaves open a question that can only be
decided by future litigation.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter indicated that if
mineral rights had not been included in the right of way grant,
those rights would have been conveyed by the patents subsequently
issued for the sections crossed by the right of way.29
Contrary to Justice Frankfurter's opinion, however, is an
Interior Department decision, squarely in point, in which the
Assistant Secretary held the State of Wyoming acquired no interest
in the minerals under the Union Pacific right of way by virtue of
a school land patent covering the entire section.2 0 The Government
may be expected to reaffirm this contention-that it has never
parted with the mineral interest in the right of way, either by the
right of way grant itself or by subsequent patent, and that the
United States is the owner of the mineral rights in the entire length
of the right of way grant.
There are a few cases in which the courts have been faced with
a similar problem, involving not the Government, however, but
individual grantors. Where a person conveys a parcel of land,
reserving the minerals, and in a subsequent conveyance includes a
general description covering the land first conveyed as well as
other land, does the second grantee acquire the reserved mineral
interest? The results of th cases vary, depending in each instance
upon a construction of the deed and a determination of the intent
of the parties.3
Where the government is the grantor, there are additional
factors to be considered. Conveyances under a public land act must
be construed to give effect to the intent of Congress. The act must
2 The Government's claim was not originally limited to that part of the right of way on public
domain. An owner of land adjoining the railroad attempted to intervene in the suit, claiming an
interest in the minerals underlying the right of way on the quarter section patented to his prede-
cessor. The district court refused to permit intervention, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding
his interest was adequately represented by the Government, and whatever issue remained between
the intervener and the Government should be left for future adjudication. MacDonald v. United
States, 119 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1941). In the Supreme Court, however, the Court determined the United
States was not entitled to judgment on the state of the record, which contained no proof that title
to the land was in the United States, but allowed this defect to be cured by stipulation, limiting the
judgment to a tract of land owned by the United States. 315 U.S. at 280.
77 Sup. Ct. at 695.
SO State of Wyoming, 58 I.D. 128 (1942).
u See, e.g., Holloway's Heirs v. Whatley, 133 Tex. 608, 131 S.W.2d 89 (1939); Annot., 123 A.L.R.
848 (1940); 2 American Law of Property, § 10.6 (1952).
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be applied in such a way as to carry out its purposes while still
recognizing the legitimate interest of the public.
32
Where there are exceptions intended for the benefit of the
public the courts have been liberal in interpreting the act in a
manner most favorable to the government. Even where the statute
is silent, as in some of the school land cases, the courts have looked
beyond the statute to precedent and policy and have determined
that mineral land was excepted from a grant which did not in
express terms contain any exceptions; mineral lands were not
included in a grant unless the act expressly so provided23 Having
found a Congressional policy of withholding mineral lands, the
courts held it would be illogical to assume Congress would dispose
of such lands except by statute specifically relating to them. The
same reasoning may be applied to the reserved minerals in a rail-
road right of way.
The solution may depend in the first instance on the rule of the
Townsend case that once the right of way grant took effect that strip
of land was no longer public land and was not subject to further
disposition by the Government. It is true the rule may have been
founded on a belief that the Government had nothing further to
give, while it is now held the Government did have a reserved
mineral interest in the right of way. But the Townsend case dealt
with a claimant under the Homestead Act-a general act concerning
non-mineral public lands. It may be contended whatever interest
the government had in the right of way could not be acquired by
the homesteader. The extent of his interest depends on the statute
under which it was acquired, and that statute did not authorize a
grant to him of the severed mineral estate in the right of way.
It has been stated repeatedly in the public land cases that
'nothing passes but what is conveyed in clear and explicit
language.3 4 It is reasonable to conclude that, having once reserved
the mineral estate, the government would not subsequently author-
ize disposition of it except by statute dealing with the reserved
minerals in explicit terms.
If this contention is upheld, the situation is one in which the
1930 leasing act is peculiarly applicable. That act provides the Sec-
retary of the Interior may lease deposits of oil and gas in rights of
way acquired under any law of the United States, "whether the
same be a base fee or mere easement." 5 The legislative history of
the act would indicate it was designed to resolve the situation in
which, because of the nature of the right of way grant, no one could
develop the underlying minerals, with the result the oil might be
drained from beneath the right of way by wells on adjoining land.
If the adjoining land were privately owned there would be a conse-
quent loss of revenue to the government."
This situation could only occur if the Government retained the
mineral interest in the right of way while conveying surface rights
Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Kansas Pvc. Ry. Co., 97 U.S. 491 (1878).
United States v. Sweet, 245 U.S. 563 (1918); Ivanhoe Mining Co. v. Keystone Consol. Mining
Co., 102 U.S. 167 (1880).
" E.g., Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 272 (1942), and cases there cited.
146 Stat. 373, 30 U.S.C. 301 (1952).
' The history of this act is discussed in United States v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 32 F. Supp.
651 (D. Mont. 1940); and in Phillips Petroleum Co., 61 I.D. 93 (1953).
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to the right of way strip and fee simple title to the adjoining lands.
This will be the situation resulting from the Union Pacific decision,
if in fact it is determined the Government did retain the minerals
in the right of way even after the land was patented.
The 1930 act has been described by a court of appeals as "little
more than a self-serving declaration,' 3 7 as it was enacted at a time
when ownership of minerals underlying rights of way had become
a subject of controversy. In eliminating at least a part of the contro-
versy the Union Pacific decision may give the act its justification.
Because of recent interpretations of the act, however, it adds
another facet to the consequences of the Union Pacific decision.
Does the 1930 act also apply to the right of way where the adjoining
land is still public domain? Or does a lease under the 1920 Mineral
Leasing Act, on land crossed by the right of way, include the min-
erals underlying the right of way?
Where the Government receives an equal royalty in either
event, it would seem of little consequence to the United States
whether the oil was drained by the 1920 act lessee or by the lessee
of the right of way. The original departmental regulations provided
that no lease would be authorized under the 1930 act unless it was
necessary to offset or prevent drainage and loss to the Govern-
ment 3 This provision, however, was deleted from the 1946 revision
of the regulations, 9 and in a case involving the rights of Phillips
Petroleum Company in a railroad right of way the Department
ruled that minerals underlying the right of way on federal lands
are not included in a 1920 act lease, but may be developed only
under the provisions of the 1930 act; and the right of way may be
leased regardless of the status of ownership of the oil and gas in the
adjoining land.4 0 The right of way involved in the Phillips case was
an easement only, and the same ruling would apply a fortiori where
the right of way is a determinable fee.
The 1930 act gives the railroad the exclusive right to make
application for a lease of the right of way, and the lease is given to
the railroad unless a higher bid of compensatory royalty is made by
the adjoining owner or lessee. Thus, while the railroad is determined
not to be the owner of the oil and gas, it does have the exclusive
right to acquire the oil and gas rights as lessee.
The result of the Union Pacific decision, then, is to leave the
railroad without title to the oil and gas in any part of the right of
way; to leave undetermined the title to the minerals underlying
the right of way where it crosses land now held by private owners;
to determine the mineral ownership is in the United States where
the right of way is on public land; and to give the railroad a leasing
privilege, at least where the right of way crosses federal land, and
if the United States owns the minerals in other sections also, then
for its entire length.
a, MacDonald v. United States, 119 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1941).
88 53 I.D. 137 (1930).
89 43 C.F.R. 200.80 to 200.87 (1954).
'o Phillips Petroleum Co., 61 I.D. 93 (1953), aff'd, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. McKay (Dist. Ct. for
D.C., No. 5024-53, June 17, 1955).
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Despite certain prior conclusions apparently to the contrary and
the obvious language of the Natural Gas Act' the Supreme Court
held in the Phillips case2 that an independent natural gas producer
which sold gas to interstate pipe line companies for interstate trans-
portation and resale, was a "natural gas company" within the
meaning of the act.
The Commission, acting in recognition of the powers held ex-
tended to it, issued its Order 174 series, promulgating regulations
applicable to its new subjects, those persons deemed to be independ-
ent producers of natural gas. These orders were designed to imple-
ment, among other parts, section 4 of the act which requires every
natural gas company to file with the Commission schedules of its
rates and charges in such form as the Commission may designate
in regulations.
It is with this class of persons, those subject to the Natural Gas
Act, and the application to them of section 4 as implemented by
Order series 174, that this Note is primarily concerned.
Particular attention is directed to section 717c (c) of the code
the pertinent provisions of which are set forth below. 4 Note that
the code specifically provides that the natural gas company is re-
quired to file, in the first instance, schedules showing all rates and
charges for any transportation or sale subject to jurisdiction of the
Commission. 5 This so-called rate schedule is defined in section
154.93 of the regulations' as meaning the basic contract and all
152 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1952).
2 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
3 18 C.F.R. § 154.92 (Supp. 1957).
2 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717c (c) (1952) "Under such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe, every natural gas company shall file with the Commission . . . schedules
showing all rates and charges for any transportation or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission . . . together with all contracts which in any manner affect or relate to such rates . . .
"(d) . . . no change shall be made by any natural gas company in any such rate . . . except
after thirty days' notice to the Commission and to the public . .
Id. § 717c (c).*18 C.F.R. § 154.93 (Supp. 1957).
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supplements or agreements amendatory thereof, effective and ap-
plicable on and after June 7, 1954, the date the Phillips case was
decided. Such schedule must show the service to be provided and the
rates and charges, terms, conditions, classifications, practices, rules
and regulations affecting or relating to such rates or charges, ap-
plicable to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce
or the sale of natural gas in interstate commerce for resale subject
to the jurisdiction of the Commission.
Thus, a natural gas producer who sells gas which moves in
interstate commerce must file, as a component part of his rate
schedule, the gas sale contract he has made with the gas purchaser.
Sales of natural gas by producers are made under long terms con-
tracts. The purchaser of gas, having constructed or planned to con-
struct facilities for gathering and transporting gas at great cost to
himself, is primarily interested in securing for his present apd
future commitments vast reserves of gas sufficient to justify his
cash outlay and his obligations to deliver in years to come. More-
over, if he is transporting in interstate commerce, the Commision
will require him to show he has sufficient reserves committed to
provide the service contemplated for the ensuing twenty years.
Such long term contracts usually provide, inter alia, for certain
specified lands from which gas is produced and which are potential-
ly capable of producing gas to be dedicated to the terms and pro-
visions of the contract, for the price to be received for the sale of
gas to be escalated at certain specified periods of time to increase
rates, and for some type of favored nation clause. These provisions
conform to the practices and usage in the industry for reasons
peculiar to it. The Commission must thus consider the gas sales
contract in its determination of what shall be a just and reason-
able rate for the producer to obtain for his gas.
Other than the contract, what criteria must the Commission
use to determine whether or not the rate charged is just and reason-
able? It must be remembered that the statute itself provides no
standard. Nor has the Commission any means based upon experience
by which to establish a just and reasonable rate. Although the
Natural Gas Act was approved and became law in 1938, its applica-
bility prior to the Phillips decision had been limited to persons
other than producers and gatherers, as the act provided. Bearing in
mind that the producer of natural gas furnishes a commodity, a
non-replaceable natural resource, it is easily apparent that any
We Will Render Any Possible Assistance in Connection With Your Law Book Needs
American Jurisprudence *American Law Reports
Am Jur Legal Forms, Anno. *A.LR. 2d Series
Am Jur Plead. & Proc. Forms Federal Code Anno.
*U. S. Reports, Low Ed. Texts on all Subjects
*Available in MICROLEX Editions
BENDER-MOSS COMPANY
Lawyers Co-Op Publishing Company
91 McAllister Street San Francsco 2, California
DICTA
July-August, 1957
just and reasonable rate must be established so as to encourage
further exploration and development of natural gas resources. Such
rate cannot be limited in its contemplation to the protection of the
ultimate consumer. Although certain pro-regulation interests have
characterized the ultimate consumer as a captive of the gas pro-
ducers, pipeline companies and retailers, actually the converse
appears to be true-the producer is now the captive.
If the producer's rate is to be limited to the more or less
standardized lines of regulation of public utilities based on the
theory of determining the value of a service by determining the
investment in facilities to provide the service, plus operating ex-
penses, he is without means of showing that his discovery has a
tangible value or that its replacement is a matter of known or
estimated value. The interstate pipe line companies who, prior to
the Phillips decision were the principal subjects of rate regulation
by the Commission, supplied the greater part of their needs from
their own reserves, but were not permitted to claim depletion even
as a cost item in determining the cost of service. 7 Nor have the
courts indicated with any degree of certainty that the Commission
may consider depletion in determining rates for independent pro-
ducers. The latter are justifiably confused as to just what evidence
they may present in support of a claimed just and reasonable rate.
The Federal Power Commission is not bound "to the service of any
single formula or combination of formulas" in fixing rates. The
Commission may, for rate-making purposes, select any permissible
formula or combination of formulas which it considers appropriate
under the circumstances.9 Nowhere has the writer found any degree
of certainty in the decisions reflecting upon the use of depletion as a
positive criterion for the determination of a fair rate.
The Supreme Court stated in the Hope case:
The rate-making process under the Act, i.e., the fixing
of 'just and reasonable' rates, involves a balancing of the
investor and the consumer interests .... From the investor
or company point of view it is important that there be
enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also
for the capital costs of the business .... By that standard
the return to the equity owner should be commensurate
with returns on investments in other enterprises having
corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be suffi-
cient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the
enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract cap-
ital.1o
By what other standard may the prudent investor in the industry
be confidently assured of the financial integrity of the enterprise
than a thorough review of the company's proven reserves and its
aggressive determination to develop new reserves to replace those
depleted? Certainly one of the considerations under which the in-
dependent producers proceed with exploration activity is the tax
relief granted them through the depletion allowance.
58 Pub. Util. Fort. 366-67 (1956).
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC. 143 F.2d 488, 493 (8th Cir. 1944), off'd, 324 U.S.
635 (1945).
' FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942).
' FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
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The fair value criterion, on the other hand, has apparently re-
ceived preferential treatment in the decisions. In the Hope case the
Court's reasoning appears to have been that fair value of a discovery
is not includable in the rate base, but that only actual legitimate
costs are includable. The court, quoting from Block v. Hirsh" stated,
"The fixing of prices, like other applications of the police power,
may reduce the value of the property which is being regulated. But
the fact that the value is reduced does not mean that the regulation
is invalid. 1 - And continuing, the Court said:
"It does, however, indicate that 'fair value' is the end
product of the process of rate-making not- the starting point
as the Circuit Court of Appeals held. The heart of the
matter is that rates cannot be made. to depend upon 'fair
value' when the value of the going enterprise depends on
earnings under whatever rates may be anticipated.'
13
It is submitted that the Court failed to consider fully the peculiar
attributes of "value" of developed property. That a discovery has
a fair value without regard to the aspect of rate control must be
urged, if for no other reasons than these: Suppose the operator does
not know at the moment his discovery is evaluated by engineers
whether or not he will commit his gas to movement in interstate
commerce? It nevertheless has a fair market value in the ground.
Or, suppose he may wish to commit his gas wholesale to an indus-
trial user? In neither case does the Commission have jurisdiction
over the gas, its movement or its sale price, yet it does have a fair
market value in place. Or, suppose he negotiates to sell the dis-
covery in place together with his rights to produce and market it.
If his successor in interest sells the gas in interstate commerce, can-
not the successor claim his cost as part of his rate base?
In another case, Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC14 the
Eighth Circuit asserted that although the Commission was not
bound to give weight to evidence of replacement or reproduction
cost of the properties, no court had at that time ruled that the
Commission may, at a rate hearing, refuse to receive the evidence. 15
So it would appear that the way was yet open through a proper
256 U.S. 135 (1921).
'2320 U.S. at 601.
iS Ibid.
" 143 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1944), aff'd, 324 U.S. 635 (1945).
' Id. at 493.
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showing of necessity to include fair value but for the language in
the Colorado Interstate case18 where the Court asserted that it could
not say as a matter of law that the Commission erred in including
the production properties in the rate base at actual legitimate cost.
The Tenth Circuit in Cities Service Gas Co. v. FPC,1 7 apparently
rendered the issue moot in holding that fair value was no longer
deemed essential to find an economic rate base for rate making
purposes.
It is significant, however, that in none of the cases did the pro-
ponent of a rate increase show as a matter of necessity the in-
adequacy of an existing rate or that an increased rate would be just
and reasonable for preservation or the financial integrity of the
company. It would seem that a proper showing of costs for explora-
tion and development to replace the value of the gas being depleted
would be convincing evidence looking toward the preservation of
financial integrity.
As mentioned above, an essential and required part of a pro-
ducer's rate schedule is the gas sale contract under which he dis-
poses of his gas, such contract usually containing a price escalator
clause and probably some form of favored nations clause. Notwith-
standing that such a contract may have been found by the Com-
mission to have been entered into by arms length bargaining in
good faith, the producer is precluded from unilaterally bringing the
contract price increases into effect by the provisions of section 717c
(d) and (e) of the code."8 Section 717c (d) provides that no change
may be made by any natural gas company except after thirty
days' notice to the Commission and to the public. Section 717c (e)
provides that upon such notice the Commission shall have authority
to enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of the proposed
rate change, either on its own motion or upon complaint of any state,
muncipality or state commission.
Thus, the producer is faced with a problem at the time or times
specified in the contract when automatic price changes are to take
effect. Assuming he has filed his rate schedule, whether it has or
has not resulted in a certificate of public convenience and necessity,
if he has such a contract as described above conditioned upon
certain automatic price changes, he will be required by the code
provisions just noted to file with the Commission, at least thirty
days prior to the effective date of such increase, a new rate schedule
or a supplemental rate schedule proposing an increase in rates.
Since the Commission is bound to determine that any rate is just
and reasonable it may, on its own motion, without intervention by
any complainant, hold a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such
proposed rate change. The question arises, what is the effect of the
established contractual relationship between the producer and the
buyer upon the Commission's determination of a just and reason-
able rate?
Probably the strongest argument the producer feels he can
advance to justify the proposed rate increase would be that it
10 Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1945).
17 155 F.2d 694, 701 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 773 (1946).
's 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1952).
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resulted from arms length contract negotiation, and that the result-
ant price increase is no greater than the competitive field price
or the reasonable market price prevailing in the pricing area.
This argument was advanced in the first series of cases before the
Commission relative to this issue.19 The Commission found the
contracts before it to have been negotiated after arms length bar-
gaining and entered into in good faith, but stated that such finding
did not make the contracts immune from regulation in the public
interest. It further stated that neither did the producer's contract
terms per se indicate that the prices agreed upon were just and
reasonable either initially or as subsequently increased pursuant to
escalation clauses or otherwise. The Commission did not mention
the latter part of the proponent's argument respecting field prices.
The field price element was considered in an earlier case, City
of Detroit v. FPC2°, where the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia set aside an FPC rate order in which the Commission had
used a field price formula, in lieu of the traditional rate base
method, for valuing company produced gas sold by a pipe line com-
pany. The court did not reject the field price formula as a means of
determining the rate, but stated in effect that the rates resulting
from the use of such a formula must be compared with those result-
ing from the rate base approach in determining whether or not the
former rate is within the primary aim of the Natural Gas Act,
that is, to guard the consumer against excessive rates, and if the
former results in a higher rate then the Commission must justify
such rate. Moreover, the court noted that the Commission had
favored the use of the field price over the rate base in its consider-
ation of a method which would best serve the ultimate public inter-
est in that:
"the base rate sysem (1) tends unduly to accelerate con-
sumption of gas, (2) does not sufficiently encourage its dis-
covery and development, thus failing to promote the
national interest in both the production and use of natural
gas, and finally, (3) that the interest of the public definitely
lies in the direction of natural gas production by pipe line
systems themselves as distinguished from their complete
19 Union Oil Co., 5 Oil & Gas Rep. 166 (F.P.C. Nos. G-4331, G-4332, G-4505 1955).
W 230 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956).
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dependence for gas upon purchases from other pro-
ducers.
21
While the first mentioned consideration was quickly eliminated by
finding that the Commission could not base its order on consider-
ations of conservation, some validity was lent to the second and
third considerations, although the court found that the Commission,
when using the field price method, should show that the increase
in rates thus resulting could not be more than would reasonably
be necessary for the purposes advanced for any increase.
22
Amid the confusion, the Commission gave notice of proposed
rule making, inviting suggestions as to the principles and methods
to be applied by it in its regulations of rates to be charged by inde-
pendent producers for the transportation and sale of natural gas
subject to its jurisdicition. The Commission later concluded that on
the basis of the information gained it should not lay down any rule
as to what would be necessary or appropriate for consideration in
determining a just and reasonable rate. Thus the independent pro-
ducer found himself out in left field, a situation undoubtedly recog-
nized in the dissenting opinion of Comissioner Digby rendered fol-
lowing the order of the Commission issued in Cities Service Gas
Co.2 3 Commissioner Digby asserted:
"Our present rules do not require very much information
to be supplied by the independent producer who desires a
certificate. Presumably, the rules relating to independent
producers were drawn with a view to obtaining from the
producer all of the infromation which we would need to
have in our determination of whether or not the certificate
would be in the public interest. We do not require any fin-
ancial data to be supplied by the producer, we do not seek
any economic data from him, nor do we even ask that he
submit data so that his contract price may be compared to
others in the same area. In short, in the producer applica-
tions we do not require and thus we do not have the in-
21 Id. at 812-13.
As an aide, and of interest to independent producers, the court further found that the Com-
mission should have given attention to the processing of natural gas on interstate lines applying
profits realized therefrom as credits to operating costs. The Commission had done this in the post,
but elected not to so do in this case on the ground that the rates prescribed should not be subject
to fluctuating prices of gasoline.
F.P.C. Docket Nos. G-2569, G-2570, Op. No. 288 (1955).
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formation upon which to ground a finding as to what would
be a reasonable and just initial rate as we have in the pipe-
line applications."
Three representative cases before the Commission illustrate
the possibilities available to the producer, yet amply demonstrate
that no definite standards have as yet been established in the
administration of the Natural Gas Act as it is applied to the pro-
ducer.
In one case14 the petitioner filed a notice proposing to increase
his rate from 5.2¢ to 10¢ per MCF in accordance with an escalator
clause in the contract. At the hearing, the Presiding Examiner
approved the increase. The petitioner bought casinghead gas at the
well head, gathered and transmitted it to its processing plant, and
sold the residue gas in interstate commerce for resale to an inter-
state transmission company. Evidence was introduced showing
arms length bargaining leading to the contract, cost of service, and
the prices at which other producers were selling residue gas to pipe
line companies in the same state. Upon the record the Commission
found the proposed increase to be just and reasonable, but in so
finding stated that it did not pass on the question of whether evi-
dence of the character then before it would in any other case sub-
stantiate a rate as just and reasonable.
In another case2 5 the applicant had filed notice for a rate in-
crease in conformity with its gas sale contract basing the proposed
increase upon a favored nation clause in the contract. The proposed
rate increase was to 10 per MCF from 5.2¢ per MCF. Here, the
Presiding Examiner refused to allow the increase on grounds that
the rate was reflective of only two gas wells owned by applicant
from which gas was sold under the subject contract, and not of the
petitioner's entire gas business which the Examiner held to be the
correct representative unit. The petitioner appealed, and the Com-
mission then allowed the rate increase after concluding that the
unit applied by the applicant was appropriate in the circumstances.
The Commission found that the petitioner used a cash payout basis
for substantiating its claim of a just and reasonable rate, the method
being to compute the difference between total revenues over the life
Wunderlich Development Co., 5 Oil & Gas Rep. 1090 (F.P.C. No. G-3940 1956).
2s Davidor & Davidor, 5 Oil & Gas Rep. 1081 (F.P.C. No. G-8550 1956).
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of the wells and the direct costs necessary to obtain revenue, in-
cluding costs of producing less revenues obtained from sale of dis-
tillate produced with the gas. Evidence of current prices for com-
parable sales of natural gas in the same area and of arms length
bargaining toward the contract were found to be pertinent and
relevant. The Commission computed the applicant's cost of service
using a rate of return of 9%, finding a rate approximate to the 10¢
rate proposed to be just and reasonable in comparison with other
rates in the area.
In a third case, 6 growing out of an escalator clause in a pro-
ducer's contract, the petitioner filed notice of a proposed increase of
from 6¢ to 10¢ per MCF. At the hearing the Presiding Examiner
allowed a portion of the cost of drilling three dry holes to the
exploration and development expense amortized over a period of six
years, the estimated life of the producing well. The Commission
distinguished this treatment from that followed in the pipe line
company case where the non-productive well costs were not con-
sidered. A rate of return of 10% was allowed on an original cost
rate base. The Commission, in reviewing and passing the exam-
iner's findings, confessed it could not say what effect City of De-
troit would have over this case, but that the instant circumstances
seemed to satisfy the requirements there stated, i. e., that the rate
base method must be used as a comparison with rates founded upon
any other theory. The proponent here introduced in evidence
(1) a showing that the contract was completed after arms length
bargaining; (2) FPC gas rate schedules indicating the current recog-
nized rate for gas upon terms and conditions similar to this was 10€
per MCF in that general area of that state; (3) well costs and payout
periods upon a reasonable assumption of available reserves, pres-
sure, rate of depletion, and operating costs after taxes and royal-
ties; (4) the operator's rule-of-thumb ratio for determining in his
usual business operations the rate of payout over cost of a pro-
duction venture and that of a venture involving drilling risks;
(5) actual costs including (a) drilling, completing, connecting and
operating the well from which gas was being sold, (b) exploration
and development expenses including cost of lease, rentals and costs
m Christie, Mitchell & Mitchell, 6 Oil & Gas Rep. 385 (F.P.C. No. G-3669 1956).
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of drilling three dry holes, (c) production and excise taxes, (d) royal-
ties and (e) cost depletion. The Commission was careful to point out
that the elements in this case were far from standard, and due to
the differing pecularities in the thousands of varying types of enter-
rises entered into by the independent producer, the approach used
ere afforded no opportunity to assume this data would be effective
in any other case.
CONCLUSION
In attempting to justify an initial rate or a proposed change in
rate for the sale of gas in interstate commerce for resale, the inde-
pendent producer must come face to face with reality and muster
the most appropriate essentials looking toward the necessity of the
proposed rate, not only with respect to his own financial integrity
but also with respect to the interests of the public. While fair value
of the gas in place is out, the producer may show economic and
financial data or a comparative schedule of the average field prices
in the pricing area, or some other appropriate not-yet-discovered
basis for claiming an increase. Aside from considerations of FPC
as to the prices he receives; yet as we have seen, the usual price
escalator clause and favored nation clause may not be given full
effect without justification before the Commission.
Perhaps one of the reasons for the difficulties experienced in
the regulation of the independent producer is that his is a highly
competitive industry, not a public utility free of emulation in its
field. Whatever may be the opinion of either of two sharply divided
camps, whether the Congress intended by passing the Natural Gas
Act that is should embrace the independent producer, or whether
the Court in the Phillips decision furnished that intent, it is almost
certain that Congress must sharpen its pencils, or better yet its
thinking, and provide some reasonable standards upon which the
Commission may regulate. Better yet, Congress might exempt the
independent producer altogether in order that he may concentrate
more upon exploration and development and less on expostulation
and retrospection.
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